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Abstract
Three principal forms of structural realism are distinguished in this thesis: 
weak epistemic structural realism (WESR), strong epistemic structural 
realism (SESR) and ontic structural realism (OSR). In chapter 1, it is argued 
that the positive argument in favour of WESR, i.e. the claim that it can 
accommodate the no miracles argument and the pessimistic induction is 
unconvincing, because (i) the no miracles argument is flawed, so it is no 
particular virtue of WESR that it can accommodate it and (ii) it is not clear 
that WESR really can accommodate the pessimistic induction. In chapter 2, 
it is argued that there are unresolved difficulties in drawing the 
observable/unobservable distinction (or an appropriate alternative 
distinction) in a way that is suitable for the WESRist’s purposes. In chapter 
3, it is argued that the main argument for SESR is unconvincing, because it 
is based on Russell’s principle o f acquaintance (or a modem variant of this 
principle), a principle for which no substantial argument has been given and 
which has absurd consequences (as shown in appendix 2). In chapter 4, it is 
argued that neither the WESRist nor the SESRist has provided a convincing 
response to Newman’s objection. In chapter 5, it is argued that, depending 
on how one interprets the doctrine, OSR is either (i) wholly untenable or (ii) 
conventional scientific realism (or antirealism) combined with the 
traditional metaphysical view that objects are bundles of properties and that 
in the latter case the doctrine has some plausibility, but the arguments that 
have been adduced in favour of it are inconclusive. The thesis is concluded 
with a sketch of the sort of position in the scientific realism debate that I 
find more attractive.
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Introduction
Introduction
The first fully elaborated statement of structural realism can be found in the 
work of Russell (1912, 1927) (although Worrall [1989, 1994] argues that the 
doctrine can also be found in the writings of Duhem [1906] and Poincare 
[1903]). Russell himself abandoned the position in the face of Newman’s 
objection (Newman, 1928). The doctrine was revived four decades later by 
Maxwell (1968, 1970a, 1970b), who both coined the term, “structural 
realism” and introduced the Ramsey-sentence approach to the doctrine, 
which is adopted by most contemporary structural realists.1 There was, 
however, another lull in the interest in structural realism throughout most of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Contemporary interest in the doctrine can be traced 
back to Worrall (1989, 1994) who argued that it allows one to reconcile the 
two most powerful arguments in the scientific realism debate: the 
“pessimistic induction” (also known as the pessimistic metainduction) (in 
favour o f scientific antirealism) and the “no miracles argument” (in favour 
of scientific realism). Over the last ten years or so numerous positions 
calling themselves “structural realism” have emerged, most notably the 
“ontic structural realism” first proposed by Ladyman (1998).
The first aim of this thesis is to distinguish the different types of 
structural realism that have been proposed and provide a clear statement of 
each. This work is carried out, in outline, in this introduction. The question 
addressed in the main body of the thesis is whether or not any of these forms 
of structural realism is tenable.
1 As we shall see, Russell’s approach to structural realism is similar to, but distinct from, 
the Ramsey-sentence approach.
2 Chakravartty (1998, 2004) has put forward a position he calls “semirealism”, which he 
maintains is a form o f structural realism. His position is discussed in appendix 1 (which is 
best read after chapter 1), where it is argued that although semirealism has some of the 
characteristics o f structural realism it is significantly different from the versions of 
structural realism that are discussed in the main body o f this thesis. Other doctrines that are 
still more distantly related to structural realism, e.g. “structural empiricism” (see, for 
example, Bueno, 1999 and van Fraassen, 2006) are not discussed at all in this thesis, as 
their relation to the doctrines that are discussed herein is considered too distant.
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1. ESR and OSR
Structural realism comes in two main forms: epistemic structural realism 
(ESR) (discussed in chapters 1 to 4 of this thesis) and ontic structural 
realism (OSR) (discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis).
The ESRist upholds two main theses. On the one hand there is the 
“realist” thesis:
Mature scientific theories provide us with a substantial amount of 
knowledge about both the observable and the unobservable world.
On the other hand there is the “structuralist” thesis, which, as a very rough 
first approximation, we may state as follows:
All we know o f the unobservable world is its structure.
The OSRist upholds the same realist thesis, but a different structuralist 
thesis, which (again as a very rough first approximation) we may state as 
follows:
The world is a structure.
The ESRist’s position will be further explained in section 2 of this 
introduction. Exactly what the OSRist’s position really amounts to is not 
further discussed until chapter 4.4
3 The qualification “mature” is important: the ESRist, like the conventional realist, does not 
commit himself to realism with respect to all scientific theories. Moreover, the 
“knowledge” that science is supposed to provide is taken to include claims that are not 
strictly true, but only approximately true. Spelling out what maturity and approximate truth 
are may not be easy (although Worrall [1989] has argued that it is straightforward to 
explicate maturity: he suggests that a theory is mature if  and only if  it correctly predicts an 
empirically confirmed result that it was not engineered to yield) but these issues will be 
held in abeyance throughout this thesis.
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2. Ramsey-Sentences and ESR
From a formal point of view, languages are built out of two types o f term:5 
logical terms and non-logical terms. In a language of second-order logic 
these two groups consist of the following:
[1] Logical terms:
(1) logical connectives Qt~?\  etc.)
(ii) quantifiers (“V”, “3”)
(iii) individual and predicate variables (xi, X2,... and Xi, X2 ...) 
and possibly:
(iv) the identity predicate (“=”)
[2] Non-logical terms:
(i) a number o f names (ai, a2 . ..) denoting objects and
(ii) a number of predicates (Pi, P2 . ..) denoting properties and relations.
The claim that “all we know of the external world is its structure” might 
suggest that the ESRist thinks that our knowledge of the external world is 
purely structural (that it consists of only logical terms). Despite the way they 
sometimes talk, this is not a view that any serious ESRist has ever adopted 
(at least, not for very long: as we shall see, Maxwell held this position in 
1965 but had abandoned it by 1968) but it is a view sometimes imputed to 
ESRists by their critics.
4 Both the ESRist and the OSRist presuppose a number o f other philosophically 
controversial theses, e.g. the thesis that the external world is not created by our minds and 
the thesis that theoretical terms are (at least putatively) referring expressions. However, 
arguments for and against the realist and structuralist theses have formed the basis for most 
of the discussion o f structural realism in the literature, and will also form the basis for most 
of the discussion in this thesis.
5 Sometimes the word “term” is used by logicians as a synonym for “name”. Throughout 
this thesis it is used in a broader sense, as explicated here.
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The Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR was first proposed by 
Maxwell (1968) and is adopted by most (but not all) modem ESRists. Let an 
observational term be a non-logical term that refers to an observable object, 
property or relation and a theoretical term be a non-logical term that refers 
to an unobservable object, property or relation. The Ramsey-sentence of a 
theory is obtained from a sentence expressing the theory by first replacing 
the theoretical terms (names and predicates) in the sentence with new 
variables (using the same variable for each occurrence of the same term, and 
different variables for different terms). The resulting formula is then turned 
into a sentence (the theory’s Ramsey-sentence) by binding the variables 
with the appropriate existential quantifiers (placed at the start o f the 
formula, so that every occurrence of the same new variable is in the scope of 
the same quantifier). Note that, in general (as long as the original sentence 
contains at least one theoretical predicate) constructing the Ramsey-sentence 
o f a theory will require a language of second-order logic.6
Maxwell provides an example (Maxwell, 1970a, p. 186). Consider 
the “theory” expressed by the sentence:
Vx([Ax & Dx] —> 3yCy)
where “A” and “D” are “theoretical” predicates such that “Ax” means “x is 
a radium atom” and “Dx” means “x radioactively decays” and “C” is an 
“observational” predicate such that “Cx” means “x is a click in a suitably 
located Geiger counter”. Its Ramsey-sentence is:
3X3YVx([Xx & Yx] -»  3yCy)
6 Zahar (2001, p. 236) points out that we can construct an equivalent sentence using a first- 
order language that contains the predicates “being a set” and “e ”. However, we would of 
course have to leave these unRamseyfied, and it is hard to see what justification there could 
be for that, unless one was prepared to take them as logical predicates, like “=”.
7 Of course this doesn’t express any real “theory” and is moreover false: if a radium atom 
decays on Mars there will not be a click in a suitably located Geiger counter, because there 
will not be a suitably located Geiger counter, but it will suffice to give the general idea.
11
Introduction
The ESRist (if he takes the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR), 
elaborates his structuralist thesis as follows:
A theory’s Ramsey-sentence is as much as a theory reliably tells us about 
the world.
Depending on the basis on which they make this assertion, ESRists may 
argue that either, (i) the Ramsey-sentence of a theory is the true logical form 
of the theory, so believing in the theory’s Ramsey-sentence is believing the 
theory, or, (ii) the Ramsey-sentence o f a theory is not the true logical form 
of the theory, so believing in the theory’s Ramsey-sentence is not the same 
as believing the theory. These different approaches are considered in more 
detail in due course.
Notice that, when it is elaborated this way, the ESRist’s 
structuralist thesis has the following corollary:
The knowledge provided by our mature scientific theories consists (in its 
ultimate form) of statements constructed using only logical and 
observational terms.
This corollary is a claim the instrumentalist would also endorse. ESR 
remains distinct from instrumentalism because the instrumentalist claims 
that our theories provide knowledge only about the observable world, 
whereas the ESRist maintains that the Ramsey-sentences of our theories 
provide knowledge about both the observable world and about the structure 
of the unobservable world.
At first sight, it may seem that as Ramsey-sentences are 
constructions formed using only logical and observational terms, they could 
not tell us anything about the unobservable world. This is certainly not true. 
As van Fraassen (1980, p. 54) notes the claim that “there are entities that are 
not Oi and not O2 and...” where each Oj is an observational predicate and 
the sentence ascribes to the entities it refers to the negation of every Oj in 
the language, successfully makes the claim that there are unobservables 
(which is a claim about the unobservable world), using only logical and
12
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observational vocabulary. However, depending on how the observational 
term/theoretical term distinction is drawn it may be true that Ramsey- 
sentences can’t tell us anything substantial about the unobservable world 
(this issue will be discussed in chapter 4).
Given that ESR has been explicated in terms of Ramsey-sentences, 
one may wonder if ESR is any more “structural” than conventional scientific 
realism: after all, the Ramseyfied version of a sentence is no more closely 
linked to the structures that satisfy it than is the original sentence. However, 
although there isn’t any particularly intimate relation between structural 
realism and structures (in the set-theoretic sense) the term “structural” is not 
totally inappropriate: the ESRist maintains that theoretical predicates (and 
the sets that provide the extensional interpretation of these predicates) 
should not be given an intensional interpretation, but should be treated 
purely extensionally, i.e. treated in a purely mathematical or “structural” 
way.
On a related issue, proponents of the “semantic” view of theories 
may object to the characterisation of ESR given here, which takes for 
granted that theories are linguistic objects (an assumption that they reject). 
However, the syntactic view/semantic view debate is orthogonal to the 
issues discussed in this thesis. One can be a structural realist and advocate 
either the syntactic or the semantic view of theories. Although structural 
realism has been explicated in terms of the syntactic view in this thesis the 
substantive points that will be made about it are independent o f this view. 
There is some further discussion of this issue in chapter 4.
3. WESR and SESR
ESR can be subdivided into two doctrines: weak ESR (WESR) and strong 
ESR (SESR) (as they will be called in this thesis). SESR presupposes a 
particular metaphysical and epistemological doctrine called “indirect 
realism”. This is the view that although the external world exists, we do not 
have direct access to it. It implies that there is a distinction between the 
“internal world” o f our own consciousnesses, to which we have direct
13
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access, and the external world, to which we do not (this internal/external 
distinction is sometimes called the phenomenal/noumenal distinction or the
O
mental/physical distinction).
It is important to separate the internal/external distinction from the 
observable/unobservable distinction. Within the indirect realist framework 
the observable/unobservable distinction may be roughly characterised as a 
distinction between those external objects, properties and relations (e.g. 
tables, redness9) that have a direct counterpart in internal experience and 
those external objects, properties and relations (e.g. quarks, strangeness) that 
do not. Because the phrase “direct counterpart” is so vague this 
characterisation does not succeed in unambiguously drawing the intended 
distinction, but hopefully the general idea is clear enough. Some attempts 
that have been made to draw this distinction more clearly are discussed in 
chapter 2.
The essential difference between WESR and SESR is that while 
the WESRist thinks that theoretical terms (i.e. terms referring to 
unobservable objects, properties and relations) need to be Ramseyfied 
(leaving Ramsey-sentences containing only logical and observational terms) 
the SESRist thinks that external terms (i.e. terms referring to external 
objects, properties and relations) need to be Ramseyfied (leaving Ramsey- 
sentences containing only logical and internal terms). The version of ESR 
outlined in the previous section is thus WESR. The SESRist’s structuralist 
thesis can still be stated as:
A theory’s Ramsey-sentence is as much as a theory reliably tells us about 
the world.
8 SESR will not be criticised for relying on indirect realism in this thesis. This is because 
indirect realism seems to me a plausible view. But it should be noted that for an advocate of  
direct realism (i.e. the view that we have direct access to the external world) SESR is a non­
starter.
9 In fact, the indirect realist might say that we need to distinguish two “redness” predicates: 
one that refers to the redness of internal objects (sense-data) and another that refers to the 
redness o f external (physical) objects. This issued will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 3.
14
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But because of his different approach to Ramseyfication, the SESRist’s 
structuralist thesis has a somewhat different corollary, viz:
The knowledge provided to us by our mature scientific theories consists (in 
its ultimate form) of statements constructed using only logical and internal 
terms.
As we shall see, the main argument for the SESRist’s structuralist thesis, 
which was first advanced by Russell (1912, 1927) is actually only an 
argument for this corollary (but the thesis does seem highly plausible, given 
the corollary). In fact, as Russell was writing before the Ramsey-sentence 
approach to ESR was developed we may take it that, for Russell at least, this 
“corollary” is the structuralist thesis.
In fact, although the example o f Ramseyfication that was given in 
the previous section is Maxwell’s own and it suggests WESR he himself 
was a SESRist. He makes this quite clear when he states that, “My own 
view...is that all items should be considered theoretical [meaning that terms 
referring to them should be Ramseyfied] unless they occur in direct 
experience; since I reject any form of direct realism, this means that the 
observable [meaning the things referred to by terms that do not need to be 
Ramseyfied] is instantiated only in inner events of observers” (Maxwell, 
1970a, p. 181).
On the face of it, however, Ramseyfying all terms except those that 
refer to items of internal experience will result in the Ramsey-sentences of 
most (if not all) theories being purely formal, and thus entirely devoid of 
empirical content, because, on the face of it, most (if not all) theories do not 
deal with items of internal experience at all. Take for example the toy theory 
given above. Clicks in suitably placed Geiger counters are not items of 
internal experience, so (taking the SESRist line) the predicates referring to 
them should also be Ramseyfied away, leading to the following Ramsey- 
sentence for the theory:
3X3Y3ZVx([Xx & Yx] -> 3yZy)
15
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which is purely formal, and therefore has no empirical content.
The proponent of SESR can avoid this unwelcome conclusion by 
arguing that although most theories, in themselves, are not directly about 
internal experience they are nonetheless connected to internal experience by 
auxiliary theories, which are always implicitly held. For example, we 
implicitly hold that we will have an experience of a sense-data Geiger 
counter click only if, (i) there is a (real) Geiger counter click, (ii) we are 
hallucinating Geiger counter clicks, (iii) we are dreaming about Geiger 
counter clicks, (iv) somebody is playing a practical joke,...Alongside the 
theory:
Vx([Ax & Dx] -> 3yCy) 
we would thus also hold:
3x(C’x & Eax) —> (3y[Cy] v H a...)
where a is a constant referring to oneself, “C’x” means “x is a sense-data 
Geiger counter click”, “Exy” means “x experiences y”, “Cx” means the 
same as before and “Hx” means “x is hallucinating Geiger counter clicks”. 
The combined theory we hold is thus expressed by the sentence:
Vx([Ax & Dx] -> 3yCy) & (3x[C’x & Eax] -> [3y(Cy) v H a...])
Taking the SESRist approach to Ramseyfication one obtains something like 
the following Ramsey-sentence of the combined theory:
3W 3X3Y3Z...Vx([Wx & Xx] -> 3yYy)&(3x[C’x & Eax] -> [3yYy v 
Za...])
which does contain some non-logical terms (“C”\  “E” and “a”) and thus 
does not fail to make an empirical claim for lack of them.
16
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Chapter 1 
Weak Epistemic Structural Realism
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the difference between 
WESR and SESR is that while the WESRist thinks that theoretical terms 
(i.e. terms referring to unobservable objects, properties and relations) need 
to be Ramseyfied (leaving Ramsey-sentences containing only logical and 
observational terms) the SESRist thinks that external terms (i.e. terms 
referring to external objects, properties and relations) need to be Ramseyfied 
(leaving Ramsey-sentences containing only logical and internal terms).
Given a reasonably charitable reading, Worrall (1989, 1994) 
appears to be espousing a form of WESR. However, comments like the 
following (where Worrall discusses the shift from Fresnel’s theory o f light 
to Maxwell’s):
There was an important element o f continuity in the shift 
from Fresnel to Maxwell -  and this was much more than a 
simple question of carrying over the successful empirical 
content...the continuity is one of form  or structure not of 
content. (Worrall, 1989, p. 157, original emphasis)
have led Psillos (1999, chapter 7) to attribute to him a view very different 
from WESR, the view that the only element of continuity across scientific 
revolutions (and thus the only aspect o f theories about which we should be 
realists) are uninterpreted equations, which are somehow supposed to carry 
with them empirical content. Such a view would be absurd because (as 
Psillos goes on to point out) carrying over empirical content requires, of 
course, much more than just carrying over uninterpreted equations (clearly, 
an uninterpreted equation has no empirical content: the different theories 
describing the behaviour of pendulums, of masses on springs and of 
voltages in circuits with a condenser and a solenoid all use the equation
9 9d x/dt = -[k/m]x, whilst clearly having very different empirical contents).
17
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The view ascribed to Worrall here is that the equations are 
preserved along with the interpretations of some of the terms in the 
equations. Specifically, the terms that are interpreted as denoting observable 
objects, properties and relations keep the same interpretations. This view is 
not only more reasonable but also appears to be better supported by 
Worrall’s case study.1 For example, consider one of the equations (relating 
the intensities of incident, reflected and refracted beams o f light when light 
passes from one medium to another) that is preserved in the 
Fresnel/Maxwell episode:
R/I = tan(i-r)/tan(i+r)
While the interpretations of I and R vary between Fresnel and Maxwell 
(being taken as amplitudes of vibration of a [postulated] mechanical ether 
and a [postulated] non-mechanical electromagnetic field respectively) the 
interpretations of i and r (as the angles made by the incident and refracted 
light beams with the normal to the boundary between the media) are the 
same in both theories. To retain empirical adequacy Maxwell had to retain 
not only the structure of Fresnel’s equations but also the interpretation of the 
observational terms.
It is also clearly not enough just to retain the equations that link I 
and R to i and r. Maxwell also needed to retain the equations that link I and
9 9R to observed light intensities, i.e. I = Ii and R = I r  (where Ii and I r  are the 
intensities of light, polarised in the plane of incidence, of the incident and 
reflected beams respectively) and the interpretations o f the “observational” 
terms (Ii and Ir ) in these equations. Maxwell was only free to reinterpret the 
theoretical terms (I and R). So the case suggests that there is continuity (not 
just of the equations but also) of the interpretations o f some of the terms in 
the equations (the observationally interpreted terms) across scientific 
revolutions.
1 In fact, Worrall has confirmed (in a personal communication) that this is the view he 
intended.
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Worrall’s argument for WESR is based on the claim that it can 
reconcile the two most powerful arguments in the scientific realism debate: 
the “no miracles argument” (in favour of scientific realism) and the 
“pessimistic induction” (also known as the pessimistic metainduction) (in 
favour of scientific antirealism). In section 1 of this chapter the no miracles 
argument is discussed: it is argued that whilst WESR could accommodate (a 
form of) this argument, the argument is flawed, so this is no particular virtue 
o f WESR. In section 2 the pessimistic induction is discussed: it is argued 
that while (a form of) this argument does have some force the W ESRisf s 
response to the argument is not particular convincing (no more convincing, 
in fact, than the conventional realist’s response). It is therefore concluded 
that Worrall’s argument for WESR is not compelling.
1. The No Miracles Argument
The no miracles argument has been called the “ultimate” argument for 
realism (Putnam, 1979, p. 73). The argument runs roughly as follows: some 
scientific theories enjoy enormous empirical success; if these theories are 
not even approximately true, this appears to be miraculous; on the other 
hand the approximate truth o f such theories would explain their success; as 
we don’t want to accept miracles, we should thus accept that such theories 
are approximately true (at least, in the absence of another explanation of 
their success).
The structural realist’s realist thesis was stated in the introduction 
to this thesis as follows:
2 Although Worrall never puts it this way, we can think of him as using the no miracles 
argument to support the structural realist’s realist thesis and the pessimistic induction to 
support the WESRist’s structuralist thesis.
3 Note that the argument relies on the notion of approximate truth. It would obviously be 
too strong if it were phrased in terms of absolute truth. After all, Newton’s theory of 
gravitation was astonishingly successful and so is general relativity, but since the theories 
are contradictory they can’t both be absolutely true (whereas it seems possible that they 
might both be approximately true).
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Mature scientific theories provide us with a substantial amount of 
knowledge about both the observable and the unobservable world.
If (following Worrall) we define mature scientific theories as those that are 
successful then this thesis is supported by the no miracles argument, 
assuming that the totality of the theories that (according to the no miracles 
argument) we can take to be approximately true can be said to provide us 
with a substantial amount of knowledge about both the observable and the 
unobservable world.
However, it may be wondered whether or not this rendering o f the 
no miracles argument is compatible with the ESRist’s structuralist thesis. 
The ESRist’s structuralist thesis is that a theory’s Ramsey-sentence is as 
much as a theory reliably tells us about the world, i.e. that a theory’s 
Ramsey-sentence is all that we can take to be approximately true, whereas 
the upshot of the no miracles argument is that the theory is itself 
approximately true. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the ESRist 
may think that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory is the true logical form of 
the theory, or that it is something quite distinct from the theory. In the 
former case he can accept the no miracles argument in this form (since the 
Ramsey-sentence of the theory is taken to be the true logical form of the 
theory to say that a theory’s Ramsey-sentence is approximately true is to say 
that the theory is approximately true). However, if the ESRist holds that the 
Ramsey-sentence of the theory is something quite distinct from the theory 
then the no miracles argument in this form is not compatible with his 
structuralist thesis.
In either case, however, the ESRist could endorse the following 
variant of the no miracles argument: some scientific theories (e.g. general 
relativity) appear to enjoy enormous empirical success; if  the Ramsey- 
sentences o f  these theories are not even approximately true this appears to 
be miraculous; on the other hand if the Ramsey-sentences o f  these theories 
were approximately true then this would explain their success; as we don’t 
want to accept miracles, we should thus accept that the Ramsey-sentences o f  
such theories are approximately true (at least, in the absence of another 
explanation of their success). This version o f the no miracles argument is
20
Chapter 1
definitely compatible with the ESRist’s structuralist thesis, whilst it still 
seems to support his realist thesis: the thesis that mature scientific theories 
provide us with a substantial amount o f knowledge about both the 
observable and the unobservable world. Although Worrall does not 
explicitly put forward this version of the no miracles argument, it seems to 
be the only version of the argument that unambiguously supports the 
WESRist position, and, since he does take the no miracles argument to 
support this position, it seems reasonable to attribute this version of the 
argument to him.4
1.1. First Interpretation of the No Miracles Argument
Magnus and Callender (2004), following Howson (2000), suggest the 
following reconstruction of the no miracles argument:
Premise 1: x is probably a successful theory.
Premise 2: If x is an approximately true theory then it would probably be a 
successful theory.
Premise 3: If x is not an approximately true theory then it would be a 
miracle if x is a successful theory.
Conclusion: If x is a successful theory then x is probably an approximately 
true theory.
Let Ax mean that x is an approximately true theory. Let Sx mean that x is a 
successful theory. Let P(X) be the probability of X and P(X|Y) be the 
probability of X conditional on Y. Then the argument runs as follows:
Premise 1: P(Sx) ~ 1
4 This version of the no miracles argument has been put forward explicitly by Cruse and 
Papineau: “The Ramsey sentence realist says that we should believe in the approximate 
truth o f a successful theory’s Ramsey sentence, on the grounds that it would be a miracle 
that the theory were successful, were its Ramsey sentence not true” (Cruse and Papineau, 
2002, p. 179).
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Premise 2: P(Sx|Ax) ~ 1 
Premise 3: P(Sx|~Ax) ~ 0
Conclusion: P(Ax|Sx) ~ 1
This argument is valid. First note that P(Ax) ~ 1:
P(Sx) = P(Sx|Ax).P(Ax) + P(SxhAx).P(-Ax)
So, P(Sx) = P(Sx|Ax).P(Ax) + P(SxhAx).(l-P[Ax])
So, P(Ax) = (P[Sx] - P[SxhAx]) / (P[Sx|Ax] -  P[Sx|"Ax])
So, P(Ax) ~ 1 (using premises 1-3)
Bayes’ theorem states that:
P(Ax|Sx) = (P[Ax].P[Sx|Ax]) / P(Sx)
So, P(Ax|Sx) ~ 1 (using the result just obtained and premises 1 and 2)
So the argument is valid. However, as Magnus and Callender (2004) point 
out, it is not sound. Their objection to the argument is (in essence) that 
premises 1 and 3 will only both seem plausible if one equivocates over the 
reference class. Suppose that the reference class is the set of all possible 
theories. Then premise 1 is surely false, because it is surely not the case that 
a theory selected at random from the set of all possible theories will 
probably be successful. (Without premise 1 the argument is not valid. A 
counterexample is illustrated in figure la .5) So suppose instead the reference
5 Indeed, even if we were to retain a weakened version of premise 1, to the effect that it 
would not be a miracle for a given theory to be successful, then the argument would still not 
be valid. The argument would then run as follows:
Premise 1: P(Sx) > m 
Premise 2: P(Sx|Ax) « 1 
Premise 3: P(Sx|~Ax) < m
Conclusion: P(Ax|Sx)» 1
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class is the set o f mature theories. If, following Worrall (1989), we define a 
theory to be mature if and only if it is successful, then premise 1 is certainly 
true, in fact P(Sx) = 1. But now premise 3 is false, because P(Sx|_iAx) = 1, 
because all theories in the reference class are successful, irrespective of 
whether or not they are approximately true. (Without premise 3 the 
argument is not valid. A counterexample is illustrated in figure lb.)
Empirically 
successful theories
Approximately 
true theories
Possible
theories
Figure la: This illustrates a situation in which, (i) If x is an approximately 
true theory then it is probably a successful theory: P(Sx|Ax) » 1 (in fact, 
P[Sx|Ax] = 1), (ii) If x is not an approximately true theory then it would be a 
miracle if  x is a successful theory: P(Sx|^Ax) ~ 0, but, (iii) It is not the case 
that if x is a successful theory then x is probably an approximately true 
theory: P(Ax|Sx) is n o t« 1.
(where m is some small probability such that the occurrence o f an event is miraculous if 
and only if the probability of the event is less than m). This is not valid. If we take m to be 
0.0010005 then a counterexample is provided when one in a million theories is 
approximately true, 1001 in a million theories are successful and all approximately true 
theories are successful. In that case, (i) P(Sx) = 0.0010010 (so P[Sx] > m), (ii) P(Sx|Ax) = 1 
(so P[Sx|Ax] w 1), (iii) P(Sx|~Ax) = 0.0010000 (so P[Sx|-Ax] < m), but, (iv) P(Ax|Sx) = 
0.0009990 (so P[Ax|Sx] is not « 1). Indeed, in this counterexample not only is a successful 
theory probably not approximately true, it would be a miracle if  a successful theory turned 
out to be approximately true (P[Ax|Sx] < m)!
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Approximately 
true theories
Mature/successful
theories
Figure lb: This illustrates a situation in which, (i) x is probably a successful 
theory: P(Sx) » 1 (in fact P[Sx] = 1), (ii) If x is an approximately true theory 
then it is probably a successful theory: P(Sx|Ax) w 1 (in fact, P[Sx|Ax] = 1), 
but, (iii) It is not the case that if x is a successful theory then x is probably 
an approximately true theory: P(Ax|Sx) is not » 1.
1.2. Second Interpretation of the No Miracles Argument
Another attempt to reconstruct the no miracles argument probabilistically 
might run as follows:
Premise 1: If x is an approximately true theory then it would not be a 
miracle if x is a successful theory.
Premise 2: If x is not an approximately true theory then it would be a 
miracle if x is a successful theory.
Conclusion: If x is a successful theory then x is relatively likely to be an 
approximately true theory (i.e. a theory from the set of successful theories is 
more likely to be approximately true than a theory from the set of all 
theories).
That is:
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Premise 1: P(Sx|Ax)»  0 
Premise 2: P(Sx|~Ax) ~ 0
Conclusion: P(Ax|Sx) > P(Ax)
This argument is valid and also (plausibly) sound. Bayes’ theorem states:
P(Ax|Sx) = P(Ax).P(Sx|Ax) / P(Sx)
So, P(Ax|Sx) > P(Ax) if and only if P(Sx|Ax) / P(Sx) > 1 
So, P(Ax|Sx) > P(Ax) if and only if  P(Sx|Ax) > P(Sx)
So, P(Ax|Sx) > P(Ax) if and only if P(Sx|Ax) > P(Sx|Ax).P(Ax) + 
P(SxhAx).P(-Ax)
So, P(Ax|Sx) > P(Ax) if and only if P(Sx|Ax) > P(Sx|Ax).P(Ax) + 
P(SxbAx).(l -  P[Ax])
The second inequality follows from P(Sx|Ax) > P(Sx|~Ax) (provided P[Ax] 
^  1), which follows from premises 1 and 2 of the argument. So it follows 
from the premises of the argument that P(Ax|Sx) > P(Ax) (i.e. the argument 
is valid).
The problem with this attempt to reconstruct the no miracles 
argument is that the conclusion of the argument is not the conclusion the 
realist wants. What the scientific realist wants is that it is likely that a 
successful theory is approximately true, i.e. that P(Ax|Sx) > 0.5 (i.e. what 
he wants is not the result that a theory from the set of successful theories is 
more likely to be approximately true than a theory from the set of all 
theories but the result that a theory from the set o f successful theories is 
actually likely to be approximately true). But, even if the premises of the 
argument are true, P(Ax|Sx) can be made arbitrarily small by making P(Ax) 
small enough. This is apparent from figure la. Hence, although this 
argument may show that success makes approximate truth relatively likely it 
requires an additional argument to show that success makes approximate 
truth likely, which, so far, the realist has failed to supply.
1.3. Third Interpretation of the No Miracles Argument
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The third interpretation of the no miracles argument, which is the most 
commonly proposed, is that the argument is an instance of the argument 
form known as “inference to the best explanation” (IBE). IBE is (allegedly) 
a form of inference that is often used in science. If we have a theory that 
explains some phenomenon better than any other theory (that we know of) 
then scientists (allegedly) infer from this that the theory is (approximately) 
true. So instances of IBE take the following form (in the following p is a 
description of an established phenomenon and T is a statement o f a theory):
Premise 1: p
Premise 2: T is the best explanation of p 
Conclusion (via IBE): T is approximately true
We might call this a “ground level” IBE. When the no miracles argument is 
construed as an instance of IBE, it is a kind of “meta level” IBE: the 
phenomenon in question is taken to be the success of some scientific theory, 
T, and the theory that (allegedly) offers the best explanation o f this fact is 
the theory that T is approximately true. I.e. the no miracles argument runs as 
follows:
Premise 1: T has been successful
Premise 2: The theory that T is approximately true is the best explanation of 
the fact that T has been successful
Conclusion (via IBE): The theory that T is approximately true is 
approximately true
Notice that, strictly speaking, the conclusion of the no miracles argument (if 
it follows the pattern of other instances of IBE) should not be simply that T 
is approximately true but that it is approximately true that T is 
approximately true. It is not clear what (if anything) this means. Realists 
take the conclusion of the no miracles argument to be that T is
26
Chapter 1
approximately true, so they must think that the approximate truth of the 
approximate truth of T is the same as the approximate truth o f T. But this is 
not obvious: it seems possible that it could be approximately true that T is 
approximately true even if T is radically false. However, let’s leave this 
point aside, since there are less linguistically frustrating difficulties with this 
interpretation of the no miracles argument, which are discussed in 
subsections 1.4-1.6.
1.4. Laudan’s Objections to the No Miracles Argument
Laudan’s (1981) main objection to the no miracles argument is based on the 
pessimistic induction. Roughly speaking, he argues that there have been 
many successful theories in the history of science that (we now believe) are 
not even approximately true and that we should infer from this that it is not a 
miracle for a radically false theory to be successful. Hence the no miracles 
argument is undermined. The pessimistic induction will be examined in 
more detail in section 2.
Another objection Laudan brings against the no miracles argument 
is that approximate truth could not in any case be invoked to explain success 
because there is no real reason to think that the fact that a theory is 
approximately true implies that the theory will be successful.6 Laudan 
objects that proponents of the no miracles argument have not provided an 
account of approximate truth, so the claim that approximate truth implies 
success is open to question. He insists that the realist needs, “more than a 
promissory note that somehow, someday, someone will show that 
approximately true theories must be successful theories” (Laudan, 1981, p. 
1125).
Laudan is certainly right that the connection between the 
approximate truth of a theory and its success has not been rigorously 
demonstrated. Indeed, Worrall freely admits (1989, p. 106) that his use of
6 Laudan accepts, o f course, that a true theory would be successful. He balks only at the 
realist’s assumption that an approximately true theory would also, probably, be successful 
(Laudan, 1981, p. 1124).
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the no miracles argument is based on the intuition that there is a connection 
between the two. However, although this might throw some doubt on the 
legitimacy o f the no miracles argument, it does not completely undermine it, 
because it does seem intuitively reasonable to suppose there is a connection 
between the approximate truth of a theory and its success.
1.5. A Related Objection to the No Miracles Argument
Notwithstanding what has been said in subsection 1.4, it seems that the 
(second) premise of the IBE interpretation of the no miracles argument, 
which states that, “the theory that T is approximately true is the best 
explanation of the fact that T has been successful” is false. It seems that 
even if we put Laudan’s worries aside and accept that approximate truth 
would imply success, approximate truth (or even complete truth) would not 
in any case explain success.
Suppose we ask of a given theory, “Why is it so successful?” and 
we are told that it is because, “It is approximately true” (or something like 
this). We should not be satisfied with this answer. We think that the success 
of the theory requires an explanation (presumably) because success is not a 
characteristic that we would generally expect a theory to display, i.e. 
because we believe that of all the possible theories that we might have 
devised, not many would have been successful. The answer given is 
explanatory only if success is a characteristic we would generally expect an 
approximately true theory to display, i.e. we believe that all (or at least 
most) of the approximately true theories that we might have devised would 
have been successful. But this implies that, of all the possible theories that 
we might have devised, not many are approximately true. So approximate 
truth is not a characteristic we would generally expect a theory to display. 
As it is not as if we had to choose from a list o f possible theories, knowing 
in advance which ones were approximately true, the reply to our question 
seems only to raise another question, “Why is the theory that we devised 
approximately true?”. Approximate truth can’t appropriately explain 
success, because if success needs an explanation then so does approximate
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truth: approximate truth is no more a characteristic that we would expect a 
theory to display than is success.
The problem is highlighted by making a no miracles style 
argument in a more commonplace setting. Suppose I am watching the 
national lottery, and the first five balls that are drawn match five of the 
numbers on my ticket. It would be a miracle if  this just happened by chance. 
On the other hand it would be no miracle (in fact, it would be bound to 
happen) if I had a winning ticket (i.e. a ticket on which all six numbers 
match). As we don’t want to accept miracles we should thus accept that I 
have a winning ticket (at least, in the absence of another explanation of why 
the first five numbers match). In this context it is (I hope) obvious that the 
proposed explanation is inadequate, because the hypothesis that I have a 
winning ticket is obviously in need of an explanation at least as much as the 
fact it is invoked to explain. Likewise, the approximate truth of a theory is at 
least as much in need of an explanation as its success. (Peter Lipton 
suggested this comparison at a conference.)
The situation is illustrated in more general terms in figure 2. 
Suppose we have some outcome, a, with a surprising property, P (surprising 
in the sense that most outcomes do not have the property). If we ask “Why 
does a have property P?” and we are told that it is because, “It has property 
Q” we are being fobbed off, unless we can explain why a has property Q in 
a non-circular manner (e.g. by pointing out that we selected a from the class 
of outcomes with this property).
The proponent of the no miracles argument might claim that this 
shows nothing, since all explanations must stop somewhere and that he is 
happy to leave approximate truth unexplained. But then it seems that the no 
miracles argument is question begging, since the antirealist is just someone 
that is happy to leave success unexplained.
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Outcomes with 
property P
Outcomes with 
property Q
Outcome a
Possible
outcomes
Figure 2: The large rectangle represents the space of possible outcomes 
(e.g. theories). The circle represents outcomes with property P (e.g. the 
property of being empirically successful). The square represents outcomes 
with property Q (e.g. being approximately true).
1.6. The Redundancy of the No Miracles Argum ent
Instances of IBE are not, of course, deductively valid: the (seemingly) best 
explanation of some fact may not turn out to be the true explanation of that 
fact (if indeed there is an explanation of it at all). In fact, antirealists often 
claim that inferences of this form have no legitimacy at all (in particular, the 
antirealist denies that the inference to unobservables is legitimate, despite 
the fact they might offer the best explanation of an observable 
phenomenon). Consequently, as Fine (1984, pp. 1187-1189) has pointed out, 
if the no miracles argument is construed as an instance of IBE it appears to 
be monumentally question begging: it will never convince the antirealist 
since he doesn’t accept that the form of inference it exemplifies is in general 
legitimate. It is simply preaching to the converted or, at best, the agnostic.7
7 Zahar claim s that “F ine’s argument is predicated on a contentious assumption, namely that 
scientific  realism deserves its name: SR [i.e. scientific realism] is taken to be an empirical 
hypothesis w hose factual basis consists o f  the successes o f  various scientific theories.” 
(Zahar, 2001, p. 58, original emphasis). Zahar goes on to argue that scientific realism is not 
an empirical hypothesis but is rather a m etaphysical hypothesis and then concludes that 
because o f  this “the w hole basis for F ine’s argument co llapses” (Zahar, 2001, p.59).
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Moreover, if someone does accept that IBE is legitimate, the no 
miracles argument is completely redundant, since he will accept the simpler 
ground level IBE that can be less problematically used to reach the desired 
conclusion that our best scientific theories are approximately true.
So the debate really comes down to this: should we accept that IBE 
is a legitimate form of inference? If yes, then we can use a ground level IBE 
to infer that our best theories are approximately true. (And if, contrary to 
what has been suggested, the premises o f the no miracles argument are true 
then we could also use the no miracles argument to reach this conclusion, 
but it would be unnecessary to do so.) If no, then we can use neither the 
ground level IBE, nor the meta level IBE of the no miracles argument, and 
the realist must look elsewhere for an argument to support his position. Let 
us turn then to consider the arguments for and against the legitimacy of IBE.
1.7. The Underdetermination Objection to IBE
Why does the antirealist (claim to) reject IBE? One reason is suggested by 
the argument known as the underdetermination of theory by evidence. We 
invariably base our theories, and test them against, a finite amount of 
evidence. But any finite amount of evidence could be accommodated by 
infinitely many theories. The antirealist argues that although some o f these 
theories may be better than others for pragmatic or aesthetic reasons, there is 
no reason to think that any one o f them is more likely to be true than any 
other. Hence an inference to the best explanation is not very likely to be an 
inference to a true explanation.
One might take issue with the claim that any finite amount of 
evidence could be accommodated by infinitely many theories. Or claim that, 
even if this is so, all the infinitely many theories that accommodate a 
substantial amount evidence are likely to be approximately true, so we can,
However, Fine claims only that the antirealist doesn’t generally accept the form of  
inference that the no miracles argument exemplifies and this claim in no way rests on the 
assumption that scientific realism is an empirical hypothesis, so Zahar seems to be way off 
beam here.
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with reasonable safety, infer the approximate truth of any o f them. However, 
these are not good responses to the underdetermination argument, as is 
evident if we consider the argument in its “curve-fitting” form. In this form 
the argument goes as follows. Given any finite number of data points (no 
matter how large) we can draw infinitely many curves that pass through all 
of them. Hence any finite amount of evidence can be accommodated by 
infinitely many theories. Moreover, the evidence does not even force on us a 
curve that approximates the true curve (i.e. the curve that represents the 
actual relation between the variables represented on the axes) to any 
reasonable degree: although infinitely many curves will be rather similar to 
the true curve (in some sense that could be made precise, e.g. -  assuming the 
graph has two axes -  in the sense that the area between the curve and the 
true curve is small or in the sense that for every value of the x co-ordinate 
both curves have a similar value of the y co-ordinate) infinitely many will be 
radically different to the true curve (in the same sense) (if we choose a curve 
somewhere in the “middle” the maximum possible inaccuracy is minimised, 
in an intuitive sense, but it still has no finite bound, according to either of 
the measures suggested above). Hence any finite amount of evidence can be 
accommodated by infinitely many theories that are not even approximately 
true.
O f course, realists have replied to this argument, often arguing that 
we have more than just empirical evidence to help us determine the true 
curve. E.g. it has been argued that we (somehow) know that nature is 
simple, relative to our way of viewing it, so the simplest curve is most likely 
to be the true one. But, as noted, the antirealist will say that although there 
maybe pragmatic and aesthetic reasons to prefer the simplest curve there are 
no good epistemic reasons: the assumption that nature is simple, relative to 
our way of viewing it might be pragmatically and aesthetically justified, but 
it is not epistemically justified.
Applied to the no miracles argument the underdetermination 
objection runs as follows. Even if the approximate truth o f a theory is the 
best explanation o f its success that does not mean that it is particularly likely 
that it is the (or an approximately) true explanation. After all, there are 
infinitely many (typically less simple) theories that would have exactly the
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same empirical success that any given successful theory enjoys and although 
infinitely many of these will be approximately true, infinitely many will be 
radically false. So, unless we are prepared to swallow the view that we know 
that nature is simple, relative to our way of viewing it, it would not be 
miraculous if our theory were one o f the radically false ones.
1.8. Psillos’ Defence of IBE
Psillos (1994, chapter 4) appears to deploy two quite separate arguments in 
defence o f IBE. Firstly, he argues that IBE can be justified. His argument 
for this runs as follows:
the best explanation of the instrumental reliability of 
scientific methodology is that background theories are 
relevantly approximately true. These background scientific 
theories have themselves been typically arrived at by 
abductive reasoning. Hence it is reasonable to believe that 
abductive reasoning is reliable: it tends to generate 
approximately true theories. (Psillos, 1999, p. 80)
As Psillos is aware, this argument is circular: IBE is used to infer the 
conclusion that IBE is reliable. In fact there are two uses of IBE in the 
argument. The first instance is a generalised form of the no miracles 
argument (generalised in so far as it discusses scientific theories in general, 
rather than one particular theory):
Premise 1: Scientific theories are successful.
8 It has been suggested to me that the realist can reply here that the radically false successful 
theories are unlikely to remain successful in the future. It is true that infinitely many of 
these radically false theories will cease to be successful in the future (as long as there is at 
least some evidence collected in the future). However, as there will only be a finite amount 
of evidence collected up to any given time in the future there will always be infinitely many 
radically false theories that remain successful up to that time.
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Premise 2: The theory that scientific theories are approximately true is the 
best explanation of the fact that scientific theories are successful.
Conclusion (via IBE): The theory that scientific theories are approximately 
true is approximately true.
The (abbreviated) conclusion of the generalised no miracles argument is 
then used as a premise in a second instance of IBE:
Premise 1: Scientific theories are approximately true.
Premise 2: The theory that scientific theories are arrived at via a reliable rule 
of inference is the best explanation of the fact that scientific theories are 
approximately true.
Conclusion (via IBE): The theory that scientific theories are arrived at via a 
reliable rule of inference is approximately true.
As scientific theories are (allegedly) arrived at via IBE, this implies that it is 
(approximately) true that IBE is a reliable rule of inference: which is 
(approximately) the conclusion that Psillos desires.
Psillos argues that although circular this justification o f IBE is not 
viciously circular. He distinguishes between “premise-circular” arguments, 
where the conclusion of the argument is among the premises of the 
argument and “rule-circular” arguments, where the conclusion o f the 
argument is that the form of inference deployed in the argument is 
legitimate. Perhaps an example will help to clarify the difference. The 
following is a premise-circular justification of modus ponens:
Premise: Modus ponens is legitimate.
Conclusion: Modus ponens is legitimate.
This is premise-circular because the conclusion is the same as the premise. 
The following is a rule-circular justification of modus ponens:
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Premise 1: If the absolute is perfect then modus ponens is legitimate.
Premise 2: The absolute is perfect
Conclusion (via modus ponens): Modus ponens is legitimate.
This is rule-circular because the conclusion of the argument is that modus 
ponens is legitimate and modus ponens is used to obtain the conclusion from 
the premises.
The foregoing justification of IBE is rule-circular, since IBE is 
used to reach the conclusion (that IBE is reliable) from the premises but it is 
not premise-circular (since no premise in the argument states that IBE is 
reliable) and Psillos claims that rule-circular arguments (unlike premise- 
circular arguments) are not viciously circular.
However, it is hard to see why rule-circular arguments should be 
thought of as any less vicious than premise-circular arguments, particularly 
as rules o f inferences can often be converted into premises, and vice versa. 
For example, in some systems of first-order logic there is a rule of 
“universal generalisation”: if, in a deduction, one has obtained the formula a  
then (with some restrcitions) one may also infer V xa from the premises of 
the deduction (cf. Suppes, 1957, p. 99). On the other hand, in other systems 
there is no such rule, rather all the formulas of the form a  -» V xa (with 
some restrictions) are taken as premises that may be used at any time in any 
deduction, and one has the rule of modus ponens, allowing one to achieve 
the same results (cf. Enderton, 2001, p. 112).
In any case, whether or not we call the above argument viciously 
circular, it is clear that it will not convince anyone who does not already 
accept IBE that IBE is reliable (because it uses IBE) and as such it does not 
appear to answer the antirealist. Psillos goes on to claim that IBE is a basic 
form of inference that humans deploy and as such we should not expect to 
be able to provide a justification of IBE that is independent of IBE (he adds 
that a justification that depends on IBE -  such as the one that he provides -  
is not insignificant, in so far as there is no a priori guarantee that such a
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justification exists). He draws a parallel here to justifications o f deductive 
rules of inference. In fact he claims that, “The situation is totally analogous 
to the defence of deductive reasoning. There is no way in which one can 
persuade a deductively blind person of the soundness or rationality of 
deductive arguments” (Psillos, 1999, p. 88, original emphasis).
There are two points to note here. Firstly, Psillos appears to be
conceding that his argument will not convince the antirealist: as Lipton
(2001, p. 349) notes, to deem a form of inference basic is tantamount to 
conceding that a sceptic with regard to that form of inference cannot be 
answered. Secondly, as Lipton also notes, Psillos’ analogy between 
justifying IBE and justifying deductive inferences is not exactly apposite, 
because one is very hard pressed to find a deductive sceptic, whereas 
antirealists who profess to be sceptics with regard to IBE are relatively 
common. As Lipton puts it, “it does not appear that our inductive practices, 
as the realist construes them, are in fact basic for all o f us” (Lipton, 2001, p. 
349). In a sense then, it is more problematic to deem IBE basic than it is to 
deem various forms of deductive inference basic, simply because there are 
apparently more IBE sceptics than deductive sceptics. (Of course that does 
not mean that IBE isn’t basic: it just means that if we deem it basic there are 
lots of people whom, we have to concede, we cannot convert.)
Psillos’ second defence of IBE is to suggest that it needs no 
justification. He claims that the correct attitude towards rules o f inference is 
not “guilty until proven innocent” but rather “innocent until proven guilty” 
(cf. Psillos, 2001b, p. 368) so that even if IBE cannot be justified and is no 
more basic than any other rule of inference it is nonetheless legitimate to use 
it:
If one knew that a rule of inference was unreliable, one
would be foolish to use it. This does not imply that one
should first be able to prove that the rule is reliable before 
one uses it. All that is required is that one should have no 
reason to doubt the reliability of the rule (Psillos, 1999, p.
85)
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This seems to suggest that no rule of inference is more basic than another; 
that all rules of inference are bom equal. However, a blanket innocent until 
proven guilty policy is unworkable. Suppose we start with the assumption 
that both induction and counter-induction (cf. Salmon, 1966, pp. 12-17) are 
innocent. There are then two ways in which we can proceed: either we can 
prove counter-induction guilty using an inductive argument:
Premise: Counter-induction has been unreliable in the past
Conclusion (via induction): Counter-induction will be unreliable in the 
future
or we can prove induction guilty using a counter-inductive argument: 
Premise: Induction has been reliable in the past
Conclusion (via counter-induction): Induction will be unreliable in the 
future
If we proceed by the latter route we will be left believing that counter­
induction, but not induction, is a reliable form of inference (and, in the 
absence of induction, it seems there will be no possible way in which 
counter-induction could ever be found guilty). But surely we don’t want to 
be left believing this. Yet, without pre-judging the case, there seems to be 
nothing to choose between these two routes. So it seems that we must pre­
judge the case, i.e. we must hold a selective policy, whereby some mles are 
guilty until proven innocent and others innocent until proven guilty (so, after 
all, we must take some mles of inference as more basic than others).9 In that 
case, however, it remains open as to whether or not IBE is one of the former 
or the latter, so Psillos can’t well argue from the premise that there is no
9 We can’t hold all rules to be guilty until proven innocent because if one did so one would 
never be able to prove anything innocent (i.e. one would never formulate any rules of
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reason to doubt IBE to the conclusion that IBE is legitimate, because the 
antirealist may believe that IBE is guilty until proven innocent. It seems then 
that Psillos’ second argument in favour of IBE will also not convince the 
antirealist that IBE is legitimate.
1.9. The “Double Standards” Defence of IBE
Inferring any universal law -  even a simple empirical generalisation -  from 
a finite number of observations, requires an application of IBE. For 
example, we infer from a finite number o f observations o f green emeralds 
that all emeralds are green. But that is not the only hypothesis that would 
explain the observations. Another such hypothesis is that all emeralds are 
grue, or that all emeralds are gred, etc.10 We infer that all emeralds are green 
because that seems to us the best of these hypotheses (for some reason that 
is, admittedly, obscure). Or, to take a less contrived example (discussed by 
Poincare [1903] and Worrall [forthcoming]), we infer from a finite number 
of observations of the positions of the planets that that the planets orbit the 
Sun in (approximate) ellipses. But the finite observations of the planets 
could also be explained by a number of hypotheses suggesting that the 
planets orbit the Sun in much more devious ways, and just happen to lie on 
(approximate) ellipses whenever we make an observation.
Even antirealists (at least in the scientific realism debate) are not 
usually sceptics with regard to inferences to simple empirical 
generalizations like these. Hence, despite what they might claim, antirealists 
are not total sceptics with regard to IBE. But (so the “double standards” 
defence of IBE goes) unless they can say why some instances o f IBE 
(inferences to simple empirical generalizations) are legitimate whereas 
others are not there seems to be no justification for being a selective IBE 
sceptic, and antirealists seem to have an unacceptable double standard. In
inference) because a proof of innocence must require at least one rule o f inference to go 
through.
10 Where an object is grue if and only if it is green upto a particular future time, t, and blue 
after t and an object is gred if and only if  it is green upto t and red after t (cf. Goodman, 
2006, pp. 74-75).
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the absence of a justification for this selective scepticism the antirealist 
ought either to become a thoroughgoing IBE sceptic, and therefore an 
inductive sceptic, or accept IBE in other cases. If he takes the former route 
his position is unassailable. But no one really would take that route. So he 
must take the latter route. But if he accepts IBE is legitimate in general, then 
he will accept at least the ground level IBE discussed above (if not the no 
miracles argument itself), which already suggests that our best scientific 
theories are approximately true.
Van Fraassen (1989) has a response to this “double standards” 
argument. To understand his response we must distinguish two conceptions 
of rationality. According to one, “what is rational to believe is exactly what 
one is rationally compelled to believe” (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 170) whereas 
according to the other (which van Fraassen favours), “what is rational to 
believe includes anything that one is not rationally compelled to disbelieve” 
(van Fraassen, 1989, pp. 170-171).
For van Fraassen IBE is better seen as a tool of inference than as a 
rule o f inference. He accepts that it is rational to use IBE to form beliefs (as 
long as these beliefs are logically consistent) but he does not accept that it is 
irrational to refrain from using IBE in some or (presumably) all cases. So he 
thinks it is perfectly rational for the antirealist to use IBE to arrive at beliefs 
about simple empirical regularities, but to refrain from using IBE to arrive at 
beliefs involving unobservables. He presumably also thinks that it is 
perfectly rational for the realist to use it in both cases (as long as the beliefs 
he forms are logically consistent) and for the inductive sceptic to use it in 
neither. For van Fraassen rationality permits us to use IBE (within certain 
bounds) but it never obliges us to use it.
The antirealist’s so-called double standard only seems irrational if 
one thinks of IBE as a rule of inference, whose dictates must be obeyed (on 
pain of irrationality). If it is rather a tool of inference that we are free to use 
it as liberally or parsimoniously as we please then the antirealist’s double 
standard is not irrational.
1.10. Section Summary
39
Chapter 1
It has been argued that, (i) the first interpretation of the no miracles 
argument is valid but not sound, (ii) the second interpretation of the no 
miracles argument is (plausibly) sound, but that it does not deliver the 
conclusion that the realist needs, and, (iii) the third interpretation of the no 
miracles argument (as an instance o f IBE) is probably not sound (even 
assuming that IBE is legitimate), because the second premise is false, but 
even if it is a sound instance of IBE it is completely redundant, since the 
conclusion of the argument is arrived at by a simpler, ground level, IBE.
The more important issue in the scientific realism debate seems to 
be the question of whether or not the antirealist can rationally use IBE in 
some cases but refrain from its use in others and it has been suggested that if 
van Fraassen’s approach to rationality is the right one then this is possible.
Consequently, these arguments do not appear to be compelling, 
and so Worrall’s attempt to form a position that accommodates these 
arguments (as well as the antirealist’s pessimistic induction) seems 
unnecessary. Moreover, in the next section it will be argued that the claim 
that the WESRist can accommodate the pessimistic induction is 
unconvincing.
2. The Pessimistic Induction
The pessimistic induction can be stated roughly as follows: many previously 
successful theories are (by our current lights) radically false; we should 
therefore infer that many of our currently successful theories will also 
appear to be radically false in the future; we thus have no reason to believe 
that any theory is even approximately true.11
11 It should be bom in mind that the antirealist’s scepticism is (usually) restricted to only the 
theoretical parts o f our theories, so when he claims that “many previously successful 
theories are (by our current lights) radically false” he means that they are radically false 
with respect to the claims they make about the unobservable world. Likewise what he 
recommends that we should infer is that many o f our currently successful theories will also 
appear to be radically false in the future, with respect to the claims they make about the 
unobservable world.
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The strength of the pessimistic induction depends on the amount of 
evidence in its favour, i.e. on the number of theories that were successful but 
are (by our current lights) radically false. Laudan (1981) has claimed that 
the evidence can be amassed ad nauseam and he cites a dozen or so 
examples of successful theories whose claims we now take to be decidedly 
false. However, as Worrall points out, he seems to be working with a loose 
notion of success. Many of his examples are of theories that merely 
accommodated previously known empirical results. Worrall argues that a 
theory is genuinely empirically successful only if it predicts a result that it
I
was not engineered to yield.
Worrall concedes, however, that there is at least one theory Laudan 
cites that does seem to have enjoyed the right sort o f empirical success -  
Fresnel’s wave theory of light. This theory was based on the idea that light 
is a wave transmitted by an all-pervading mechanical medium, the 
“luminiferous ether”. It correctly predicted various results that it was not 
engineered to accommodate, most famously the existence o f a white spot at 
the centre o f the shadow cast by an opaque disc held in light diverging from 
a point source. Much of the discussion of the pessimistic induction in the 
literature has since focussed on this case study.
There have been two types of response to the pessimistic induction 
from the realist camp. The first response is to deny the cogency of the 
argument. This response is discussed in subsections 2.1 and 2.2. It is argued 
that although the standard version of the pessimistic induction might be 
undermined by (one of) these criticisms a non-standard form of the 
pessimistic induction is unaffected. The second response is to accept an 
attenuated version of the argument and move to a form of “selective” 
realism: to concede that many previously successful theories do appear to be 
radically false in some respect(s) and that there is no reason to think that our
12 However, he does not insist that such a result need be (temporally) novel. So the 
prediction (or rather, retrodiction) of the advance o f the perihelion o f Mercury can count as 
a genuine empirical success o f general relativity, because the theory was not engineered to 
yield the result, despite the fact that the result was known when Einstein devised the theory. 
Zahar (1973) has also emphasised the importance such predictions and retrodictions, calling 
them “heuristically novel”.
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current theories are any better off, but to argue that these previously 
successful theories nonetheless appear to be approximately true in some 
other respect(s) and so we can still reasonably hold that our current theories 
are also approximately true in this (these) latter respect(s). Variants o f this 
response are discussed in subsections 2.3-2.5. Amongst these is Worrall’s 
response to the pessimistic induction (discussed in subsection 2.5), which 
also constitutes his argument for moving from conventional realism to 
WESR. It is argued that none of these responses is particularly convincing. 
Finally, in subsection 2.6, a novel response to the pessimistic induction is 
proposed.
2.1. Lewis* Objection to the Pessimistic Induction
Lewis (2001) reconstructs the pessimistic induction as follows:
11Premise: Most previously successful theories are radically false.
Conclusion: Success is not a reliable indicator of approximate truth (where a 
reliable indicator is one that produces a low proportion o f false positives and 
a low proportion of false negatives): it is not the case that both P(Sx|~Ax) » 
0 and P^SxIAx) » 0.
As Lewis notes, this argument is not valid. The fact that previously 
successful theories that are radically false outnumber previously successful 
theories that are approximately true is consistent with there being both a low 
proportion of false positives and a low proportion o f false negatives, as long 
as there have been many more false theories than true theories. This is 
illustrated in figure 3.
13 Note that this premise seems to be somewhat stronger than the premise o f the standard 
pessimistic induction (as it has been presented in this thesis), which only claims that many 
previously successful theories are radically false. However, as Lewis does not object to the 
premise o f the argument, this seems to be irrelevant.
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However, given Lewis’ interpretation of the pessimistic induction, 
the argument is not clearly inductive, nor does it clearly give grounds for 
pessimism. It seems that the following interpretation is more faithful:
Premise: Most previously successful theories are radically false.
Conclusion: Most currently successful theories are (probably) radically 
false.
However, one can also extrapolate from what Lewis says (p. 377) an 
argument that also seems to undermine this interpretation of the pessimistic 
induction. The argument runs as follows: because it does not follow from 
the premise that success is not a reliable indicator of approximate truth we 
may assume (as seems intuitive) that success is a reliable indicator of 
approximate truth. But given that success is a reliable indicator of 
approximate truth and that most current theories are successful then it 
follows that most currently successful theories are approximately true. (The 
only reason most previously successful theories were radically false is 
because most previous theories were unsuccessful: as is apparent from 
figure 3.)
As Lewis is aware, this response to this form o f the pessimistic 
induction rests on the following contention: most previous theories were 
unsuccessful, and most current theories are successful.14 As Saatsi (2005) 
points out, this contention is problematic. The problem is not that the claim 
appears to be false but that it is not at all clear how we could possibly judge 
whether it is true or false. For example, which theories are we supposed to 
consider when we try to decide whether or not most previous theories were 
unsuccessful?
Should we count in only the theory proposals made by
eminent scientists, or perhaps all the proposals actually
14 Cf. “this commits the convergent realist to the empirical claim that successful theories 
were rare in the past and are common today” (Lewis, 2001, p. 377).
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published in scientific journals, or what? It is easy to 
imagine a variety of sociological factors, say, yielding 
scores of unsuccessful and false theories, directly affecting 
the notion of reliability at stake. But why should we care 
about those theories? It just seems that the debate...does 
not involve unsuccessful and false theories (or true yet 
unsuccessful ones, for that matter) in anything like the way 
Lewis projects. (Saatsi, 2005, p. 1096, original emphasis)
This suggests that before one can even tentatively endorse Lewis’ objection 
to the pessimistic induction one needs a clearer idea as to what Lewis’ 
crucial contention amounts to.
Radically false but 
successful theories
Radically false and 
unsuccessful theories
Approximately true but 
unsuccessful theories
Approximately 
true and 
successful 
theories
Figure 3: This illustrates a situation in which, (i) Most successful theories 
are radically false, but, (ii) Success is a reliable indicator of approximate 
truth (P[Sx|-,Ax] « 0 and P[^Sx|Ax] « 0).
2.2. Lange’s Objection to the Pessimistic Induction
Lange summarises his objection to the pessimistic induction as follows:
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For the sake of simplicity, suppose that at each moment in 
the history of science, the number of theories that are justly 
receiving wide acceptance remains the same (though the 
identities of these theories may, of course, differ from 
moment to moment). Let that constant number be N. 
(Admittedly, it is difficult to see how to count theories 
precisely, but since the pessimistic induction itself refers to 
“most theories adopted in the past”, I too shall presume that 
theories have some criterion of individuation.) Obviously, 
theories that were accepted at some earlier moment, and are 
also accepted now, were never rejected in the meantime. 
Therefore, since theories currently believed false have 
generally experienced more rapid turnover than theories 
currently accepted, the past contains more room for 
theories currently believed false than for theories currently 
accepted. It would be very easy for there to be more than N 
theories that were accepted sometime in the past but have 
now been rejected as false. If, for each theory currently 
accepted, there were (for example) two predecessors that 
were once accepted but have since been discarded, then 
fully two-thirds of the theories accepted at some time or 
other are currently believed false (Lange, 2002, p. 283, 
original emphasis)
Lange’s point can be made vivid with a little science fiction. Consider a 
species of alien that started developing mature scientific theories 10,000 
years ago. Assume that over the last 10,000 years they have had at any given 
time 100 theories. Suppose that for the last 9,900 years their theories haven’t 
changed at all (and that, despite rigorous testing, they have not found any 
empirical evidence to undermine any of their theories). Suppose that for the 
first 100 years after the dawn of their mature science the average lifespan of 
a theory was 20 years. Then there have been a total o f 600 theories since the 
dawn of their science, most of which (we can assume) look radically false
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(by their current lights). But it would obviously be silly for them to infer that 
the currently accepted 100 theories, that have survived 9,900 years will go 
the way of the other 500 theories, which lasted, on average, 20 years each.
Lange notes that the following non-standard form of the 
pessimistic induction would be immune to his objection:
Premise: At most past moments, most successful theories that were held at 
the time were radically false.
Conclusion: At the current moment, most successful theories that we hold 
are (probably) radically false.
This evades the objection because, “a current theory that has long been 
accepted will count not just once in the cumulative grand total, but rather 
once with regard to each of the past moments at which it was receiving wide 
acceptance.” (Lange, 2002, p. 284). However, as Lange points out, it seems 
very doubtful that the premise of this non-standard pessimistic induction is 
true.
Is it possible to construct a version of the pessimistic induction that 
has a plausible premise and that avoids Lange’s response to the standard 
pessimistic induction? Call the following argument the pessimistic 
induction*:
Premise: At most past moments, most successful theories that were held at 
the time and had been around for less than T were radically false.
Conclusion: At the current moment, most successful theories that we hold 
and have been around for less than T are (probably) radically false.
It seems that, if T is chosen appropriately (as perhaps about 100 years) then 
the pessimistic induction* (i) is immune to Lange’s objection to the standard
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pessimistic induction (ii) has a plausible premise and (iii) is interesting.15 In 
this case we restrict our pessimism to those theories that are relatively 
recent, not extending it to those that have been around for a long time. This 
seems intuitively reasonable: we are very confident that the theory that the 
heart pumps blood around the body, or the theory that water is composed of 
hydrogen and oxygen in the ratio of 2:1 will not be overthrown. It seems 
that this is a version of the pessimistic induction that the realist needs to 
worry about.
2.3. Psillos’ Response to the Pessimistic Induction
Psillos accepts that the general form of pessimistic induction is legitimate, 
but he argues that an attenuated version of the argument can be 
accommodated by moving to a “selective” realism. Psillos makes a 
distinction between the “idle constituents” of a theory and the “essentially 
contributing constituents”. However, this terminology is somewhat 
misleading, since Psillos acknowledges that so-called “idle constituents” 
may have at least some role to play in the derivation of empirical 
predictions. The distinction between “idle constituents” of theories and 
“essentially contributing constituents” of theories is that the scientists who 
devise and use the theory accord a low degree o f belief to the former and a 
high degree of belief to the latter. In this regard Psillos distinguishes 
between models and theories:
A model of X comprises a set of assumptions which are not 
yet believed to describe X. On the contrary, a theory of X is 
the end product of scientific theorising. When something is 
advocated as a theory of X, the degree o f belief that it 
correctly describes/explains X is, generally, high. (Psillos,
1999, p. 143)
15 If T is chosen to be 0 seconds, then the premise is trivially true, but so is the conclusion, 
so the argument is not interesting.
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Psillos claims that although assumptions about the ether were of some 
importance in deriving empirical predictions, the scientists who made these 
assumptions did not believe them to be true: the mechanical ether was just a 
“model”. The sensible realist, Psillos thinks, will believe in theories (or at 
least in the approximate truth of theories) but not in models (perhaps the 
terms “modelling assumptions” and “theoretical commitments” would be 
more appropriate than “idle constituents” and “essentially contributing 
constituents”).
The sensible realist could thus accommodate the following 
attenuated form of the pessimistic induction: the “idle constituents ” o f  many 
previously successful theories are (by our current lights) radically false; we 
should therefore infer that the “idle constituents ” o f  many of our currently 
successful theories will also appear to be radically false in the future; we 
thus have no reason to believe that the “idle constituents ” o f  any theory are 
even approximately true.
Elsamahi (2005) objects to Psillos’ approach by pointing out that 
even in cases where we can determine what degrees of belief the scientists 
who develop and use a theory assign to its various assumptions, “It does not 
seem possible to affirm with confidence that the degree of certainty or 
conviction expressed by a scientist toward one of his or her assumptions 
reflects the degree of epistemic significance of that assumption.” (Elsamahi, 
2005, p. 1358). This suggests that we ought to be sceptical o f Psillos’ 
approach even if it seems to be supported by the history of science. In any 
case, however, it does not seem to be so supported: the history of science 
seems to suggest that the “essentially contributing” constituents of theories 
are often later deemed false. The claim that Fresnel and others did not really 
believe in the existence of a mechanical ether can be questioned. Indeed, 
Laudan (1981, p. 1121) notes that Maxwell thought that “the aether was 
better confirmed than any other theoretical entity in natural philosophy”. 
And Worrall says that:
It can’t, I think, sensibly be denied that Fresnel believed in
the ether as a real, material medium. He refers to such a
medium explicitly (and in explicitly “realist” terms) at
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various points in his scientific work. For example, in his 
famous (1818) “Prize Memoir” on diffraction, he 
characterises the general problem of diffraction as follows:
“Given the intensities and the relative positions of any 
number of systems of light waves of the same wavelength, 
propagating in the same direction, to determine the 
intensity of the vibrations resulting from the concourse of 
these different systems, that is to say, the velocity of the 
oscillations of the molecules of the ether” (248). In his 
(1822, 136) he stated that the properties of polarised light 
are simply explained on his theory “by supposing that, in 
light waves, the oscillations of the molecules of the ether 
are executed at right angles to the rays”. (Worrall, 1994, p.
336, original emphasis)
Moreover, as Psillos himself notes (1999, p. 143), the difference 
between models and theories, or between “idle constituents” of theories and 
“essentially contributing” constituents is only a matter of degree (scientists 
will generally have some degree of belief in a “model” and less than 
complete confidence even in a “theory”). But this doesn’t seem to cohere 
with the view that Psillos in advancing. It suggests that there are not well- 
defined portions o f theories that we can identify as those that it is rational to 
believe to be (approximately) true and others that we can identify as those 
that it is rational to be more sceptical about. Rather, it suggests that there is a 
continuum from theoretical statements that it is rational to assign a very high 
degree of belief through to theoretical statements that it is rational to assign 
a very low degree of belief.
2.4. Kitcher’s Response to the Pessimistic Induction
Kitcher (1993, pp. 133-149) responds to the pessimistic induction in a 
similar way to Psillos. He argues that, “The history o f science does not 
reveal to us that we are fallible in some undifferentiated way. Some kinds of
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claim endure, other kinds are likely to be discarded as inaccurate.” (Kitcher, 
1993, p. 138) He distinguishes between “working posits” and 
“presuppositional posits”. The former are theoretical claims that are used to 
derive empirical predictions. The latter are theoretical claims that play no 
role in the derivation of empirical predictions. His claim is that the sensible 
realist should only hold that the former are (approximately) true.16 The 
difference between Psillos’ “idle constituents” and Kitcher’s 
presuppositional posits is that, (i) Psillos’ “idle constituents” may play some 
role in the derivation of empirical predictions, and, (ii) Psillos claims that 
the “idle constituents” o f theories are actually identified in advance by the 
scientists who develop and use the theories (the scientists place a lower 
degree of belief in “idle constituents” than in “essentially contributing” 
constituents).
Thus, according to Kitcher, the sensible realist could accommodate 
the following attenuated form of the pessimistic induction: the
presuppositonal posits o f  many previously successful theories are (by our 
current lights) radically false; we should therefore infer that the 
presuppositonal posits o f  many of our currently successful theories will also 
appear to be radically false in the future; we thus have no reason to believe 
that the presuppositonal posits o f  any theory are even approximately true. 
Clearly, however, Kitcher’s response can only work if  the history of science 
supports this attenuated version of the pessimistic induction, rather than the 
standard version.
Let’s return to the Fresnel/Maxwell case. Is the existence of the 
ether merely a presuppositional posit of Fresnel’s theory? Psillos’ (1999, pp. 
130-145) study of nineteenth century optics suggests that the concept of a 
mechanical ether was at least heuristically useful in deriving empirical 
predictions. Worrall is also at odds with Kitcher here:
16 In a similar vein, Chakravartty (1998, 2004) makes a distinction between “detection 
properties” and “auxiliary properties” as the basis o f his “semirealism”: his position is 
further discussed in appendix 1.
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the suggestion that the material ether was an idle 
component in Fresnel’s system is significantly misleading. 
Whittaker [1951] claims, for example, that “geometrical 
reasoning” led the way in Fresnel’s development of the 
wave surface in birefringent crystals. However, this 
“geometrical reasoning” itself did not spring from nowhere, 
but was based on Hooke’s law, Huygens’s principle, the 
principle of superposition (“coexistence of small 
movements”) and other assumptions of a general 
mechanical kind. Moreover, although Fresnel’s extension 
to cover all crystals of Huygen’s famous sphere/spheroid 
construction for the two refracted beams can be 
characterised mathematically as a process of putting two 
equations together (by introducing three parameters for 
Huygens’s two), that process was in turn undoubtedly 
guided by Fresnel’s “realist” belief that there could only be 
one light-carrying medium and the “natural” assumption 
that, in the general case, the coefficients of elasticity of that 
medium in the three orthogonal directions in space will be 
different. Fresnel did get some important heuristic mileage 
out of certain general mechanical-dynamical ideas 
concerning some sort of mechanical medium with some 
sort of vibrating parts. (Worrall, 1994, pp. 336-337, 
original emphasis)
Studies of other historical cases seem to further undermine 
Kitcher’s approach. Elsamahi claims that, “There are many...examples in 
the history o f science for [sic] assumptions that led to the predictive success 
of their theories but were subsequently considered false” (Elsamahi, 2005, p. 
1355). He gives two such examples. Firstly, he argues (Elsamahi, 2005, pp. 
1353-1355) (against Psillos, 1999, pp. 119-121) that the (subsequently 
rejected) assumption of the caloric theory of heat that heat consists of 
material particles was non-idle (he argues that Laplace used this assumption 
to predict the speed of sound in air). Secondly, he notes that:
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Slater’s theory of oxidative phosphorylation, which was 
proposed and accepted in the 1950s, postulated that a high- 
energy intermediate compound transfers energy from the 
oxidation of fuel substances (e.g., sugars and fatty acids) to 
the reaction that leads to forming ATP molecules in 
mitochondria. The latter molecules become the direct 
source o f energy for cellular reactions. This assumption of 
an intermediate high-energy molecule was responsible for 
successful predictions in the areas of muscle fiber and 
pumping sodium and potassium across cell membranes. Yet 
this assumption was declared false around twenty years 
later because credible experimental data showed that no 
such intermediate molecule exists. (Elsamahi, 2005, p.
1355)
It thus seems very doubtful that Kitcher’s response to the pessimistic 
induction is supported by the historical evidence.
2.5. Worrall’s Response to the Pessimistic Induction
It has been argued that (i) (a form of) the pessimistic induction has some 
force and (ii) the responses conventional realists have made to the 
pessimistic induction are unconvincing. It thus seems that it would be a 
notable virtue of WESR if it could accommodate the pessimistic induction 
successfully.
Worrall argues that although much of the theoretical machinery of 
Fresnel’s theory was abandoned in the transition from Fresnel’s to 
Maxwell’s theories of light, there was nonetheless continuity o f more than 
just empirical content: Fresnel’s equations were retained, and with them, the 
structure of Fresnel’s theory. Hence, what this case supports is not the 
standard form of the pessimistic induction but rather something more like 
the following attenuated pessimistic induction: in their unRamseyfiedforms, 
many previously successful theories are (by our current lights) radically
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false; we should therefore infer that in their unRamseyfied form s many of 
our currently successful theories will also appear to be radically false in the 
future; we thus have no reason to believe that in its unRamseyfied form  any
1 7theory is even approximately true. This form of the pessimistic induction 
is compatible with the WESRist’s realist thesis (because it is compatible 
with the view that the Ramsey-sentences of mature theories are 
approximately true). Hence, Worrall contends that WESR is a form of 
realism that allows one to accommodate the pessimistic induction (as well as 
the no miracles argument).
A possible objection to this argument is that although the 
Fresnel/Maxwell episode supports WESR other episodes o f scientific theory 
change do not, since it is unusual for a theory to adopt the equations o f its 
predecessor unaltered. Worrall concedes that complete structural continuity 
across scientific revolutions of the sort exemplified by the Fresnel/Maxwell 
case is the exception but claims that a substantial degree o f structural 
continuity is the norm:
This particular example is in fact unrepresentative in at 
least one important respect: Fresnel’s equations are taken 
over completely intact into the superseding theory -  
reappearing there newly interpreted but, as mathematical 
equations, entirely unchanged. The much more common 
pattern is that old equations reappear as limiting cases of 
the new -  that is, the old and new equations are strictly 
inconsistent, but the new tend to the old as some quantity 
tends to some limit. (Worrall, 1989, p. 160, original 
emphasis)
17 Although this is clearly the form o f the pessimistic induction that the WESRist needs it 
should be noted that Worrall doesn’t mention Ramsey-sentences at all in the papers in 
which he discusses these issues (1989, 1994). Rather, he says that the equations of a theory 
survive ([partially] reinterpreted). However, taking the view that the equations of a theory 
survive (as opposed to the theory’s Ramsey-sentence) seems hard to justify philosophically 
because it seems to be only little more than a contingent fact that parts o f a theory happen to 
be expressed mathematically (as equations) and other parts do not.
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Since the WESRist only claims that a mature theory’s Ramsey-sentence is 
typically approximately true, a substantial degree of structural continuity is 
all the WESRist would expect, so theory changes along these lines seem to 
be compatible with WESR.
However, Mark Newman (not to be confused with Max Newman, 
another critic o f structural realism) objects that:
this account is not sufficiently clear. It is far from obvious 
that we can successfully compare the equations of quantum 
mechanics with those o f classical dynamics. In the former 
case we are dealing with operators operating on rays in 
Hilbert space, in the latter we are talking of continuous real 
valued functions. In what ways and to what degree can 
these equations be said to be similar? (Newman, 2005, p.
1378)
Redhead (2001a) has answered this question on Worrall’s behalf. 
Discussing the shift from Galilean space-time to Minkowski space-time 
brought about by special relativity and the shift from classical to quantum 
mechanics he notes that although:
we do not have continuous transformation o f structure as 
we move away from the classical structure characterised by 
1/c = 0 in the case of relativity, and h = 0 in the case of 
quantum mechanics to the new structures with non-zero 
values of 1/c or h (Redhead, 2001a, p. 88)
nonetheless:
there is a definite sense in which the new structures grow 
naturally, although discontinuously, out of the old 
structures. To the mathematician introducing a metric in 
geometry, or non-commutativity in algebra are very natural
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moves. So looked at from the right perspective, the new 
structures do seem to arise in a natural, if not inescapable, 
way out of the old structures. (Redhead, 2001a, p. 88)
There is, nonetheless, a serious difficulty facing Worrall’s 
argument for WESR, which is that, despite first appearances, the sort of 
continuity o f structure displayed in the Fresnel/Maxwell case does not 
support Worrall’s attenuated pessimistic induction. This is because not all 
the structure of Fresnel’s theory is (even approximately) preserved in 
Maxwell’s theory.
Worrall acknowledges that Fresnel was committed to the existence 
of a “luminiferous ether” with various properties: it was taken to be all 
pervading, elastic, solid etc. Worrall further argues that this ether was not an 
idle posit but reasoning about it enabled Fresnel to arrive at his equations 
(the equations that reappear in Maxwell’s theory). So it seems that Worrall 
would agree that (an important) claim of Fresnel’s theory was that, “The 
ether is an all-pervading, elastic, solid and is the medium through which 
light is transmitted” but would contend that this claim is just the sort of 
claim that gets left behind in scientific revolutions.
There is, however, a serious problem with this contention, which is 
that any (contingent) claim carries with it a structural commitment (in that it 
will not be possible to satisfy it in every structure and thus, if  the claim is 
part of a theory, it puts a restriction on the possible structures that satisfy the 
theory) so there is no such thing as a (contingent) claim that expresses only 
the sort of content that the WESRist is happy to see abandoned. Consider, 
for example, the belief that the ether was a solid. If the ether was thought to 
be a solid then it was presumably thought that any finite part o f the ether 
would consist of finitely many constituent particles. In so far as the 
electromagnetic field can be said to have constituent parts at all they are 
space-time points, and a finite part of the electromagnetic field consists of 
continuously many. This suggests that the ether and the electromagnetic 
field are structurally very dissimilar.
All we seem to have in the Fresnel/Maxwell case is structural 
continuity with respect to the parts of the theory (Fresnel’s equations) that
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happen (as a matter of fact) to be expressed mathematically, not (even 
approximate) continuity with respect to the entire theory structure, which is 
what the WESRist would expect.
In the light o f this consideration, the WESRist might be tempted to 
argue that one should be a selective structural realist -  a realist not with 
respect to the structure of the whole o f a successful theory but only with 
respect to the structure of certain parts of a successful theory. This response 
is similar to the responses of Psillos and Kitcher, discussed in the previous 
two subsections. Perhaps a response along these lines can be made to work 
for the WESRist (and perhaps also for the conventional realist) but, as we 
have seen, there are problems that make this response unconvincing. In 
particular, it seems to be difficult to provide an independent criterion that 
identifies the parts of theories about which we should be (structural) realists, 
so the move looks rather ad hoc.
2.6. A Novel Response to the Pessimistic Induction
It will be argued in this subsection that, despite the fact that the conventional 
realist’s and WESRist’s responses to the pessimistic induction seem 
unconvincing, there is still room for a degree of optimism in the face o f the 
pessimistic induction. A little more science fiction will help explain why. 
Consider a species of alien that started developing mature (i.e. successful) 
scientific theories 1,000 years ago. Assume that over the last 1,000 years 
they have had, at any given time, 100 theories. Let’s suppose that, o f all 
possible successful theories they could devise, only 10% are approximately 
true. But let’s also assume that, if a successful theory is radically false, then 
there is a 50% chance that, over the course of 100 years it will be “found 
out” and replaced with another successful theory, whereas, if a successful 
theory is approximately true, it is bound to be retained.
At the dawn of their science they have 100 successful theories and 
(typically) 10 o f these are approximately true, while 90 are radically false. 
After 100 years they will have (typically) replaced 45 (50% of 90) o f the 
radically false theories with 45 new successful theories, o f which (typically) 
4.5 will be approximately true. They will have retained the 10
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approximately true original theories (along with 45 of the radically false 
original theories). So after 100 years their science will consist o f 100 
theories, of which typically 14.5 will be approximately true and 85.5 will be 
radically false. After another 100 years they will have (typically) replaced
42.75 (50% of 85.5) of their radically false theories with 42.75 new 
successful theories, o f which (typically) 4.275 will be approximately true. 
They will have retained the 14.5 approximately true old theories (along with
42.75 of the radically false old theories). So after 200 years their science 
will consist o f 100 theories, o f which typically 18.775 will be approximately 
true and 81.225 will be radically false.
The change in the percentage of approximately true theories held 
by the aliens over their 1,000 year history is illustrated in figure 4a. In this 
case both the premise and the conclusion of the pessimistic induction* are 
true.18 It is true that:
At most past moments, most successful theories that were held at the time 
and had been around for less than 100 years were radically false.
because, at any past moment, typically 90% of the successful theories that 
have been around for less than 100 years are radically false. It is also true 
that:
At the current moment, most successful theories that we hold and have been 
around for less than 100 years are (probably) radically false.
because, at the current moment, typically 90% of the successful theories that 
have been around for less than 100 years are radically false.
But, despite the fact that the conclusion of the pessimistic 
induction* is true of the aliens’ science, the aliens have reason for optimism 
about their science, because there is definitely progress: a greater percentage
18 This response would also work as a response to the standard pessimistic induction. 
Attention is focussed on the pessimistic induction* here, because it has been argued that 
this is more worrisome for the realist than the standard pessimistic induction.
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of it is becoming approximately true as time goes by. Indeed, in 4,000 years 
time (typically) over 90% of the theories that they hold will be 
approximately true, as illustrated in figure 4b.
What this shows is that, even if the pessimistic induction* is 
sound, and even if one is not convinced by the conventional realist and 
WESRist responses to the pessimistic induction,19 then, although we cannot 
uphold conventional realism (or WESR), which holds that it is rational to 
believe that (the Ramsey-sentences of) our mature theories are 
approximately true (because, in the situation envisaged most mature 
successful theories are not approximately true, nor need their Ramsey- 
sentences be) there could still be room for a degree of optimism: it would 
still be possible that science is progressing, even with regard to its claims 
about the unobservable world. So one could still hold a position that was 
essentially realist in spirit.
2.7. Section Summary
It has been argued that Lewis’ critique of the pessimistic induction rests on a 
highly questionable assumption and that although Lange’s critique does 
undermine the argument as it is usually stated, one can formulate a version 
o f the pessimistic induction that is immune to Lange’s critique of the 
original. It has also been argued that the conventional realist’s and the 
WESRist’s responses to the pessimistic induction are unconvincing. This 
seems to be a problem for WESR (and conventional realism). (However, it 
has been argued that one could still uphold a position that was broadly 
realist in spirit.)
3. Chapter Summary
19 If one o f these responses to the standard pessimistic induction could be made convincing 
there is no reason to suppose that it would not work as a response to the pessimistic 
induction*.
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It has been argued that the no miracles argument is not compelling and so 
that WESR’s ability to accommodate the argument is no particular virtue of 
the position. It has been further argued that the WESRist’s response to the 
pessimistic induction is unconvincing. This suggests that Worrall’s 
arguments for WESR do not provide sufficient motivation for one to adopt 
the position.
Percentage of alien theories 
that are approximately true
40
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o 200 400 600 800 1000
Years since the dawn of 
mature alien science
Figure 4a: The development of alien science over 1,000 years, assuming 
10% of successful theories are approximately true and there is a 50% chance 
that a radically false successful theory will be “found out” in any 100 year 
period.
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Percentage of alien theories 
that are approximately true
100
80
60
40
20
0
Oo 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Years since the dawn 
of mature alien science
Figure 4b: The development of alien science over 5,000 years, assuming 
10% of successful theories are approximately true and there is a 50% chance 
that a radically false successful theory will be “found out” in any 100 year 
period.
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Chapter 2 
An Objection to Weak Epistemic Structural Realism
In the previous chapter it was argued that Worrall’s argument in favour of 
WESR is not compelling. That does not of course mean that WESR is not 
the correct position in the scientific realism debate. In this chapter an 
argument that suggests that WESR is probably not a tenable position is put 
forward. (A discussion of arguably the most devastating criticism of WESR, 
Newman’s objection [Newman, 1928] is postponed for consideration in 
chapter 4, since it also affects SESR, which is the subject of chapter 3.)
One of the conventional realist’s objections to instrumentalism is 
that it is impossible to draw a distinction between theoretical terms and 
observational terms that is both sharp and principled. (The instrumentalist 
seems to need such a distinction, since he claims that there is a significant 
difference in kind between these terms: observational terms refer, whereas 
theoretical terms do not.) This objection seems to work equally well against 
the WESRist: if there is no sharp and principled distinction between 
theoretical and observational terms then there seems to be no principled way 
to decide whether or not a given term ought to be Ramseyfied. In this 
chapter the arguments for the claim that there is no sharp and principled 
distinction between theoretical terms and observational terms are outlined, 
as are various attempts that have been made to defeat or evade these 
arguments. The discussion concentrates on the consequences for WESR.
1. The Observational Term/Theoretical Term Distinction
1.1. Putnam’s Critique of the Distinction
Putnam (1962) argues that it is not possible to distinguish observational 
terms from theoretical terms as follows. If observational terms are terms that 
can only be used to refer to (sets of [tuples of]) observable objects, then
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there are none. Even a paradigm observation term, like “bigger than”, can 
perfectly meaningfully be used to talk about unobservable objects, as one 
might state that atoms are bigger than electrons. On the other hand, if  
theoretical terms are those that can only be used to refer to (sets of [tuples 
of]) unobservable objects, then supposedly theoretical terms like “electric 
charge” become observational, because observable objects (e.g. wires) can 
be electrically charged. (Putnam notes that the presence of an electric charge 
can be determined through a simple observation in some cases -  e.g. by 
touching a live wire -  but this does not seem to be exactly to the point here.) 
Putnam’s claim is that most of the non-logical terms in a real language can 
be used to refer to both observable and unobservable objects, so there is no 
reasonable division of non-logical terms in a real language into 
“observational” and “theoretical”.
However, as Suppe (1977) points out, we can contrive an artificial 
language in which some terms may be used to refer only to observable 
objects and others to refer only to unobservable objects. For example, where 
normal English uses the single term “red” the artificial language will use 
two terms, the first, say red0, for observable red objects (e.g. red tables) and 
the second, redt, for unobservable red objects (e.g. red blood cells). In such a 
language observational terms are those that refer to observable objects, 
properties or relations (where observable properties are taken to be sets of 
observable objects and observable relations are taken to be sets o f tuples of 
observable objects) and theoretical terms are taken to be those that refer to 
unobservable objects, properties or relations (where unobservable properties 
are taken to be sets of unobservable objects and unobservable relations are 
taken to be sets of tuples, whose members include at least one unobservable 
object [so relations that connect observables to unobservables are assumed 
to be theoretical]).
That is one possible response. It is not an intuitively appealing one, 
because the language Suppe describes seems to be very different from the 
language we actually use (for scientific, and other, purposes). However, it is 
also not the only possible response to Putnam. Putnam assumes that either a 
predicate is observational if and only if its extension contains only (tuples 
of) observable objects or that a predicate is theoretical if  and only if its
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extension contains only (tuples of) unobservable objects. What Putnam’s 
argument shows is (at best) that this assumption is not tenable. But why 
make this assumption?
The assumption seems to rest on the idea that we can determine 
whether an object is observable or unobservable, but that we cannot 
(directly) determine whether a property or relation is observable or 
unobservable, so whether or not a property or relation is unobservable must 
be defined in terms of whether or not the objects to which it applies are. But 
this idea is surely wrong. Surely we know that red  is an observable property 
as surely and directly as we know that Hilary Putnam is an observable 
object. And surely we know that being a collection o f  super strings is an 
unobservable property as surely and directly as we know that the nearest 
black hole is an unobservable object. It is true that there are some properties 
and relations that we might hesitate to class either way. But it is equally true 
that there are some objects that we might hesitate to class either way (small 
particles of dust, for example). So the idea that we must define the 
observability or unobservability of properties and relations in terms o f the 
observability or unobservability of the objects to which they apply is at least 
questionable.
It seems then that there are at least two possible responses to 
Putnam’s argument against the observational term/theoretical term 
distinction. However, the observational term/theoretical term distinction 
clearly presupposes a distinction between observable objects, properties and 
relations and unobservable objects, properties and relations and it has also 
been argued that this distinction cannot be adequately drawn. One of these 
arguments is discussed in the next subsection.
1.2. Maxwell’s Critique of the Observable/Unobservable Distinction
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Maxwell (1962) argues that the observable/unobservable distinction is 
problematic for essentially two reasons:1
[1] Observability is a matter of degree. There is a continuous transition 
between the observable and the unobservable, so drawing a sharp line 
between the observable and the unobservable will be arbitrary and an 
arbitrary distinction is inappropriate for most philosophical uses. In 
particular, it is inappropriate for the WESRist’s purposes: the WESRist 
takes a fundamentally different attitude to observational and theoretical 
terms (he thinks that the latter, but not the former, need to be Ramseyfied) 
and such a fundamental difference in attitude would be unjustified if the 
distinction between observables and unobservables was arbitrary.
[2] There is nothing that is, in principle, unobservable: over the course of 
time entities tend to become observable (or rather, more observable), 
through the advance of technology. For instance, microbes became more 
observable through the invention of the light microscope, atoms through the 
invention of the electron microscope and electrons through the invention of 
the cloud chamber. So, if theoretical terms are those that refer to objects, 
properties and relations that are in principle unobservable, then there are 
none, and so WESR collapses into conventional realism (because all terms 
are observational, so none needs to be Ramseyfied). On the other hand if 
theoretical terms are those that refer to objects, properties and relations that 
are currently unobservable then WESR may collapse into conventional 
realism in the future (if at some future time everything is observable).
In the introduction to this thesis, observables were roughly characterised as 
those external objects, properties and relations that have a direct counterpart 
in internal experience. This characterisation falls foul of both of Maxwell’s 
arguments. In the first place there are some cases in which it is hard to judge 
whether or not we have a certain experience (e.g. where we are not sure
1 Note that Maxwell himself became an ESRist by 1965. But his brand o f ESR was a form 
of SESR, which does not rely on a distinction between the observable and the unobservable, 
but on a distinction between the internal and the external.
64
Chapter 2
whether or not we can hear a high-pitched whistle). In such cases it is hard 
to say whether or not the putatively corresponding external object, property 
or relation has a direct counterpart in internal experience or not. 
Furthermore, it is not clear what counts as a direct counterpart in some 
cases: is the sense-data track in a sense-data cloud chamber a direct 
counterpart to an electron? In the second case, external objects, properties 
and relations that previously had no direct counterpart in internal experience 
(e.g. microbes) can come to have direct counterparts through the advance of 
technology (e.g. the invention of the microscope). In the light o f this it 
seems doubtful that there is anything that could never, in principle, have a 
direct counterpart. Of course, that does not mean that we cannot find some 
form of the distinction that answers Maxwell’s objections.
1.3. Van Fraassen on the Observable/Unobservable Distinction
The most notable attempt to draw the observable/unobservable distinction in 
recent times was made by van Fraassen (1980), who needs the distinction 
for his constructive empiricism. Van Fraassen concedes that there is a 
continuum between observables and unobservables, however, he argues that 
this only shows that “observable” is a vague predicate (like almost all 
predicates in natural language) and that this doesn’t mean it isn’t useful. He 
thus suggests that a fuzzy distinction between observables and 
unobservables is good enough. Of course, whether or not a fuzzy 
observable/unobservable distinction is good enough depends on what one 
wants to do with the distinction. A fuzzy distinction is inappropriate for the 
WESRist’s purposes: the WESRist Ramseyfies theoretical terms but not 
observational terms and Ramseyfication is an all or nothing matter (a term 
can’t be partially Ramseyfied) so he assumes a sharp distinction between 
observational terms and theoretical terms.
2 In fact, it seems that van Fraassen also needs a sharp distinction. Van Fraassen needs the 
distinction because he suggests that we ought to believe in the existence o f observables but 
be agnostic with regard to the existence o f unobservables. On the face o f it this suggests 
that he could work with a fuzzy distinction by matching the fuzziness o f the distinction with 
the fuzziness of belief. Intuitively, belief (and agnosticism) is not an all or nothing matter,
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Although he protests that he doesn’t need a sharp 
observable/unobservable distinction, in places van Fraassen can be read as 
attempting to draw one. He characterises the distinction as follows: “X is 
observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if  X is present to 
us under those circumstances, then we observe it” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 
16) and elaborates by commenting that:
The human organism is, from the point of view o f physics, 
a certain kind of measuring apparatus. As such it has 
certain inherent limitations -  which will be described in 
detail in the final physics and biology. It is these limitations 
to which the “able” in “observable” refers -  our limitations, 
qua human beings, (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 17)
This suggests the following characterisation of “observable”:
X is observable if and only if there are circumstances (in which we retain 
our capabilities and limitations as human beings) such that, if X is present to 
us under those circumstances, then we can observe it without the aid of 
instruments.3
It will be noted that this definition is not at all in line with our normal use of 
the word observable: we surely do think that we observe objects with 
microscopes that we do not observe unaided. However, this is no real 
objection in this context: if the characterisation succeeds in drawing a sharp
but comes in degrees. However, if van Fraassen doesn’t make a sharp binary distinction 
between belief and agnosticism it is hard to see how his position differs from realism (even 
a realist would presumably admit to some doubt about the existence of gluons). So, as he 
attempts to found this divide on the observable/unobservable distinction, he must also draw 
the latter sharply.
3 An objection that is sometimes raised against van Fraassen’s characterisation is that it 
implies that dinosaurs (for example) are unobservable, since (being unable to travel back in 
time) we are unable to observe them. However, this objection has no force against the 
characterisation attributed to van Fraassen here, since if dinosaurs were present to us, we 
could observe them.
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and principled distinction then it is good enough for the WESRist’s 
purposes.
A more serious objection to this characterisation (in this context) is 
that, on the face of it, this definition does not evade Maxwell’s first 
objection, because it seems that there are cases in which it is not clear 
whether or not we can observe something without the aid of instruments 
(e.g. a high pitched whistle). Furthermore, it makes what is observable 
relative not only to our status as human beings but also to our status as 
individuals (some of us are colour blind, some have more acute hearing than 
others, and so on). Perhaps these objections might be evaded by van 
Fraassen’s reference to the ominous sounding “final biology”, which is 
perhaps meant to tell us exactly what the paradigm human being can 
observe.4 It is also not exactly clear what counts as an instrument: is the 
lensing effect of a temperature gradient in the air an instrument? Perhaps our 
“final physics” will answer these questions. Or perhaps they are more 
properly in the domain of our “final engineering”. So it is at least doubtful 
that this characterisation succeeds in drawing a sharp line. On the other 
hand, the proposal certainly deals with Maxwell’s second argument, because 
in assessing what we can in principle observe, we consider only what we 
can observe with the unaided senses, which will be unaffected by the 
advance of technology (let us ignore the fact that it may vary as humans 
evolve) and relative to which it is clear that not everything is observable.
In fact, even if this characterisation evaded both of Maxwell’s 
arguments Churchland (1982) has argued that it would still fail to draw a 
distinction between observables and unobservables that justified a 
fundamental difference in attitude towards the two because, although the 
distinction that has been drawn is not exactly arbitrary, it does not appear to 
be epistemically relevant. To make his point Churchland asks us to consider 
a species o f alien who are:
4 It is certainly possible to doubt the plausibility o f this vision o f a final biology. However, 
there is no need to make a fuss about this point because there is a more decisive objection to 
van Fraassen’s proposal, which is discussed in the next paragraph.
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able to observe a domain normally closed to us: the 
microworld of virus particles, DNA strands, and large 
protein molecules. Specifically, suppose a race of 
humanoid creatures each of whom is bom with an electron 
microscope permanently in place over his left “eye”. The 
scope is biologically constituted, let us suppose, and it 
projects its image onto a human-style retina, with the rest 
of their neurophysiology paralleling our own. (Churchland,
1982, pp. 43-44)
According to the above definition, vims particles etc. are observable to these 
creatures. Yet the definition denies that vims particle etc. are observable to 
us, “even though we can construct and even i f  we do construct electron 
microscopes o f  identical function, place them over our left eyes, and enjoy 
exactly the same microexperience as the humanoids'’ (Churchland, 1982, p. 
44, original emphasis). Churchland’s point is that there does not appear to 
be an epistemically relevant difference between being bom with an organ 
that functions exactly like an electron microscope and being bom into a 
society that has developed the use of electron microscopes. Yet, according 
to this definition, DNA molecules (etc.) are observable in the former but not 
the latter case. Hence the observable/unobservable distinction, so 
characterised, does not mark out a significant difference in the epistemic 
status of observables and unobservables.
O f course, even if it is tme that the proposal discussed here cannot 
be made to work it does not follow that it is impossible to draw a sharp and 
principled observable/unobservable distinction, but it does at least raise a 
doubt as to the possibility, and the WESRist should find this, at the very 
least, disquieting, because his entire project seems to rest on the assumption 
that we can make a sharp and principled distinction between observational 
and theoretical terms, and our ability to do this rests on our ability to draw a 
sharp and principled distinction between observables and unobservables. In 
sections 2 and 3, two possible ways in which the WESRist might attempt to 
evade this problem by replacing the observational term/theoretical term 
distinction by a somewhat different distinction are considered.
68
Chapter 2
2. The Old Term/New Term Distinction
An option that might tempt the WESRist is to make a distinction not 
between observational and theoretical terms but between old and new terms 
(and Ramseyfy the new terms). New terms would be defined as those that 
have recently been introduced into scientific discourse by a new theory and 
old terms as any others, including terms that were once new. Lewis (1970) 
and Hempel (1966) have both advocated making a distinction between old 
terms and new terms, and the so-called “Munich structuralists” (e.g. Balzer 
et al, 1987) have advocated a similar distinction.
2.1. Hempel and Lewis
Lewis (1970) proposes that whenever a new (or as he puts it, theoretical) 
term is introduced by a theory it should be definable using old terms (some 
of which may once have been new/theoretical terms). Suppose that some 
theory, T, introduces a number of new terms. According to Lewis these 
terms “should denote the components of the unique realization of T if  there 
is one, and should not denote anything otherwise” (Lewis, 1970, pp. 437- 
438). For example, consider a toy theory that consists of the claim:
Vx(Ojx <-> O2X & Nx)
where Oi and O2 are old terms, and N is a new term introduced by the 
theory. According to Lewis, N is defined as follows:
N = X if and only if Vx(0]X <-> O2X & Xx) & (VYVx[Oix <-» O2X & Yx] —» 
X = Y)
That is, N denotes the unique property, X, that satisfies the open formula 
Vx(Oix <-> O2X & Xx). If there is no such unique property, then N denotes 
nothing.
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Lewis’ proposal would not make much sense if one’s intention was 
to go on to Ramseyfy the new terms in the normal way: there would be little 
point in being able to define a term if one was in any case going to replace it 
with an existentially bound variable. However, Lewis’ proposal does cohere 
with a non-standard approach to Ramseyfication, whereby one binds the 
Ramseyfied variables not with standard existential quantifiers but with 
quantifiers that assert the existence and uniqueness o f the referents o f the 
variables that they bind. For example, consider the above toy theory. It’s 
standard Ramsey-sentence is:
3XVx(Ojx <-» O2X & Xx)
On the non-standard approach this becomes:
3!XVx(Ojx *-> 0 2x & Xx)
which is read “There is exactly one (property) X, such tha t...”.5 This 
coheres with Lewis’ approach in that this non-standard Ramsey-sentence 
would be true if and only if the original theory is true, where the term N in 
the original theory is defined as Lewis proposes.
Lewis’ proposal suggests that scientific languages consist of a 
hierarchy of levels, where each level contains terms that were once newly 
introduced by some theory (except, perhaps, the lowest level), the newest 
terms being at the highest level. The terms at the highest level can be 
replaced without loss (except of economy of expression) by terms from 
lower levels (being definable using these terms). So terms at the highest 
level are really redundant. Having got rid of terms at the highest level we
5 The new quantifier is definable using the standard logical terms (including equality). The 
formula 3!X a can be treated as an abbreviation o f the formula 3X (a & VY[axy —» X = 
Y]), where Y is a variable that does not occur free in a, and ocXy is the formula obtained 
from a  by replacing every free X in a  by a Y. So the sentence 3!XVx(OiX <-» 0 2x & Xx) 
can be treated as an abbreviation of 3XVx(0]X <-> 0 2x & Xx & VY[Vx(0|X <-» 0 2x & Yx) 
-»  X = Y).
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can then proceed to get rid of terms at the next highest level. After all, these 
terms were once new, and so were (and thus, still are) definable using older 
terms (i.e. terms from lower levels). Clearly, by repeating this process we 
can get rid of all non-logical terms, except those at the lowest level. 
Ultimately then all terms can be defined using only these lowest level terms.
Lewis’ multi-partite distinction between terms at different levels 
thus reduces to a bipartite distinction between those terms at the lowest level 
and those terms at other levels (all of which can ultimately be defined using 
terms from the lowest level and are thus ultimately redundant). Strangely, 
Lewis does not mention this obvious consequence of his proposal.6 
Consequently, he does not address an obvious question that it suggests: what 
is special about the lowest level terms (that means that they can be 
understood directly, whereas everything else must be ultimately defined 
using them)? A possible answer would be that they are observational terms 
but if  this answer is given then Lewis’ account relies on the
n
observable/unobservable distinction after all.
However, this consequence has been noted by Cruse and Papineau 
(2002), who advocate Lewis’ approach. They deny that the lowest level 
terms must be observational terms, arguing as follows:
The only requirement now being imposed on non- 
theoretical [i.e. the lowest level] terms is that they are not 
understood as denoting just those things which satisfy some 
particular theory. It would require extra empiricist 
presuppositions to infer from this that the relevant 
vocabulary must be ‘observational’ in any substantial
6 It has been suggested to me that Lewis might not accept this consequence, on the grounds 
that there needn’t be a lowest level o f terms. However, as scientific languages are finite 
there can only be finitely many levels o f terms. Hence, if no level is lowest, the levels must 
form a closed loop: apparently low level terms must be defined in terms o f apparently high 
level terms. This is surely not what Lewis had in mind.
7 Lewis may have been willing to accept this, but it is obviously not acceptable if one’s 
reason for adopting the old term/new term distinction is to avoid the need for the 
observational term/theoretical term distinction.
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sense. Without prior empiricist prejudices, why not allow 
that a term could fail to be defined in a theory, and yet be 
neither observational nor logical? Antecedently understood 
[i.e. the lowest level] terms could thus refer to such 
substantial non-logical relations as causation or correlation, 
or indeed to many kinds o f unobservable things. (Cruse and 
Papineau, 2002, pp. 181-182)
O f course, it may be possible to give some other answer that explains why 
these supposedly special terms can be directly understood and others cannot, 
but if no answer is given (and Cruse and Papineau do not provide one) then 
there is surely no reason to suppose that they are special, and it might 
reasonably be concluded that all terms can be directly understood.
Hempel’s (1966) view of the relation between old terms and new 
terms is rather different: he does not claim that new terms must be definable 
using old terms, rather, he is willing to accept that new terms (i.e. terms 
introduced by our most recent theories) can, in general, be directly 
understood. It is not clear that this old term/new term distinction is 
sufficiently sharp: which theories count as our most recent theories? 
Moreover, terms are often used with somewhat different meanings in new 
theories (e.g. “mass” in relativistic mechanics) and in such cases it is not 
clear whether or not the term should count as old or new. Finally, and most 
seriously, it is not at all clear what the philosophical significance of the fact 
that a term was introduced by our most recent theories is even supposed to 
be. It is true that there might be good reasons to be more sceptical with 
regard to our most recent theories than with regard to older theories, because 
they’re not (yet) so well tested, but hard to see why this scepticism should 
manifest itself as a belief in the Ramsey-sentences o f our most recent 
theories but not the unRamseyfied versions of these theories: it would more 
naturally manifest itself as a reduced degree o f belief in both the
O
Ramseyfied and unRamseyfied versions of these theories.
8 It should be noted that Hempel does not put forward the old term/new term distinction in 
relation to Ramseyfication and that the problems that have been mooted here may arise only
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2.2. The Munich Structuralists
The Munich structuralists have introduced a distinction between non- 
theoretical terms and theoretical terms that is somewhat similar to the 
distinction Lewis and Hempel make between old terms and new terms. They 
define a concept to be theoretical, relative to a given theory, if and only if 
the determination of the concept presupposes the laws of the theory (cf. 
Balzer et al, 1987, p. 55). They define a concept to be non-theoretical 
otherwise. So, for example, force is theoretical relative to classical particle 
mechanics, because “Every experimental device to measure force 
presupposes, by its very construction, the validity not only of Newton’s 
[second] fundamental law but also of some more special mechanical law as 
well (e.g. the law of gravitation or some law of elasticity)” (Balzer et al, 
1987, p. 53). Could their non-theoretical/theoretical distinction be used for 
the WESRist’s purposes?
The first thing to note is that, according to this definition, it seems 
that it is (at least in principle) possible for a term to be theoretical relative to 
one theory in which it is used but non-theoretical relative to another theory 
in which it is used. Balzer et al themselves note this (1987, p. 55) and 
suggest that this possibility is in fact realised: they claim that while mass is 
theoretical relative to classical mechanics it is non-theoretical relative to 
stoichiometry (because determination of mass -  allegedly -  does presuppose 
the laws o f classical mechanics whereas it does not presuppose the laws of 
stoichiometry) (stoichiometry is the study of the relationships between 
quantities of reactants and products in chemical reactions).
This suggests that it would not in general be appropriate to 
construct the Ramsey-sentence of a theory by Ramseyfying away the terms 
that are theoretical relative to that theory, because, following that procedure, 
whether or not one had to Ramseyfy away a given term would depend on 
the theory with which one was dealing, but it is difficult to see why this
in this connection: Hempel’s distinction may be suitable for the purposes to which he puts 
it, but it cannot be used by the WESRist to justify Ramseyfication.
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should be so. For example, why must “mass” be Ramseyfied in classical 
particle mechanics, but not stoichiometry? If it is acceptable to take it as a 
primitive non-logical term in one theory, why not in others?9
Another suggestion would be that no terms need to be Ramseyfied 
except those that are theoretical relative to our most recent theories. This 
proposal is very similar to the one based on Hempel’s old term/new term 
distinction, which was discussed in the previous subsection. Like that 
proposal it seems to suffer from lack of motivation: it is just not clear why 
terms that are theoretical relative to our most recent theories need to be 
Ramseyfied while terms that are theoretical relative to older theories do not.
3. The Crude Fact/Scientific Fact Distinction
Poincare (1905, especially part 3, chapter 10) makes a distinction between 
“crude” and “scientific” facts. (Duhem [1906, especially part 2, chapter 4] 
makes a similar distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” facts.) 
Crude facts are essentially theory free, whereas scientific facts are arrived at 
via inferences from crude facts together with a number of theoretical 
assumptions. For example, “the needle points to ‘10’” would qualify as a 
crude fact (if it was true) whereas “the voltage is 10V” would qualify as a 
scientific fact (if it was true).
The first obstacle facing the WESRist who wishes to make use o f 
this distinction is that he needs a distinction between two types of term, not 
a distinction between two types of fact. A natural way to extract a 
distinction between crude and scientific terms from Poincare’s distinction 
between crude and scientific facts would be to define a term as scientific if 
and only if all the facts in which it occurs are scientific facts. At first sight it 
seems that terms like “voltage” could not be involved in crude facts, because
9 Again, it should be noted that the Munich structuralists do not put forward their non- 
theoretical term/theoretical term distinction in relation to Ramseyfication and that the 
problems that have been mooted here may arise only in this connection: their distinction 
may be suitable for the purposes to which they put it, but it cannot be used by the WESRist 
to justify Ramseyfication.
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it seems that to judge whether or not a claim about voltage was true would 
necessarily involve some theoretical assumptions. (Whereas it does seem 
that terms like “needle” could be involved in scientific facts, e.g. “the needle 
indicates a voltage of 10V”.) However, this is not true. It is possible to judge 
that the claim “the voltage is 10V or it is not the case that the voltage is 
10V” is true without any theoretical assumptions (it is just an instance o f the 
law of excluded middle). This means that, according to the definition, “the 
voltage is 10V or it is not the case that the voltage is 10V” is a crude fact 
(since one doesn’t need any physics to judge that it is true). Hence, 
according to the proposed definition, “voltage” is not a scientific term. 
Indeed, it is clear that the proposed definition would classify no terms as 
scientific. However, it is easy enough to modify the definition to avoid this 
objection. A term can be defined as scientific if and only if all the contingent 
facts in which it occurs are scientific facts.
However, the second obstacle facing the WESRist who wishes to 
make use of this distinction is not so easily overcome. The (modified) 
proposed definition will only draw a sharp and principled distinction 
between crude and scientific terms (i.e. a distinction of the sort that the 
WESRist needs) if the distinction between crude and scientific facts is itself 
sharp and principled, and it is certainly not obvious that this is so.
Worrall (1991) notes that, in a sense, all facts (about the external 
world) are scientific:
Are we not, in making any assertion about the world, no 
matter how “empirical”, really making certain assumptions, 
so that even the crudest o f crude facts are assumption or 
theory-impregnated?
At any rate, if our factual statements remain 
objective -  about the “external world” rather than our 
present sensations -  then the answer...is obviously “yes” : 
even in reporting that the end of a certain pointer coincided 
roughly with the mark “ 10” on some scale we are assuming 
that the pointer really exists, that we are not constantly
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hallucinating, that a malicious demon is not misleading us, 
and so on. (Worrall, 1991, p. 334)
If  all (contingent) facts (about the external world) are scientific then 
(according to the proposed definition of scientific terms) all terms (that refer 
to the external world) are scientific. That implies that there is a sharp crude 
term/scientific term distinction, but it is not appropriate for the WESRist’s 
purposes (because it makes all terms that refer to the external world 
scientific and hence collapses the WESR into SESR).
However, Worrall goes on to point out that although there is a 
sense in which all facts (about the external world) are scientific it is 
nonetheless the case that in practice there is always a level of facts that can 
be taken as crude, because nearly everyone agrees that they are true. Taking 
this approach, the distinction between crude and scientific facts is not a 
distinction between facts that are theory free and facts that are not theory 
free but a distinction between facts that are widely agreed on and facts that 
are not so widely agreed on. However, this distinction is not sharp: there is 
no obvious degree of agreement that is the smallest degree o f “wide” 
agreement (unless perhaps one takes “wide agreement” to mean “universal 
agreement”, but on that account it seems that there would be no crude facts 
about the external world after all, since there is always a Cartesian who is 
prepared to dispute any alleged fact about the external world). This means 
that the corresponding distinction between crude and scientific terms would 
also not be sharp, and thus would again not be suitable for the WESRist’s 
purposes.10
4. Chapter Summary
10 Note that, in this form, the crude fact/scientific fact distinction becomes rather like 
Quine’s (1960, especially pp. 40-46) observation sentence/non-observation sentence 
distinction. Roughly speaking, Quine defines an observation sentence as one whose truth- 
value most speakers o f the language would agree on, if they were exposed to the same 
stimuli for a given period of time. Quine explicitly notes that his distinction between 
observation sentences and non-observation sentences is not a sharp one, and indeed he does 
not require a sharp distinction for his purposes.
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It has been argued that neither the traditional observational term/theoretical 
term distinction (as founded on the observable/unobservable distinction), 
nor the old term/new term distinction, nor a distinction based on Poincare’s 
crude fact/scientific fact distinction, is suitable for the WESRists’ purposes. 
The difficulty of drawing a sharp and principled bifurcation o f the 
vocabulary that is suitable for the WESRists’ purposes is a serious problem 
for the WESRist. Indeed, WESR appears to be bankrupt unless some such 
distinction can be made.
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Chapter 3 
Strong Epistemic Structural Realism
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the difference between 
WESR and SESR is that while the WESRist thinks that theoretical terms 
(i.e. terms referring to unobservable objects, properties and relations) need 
to be Ramseyfied (leaving Ramsey-sentences containing only logical and 
observational terms) the SESRist thinks that external terms (i.e. terms 
referring to external objects, properties and relations) need to be Ramseyfied 
(leaving Ramsey-sentences containing only logical and internal terms).
In this chapter the forms o f SESR espoused by Russell, Maxwell 
and Zahar are outlined and criticised. A discussion o f arguably the most 
devastating criticism of SESR, Newman’s objection (Newman, 1928), is, 
however, postponed for separate consideration in the next chapter.
Russell’s (1912, 1927) argument for his structuralist thesis rests on 
his so-called “principle of acquaintance”. I call it the “semantic argument” 
for SESR. Russell also attempts to argue for the structural realist’s realist 
thesis, via the so-called “Helmholtz-Weyl principle” and “mirroring 
relations principle”. I call this the “epistemic argument” for SESR. These 
arguments are the subject of sections 1 and 2 o f this chapter. One could also 
envisage adapting Russell’s semantic argument to support the WESRist’s 
structuralist thesis. This possibility is discussed in section 3.
Maxwell puts forward what I call the “scientific argument” for 
SESR. This is discussed in section 4.
The most notable contemporary SESRist is Zahar (1996, 2001, 
2004). His most significant contribution is his attempt to place SESR in an 
adverbialist indirect realist framework, as opposed to the sense-data indirect 
realist framework used by Russell and, less explicitly, Maxwell. One can 
extrapolate from what Zahar says an argument for his adverbialist version of 
the SESRist’s structuralist thesis that is closely linked to Russell’s semantic 
argument. Zahar’s approach to SESR is discussed in section 5.
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1. Russell’s Semantic Argument for SESR
Russell puts forward his version of SESR most explicitly in The Problems o f  
Philosophy (especially chapters 3 and 5) (Russell, 1912) and The Analysis o f  
Matter (especially chapter 24) (Russell, 1927).
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, all forms o f SESR 
presuppose indirect realism. Russell’s arguments presuppose a form of 
indirect realism that would nowadays be called sense-data indirect realism. 
Sense-data indirect realism is to be contrasted with adverbialist indirect 
realism (as espoused by, for example, Ducasse, 1942 and Chisholm, 1957). 
The sense-data indirect realist asserts that what we directly perceive are not 
external objects but internal objects (sense-data). The adverbialist, on the 
other hand, takes an experience that may be described as “the sensing of a 
table” (for example) to involve not two objects (a sensor and a sensed 
object) that stand in a certain binary relation (sensing) but a single object (a 
sensor) that has a certain monadic property (“sensing tablely”). On both 
accounts an external object (e.g. a table) might be the cause of the sensing, 
but it also might not. (However, in so far as both accounts are forms of 
realism, both are committed to the claim that we have good reason to hold 
that an external table is at least usually the cause of an apparent sensing of a 
table.)
Russell’s arguments will not be criticised for relying on the sense- 
data approach to indirect realism. This is because it seems likely that 
Russell’s arguments could be translated without loss into the adverbialist 
indirect realist framework (this possibility is considered more closely 
section 5). Although the sense-data indirect realist disagrees with the 
adverbialist indirect realist on ontological matters (with regard to the 
existence of sense-data), the two positions are essentially in agreement on 
epistemological matters and Russell’s arguments rely ultimately only on the 
epistemological claims of the sense-data indirect realist framework.
1.1. Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance
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Russell’s semantic argument for SESR is founded on, (i) his theory of 
reference and meaning, and, (ii) his sense-data indirect realist epistemology. 
With regard to the former, Russell’s view (although he never quite puts it 
this way) is that there are two types of term: primitive terms and non­
primitive terms. There are correspondingly two routes o f reference: 
acquaintance and description. A speaker can use a primitive term to refer 
only if he is acquainted with the object, property or relation of reference. 
Non-primitive terms should be taken as abbreviations for definite 
descriptions, formed, ultimately, using only primitive (and logical) terms.1 A 
speaker can use a non-primitive term to refer only if he can use all the terms 
involved in the underlying definite description to refer: the term refers to the 
unique object, property or relation that satisfies the description (if there is 
one: if there isn’t the term does not refer). This can be summarised as 
follows:
[1] If x can use a primitive term to refer then x is acquainted with the 
referent.
[2] If x can use a non-primitive term to refer then x can use all the terms 
involved in the underlying definite description to refer: the term refers to 
whatever satisfies the description.
Russell takes it that meaning and reference are intimately connected. His 
view (although, again, he never quite puts it this way) is that:
1 A definite description (of an individual) behaves syntactically like a name and refers to an
individual, but contains a formula. For example, if just one object has both the property P
and the property Q, then we can form a definite description referring to this object from the
formula Px & Qx, i.e. ix(Px & Qx), which is read, “the (object) x such that x is P and x is
Q” (see Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, chapter 12, for a formal introduction to definite 
descriptions o f individuals). In second-order logic one can form definite descriptions of  
properties and relations. For example, if there is just one property that two objects, a and b, 
share, then we can form a definite description referring to this property from the formula Xa
& Xb, i.e. iX(Xa & Xb), which is read “the (property) X such that a is X and b is X”.
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[1] If x understands a primitive term (i.e. if the term is meaningful to x) then 
x is acquainted with the referent of the term.
[2] If x understands a non-primitive term then x understands all the terms 
involved in the underlying definite description.
[3] If x understands a sentence then x understands the non-logical terms in 
the sentence.
Maxwell (1970a, p. 181 and 1970b, p. 15) calls this Russell’s “principle of 
acquaintance”. Russell’s own formulation of the principle is as follows: 
“Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly o f  
constituents with which we are acquainted’ (Russell, 1912, p.32, original 
emphasis). (This is not meant to imply that we can’t refer to things with 
which we are not acquainted, but only that if  we do so, we must do so via 
descriptions, where the direct referents of the terms in these descriptions are 
things with which we are acquainted.) The formulation given here is closer 
to Maxwell’s: “All the descriptive (non-logical) terms in any meaningful 
sentence refer to items with which we are acquainted” (Maxwell, 1970a, p. 
181).
Note that parts [1], [2] and [3] of the principle of acquaintance 
provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for x to understand primitive 
terms, non-primitive terms and sentences, respectively. (Likewise, Russell’s 
and Maxwell’s formulations of the principle also state necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for a sentence to be meaningful.) The principle is thus a 
partial, not a complete, theory of meaning. However, this is all Russell 
needs for his semantic argument for SESR. So it is no objection to the 
principle of acquaintance (at least, not in this context) that it does not 
provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for meaningfulness. 
Plausibly, if we wanted to elaborate the principle into a full theory o f 
meaning, what we would need to add to [1] is the claim that x also knows 
that the relevant thing with which he is acquainted is the referent of the 
primitive term in question and what we would need to add to [2] is the claim 
that x knows that the non-primitive term in question is an abbreviation of the 
relevant definite description. However, as noted, these additions are
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superfluous in this context, and, moreover, Russell does not himself suggest 
them.
It may be wondered on what basis Russell asserts the principle of 
acquaintance. In fact, he seems to take it to be almost self-evident. He 
claims that, “The chief reason for supposing the principle true is that it 
seems scarcely possible to believe that we can make a judgement or 
entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or 
supposing about.” (Russell, 1911, p. 209). It is not obvious how this is 
supposed to support the principle of acquaintance. If we read it as “The 
chief reason for supposing the principle true is that it seems scarcely 
possible to believe that we can make a judgement or entertain a supposition 
without being acquainted with the referents o f  the primitive terms that we 
use to make the judgement or supposition” then it does support the principle 
of acquaintance. But with this reading it seems more than “scarcely 
possible” that the claim Russell rejects is true: it seems we can entertain the 
supposition that “Caesar was bald” without being acquainted with Caesar 
and Caesar appears to be a primitive term in this supposition. Russell would 
say that “Caesar” is a non-primitive name, which explains how we can 
entertain suppositions about Caesar even though we are not acquainted with 
him, but as Russell’s only argument for the principle rests on an appeal to 
intuitions about what seems possible, it is a serious worry that these 
intuitions do not seem to support the principle.
Moreover, the claim that a primitive term is meaningful to 
someone only if  he is acquainted with the referent is highly problematic 
when we consider primitive terms referring to properties and relations 
(assuming that there are such terms). What can it even mean to be 
acquainted with a property or relation (rather than just instances of the 
property or relation)? Russell was prepared to bite the Platonic bullet and 
thought that we really do become “acquainted” with properties and relations 
(and not just their instances). He claimed that, “Not only are we aware of 
particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows and 
have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow” (Russell, 
1911, p. 203, original emphasis) and again that, “In addition to our 
acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with
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what we shall call, universals...such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, 
and so on” (Russell, 1912, p. 28, original emphasis) but few people would 
be prepared to accept that these days (and if they were prepared to accept it, 
they ought to explain how and in what sense we can be acquainted with a 
universal).
In fact, we can get round this problem by modifying the principle 
of acquaintance, making the condition for the understanding of a predicate 
not acquaintance with the universal to which it refers but only acquaintance 
with an instance of the universal to which it refers. That is, we can make do 
with the following version of the principle of acquaintance:
[1] If x understands a primitive name then x is acquainted with the object to 
which the name refers.
[2] If x understands a primitive predicate then x is acquainted with at least 
one of the objects (pairs, triples, etc.) to which it applies.
[3] If x understands a non-primitive term then x understands all the terms 
involved in the underlying definite description.
[4] If x understands a sentence then x understands the non-logical terms in 
the sentence.
This version o f the principle of acquaintance does not imply that we must be 
acquainted with universals in order to understand universal terms, and, as 
we shall see shortly, it is still strong enough for Russell’s argument for 
SESR to go through. The claim here is only that a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for one to understand a universal term is that one must 
be acquainted with at least one object (or pair or triple etc. o f objects) to 
which it applies. On the face o f it this has some plausiblity: it does seem 
reasonable to suppose that the word “yellow” (for example) could not be 
meaningful to someone unless he was acquainted with at least one yellow 
object (it will be argued that this is in fact false, but at least it seems 
plausible at first sight). Henceforth in this thesis the phrase “acquaintance 
with a universal” is used to mean acquaintance with an instance of a 
universal.
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However, note that it is not plausible to say that this version of the 
principle of acquaintance could be modified to provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for x to understand all primitive terms. What could be 
added to [2] to provide a sufficient condition for x to understand a primitive 
predicate? Intuitively, what we require to make the condition sufficient is 
not just that the speaker is acquainted with a yellow thing but also that he 
can pick out the yellowness of the thing as the property to which “yellow” is 
supposed to refer. However, (part of) the point o f Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument (Wittgenstein, 1953, section 243) is that we beg the 
question if we suppose that the speaker can pick out yellowness in this way. 
Suppose a speaker sees a yellow object and says to himself “I shall call 
things like that ‘yellow’ ”. If this is all he says to himself -  if he does not 
further specify the way in which things must be like the object in question in 
order for them to be called “yellow” -  then he will call everything “yellow”, 
because everything is similar to the object in question in some respect. On 
the other hand, if  he can tell himself what the relevant respect is (with a 
statement of the form “I shall call things like that in respect X ‘yellow’ ”) 
then (since the relevant respect is yellowness) he can already refer to yellow 
(with the term X) in which case this explanation of how someone can refer 
to yellow with the word “yellow” presupposes that he can already refer to 
yellow with some other word, and is in this sense question begging. 
However, although these problems are serious for someone who wants to 
elaborate the principle of acquaintance into a full theory of meaning they do 
not affect Russell’s semantic argument for SESR.
1.2. Russell’s Indirect Realism
Since, as noted, Russell presupposes sense-data indirect realism his view is 
that we are not acquainted with external objects, properties and relations but 
only sense-data objects, properties and relations:
2 Actually this isn’t quite true: Russell does not think we are only acquainted with sense- 
data objects, properties and relations. He claims that we are also acquainted “by memory” 
(Russell, 1912, p. 26, original emphasis) (presumably with memories) and “by
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we have acquaintance with anything of which we are 
directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of 
inference or any knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence 
of my table I am acquainted with the sense-data that make 
up the appearance of my table -  its colour, shape, hardness, 
smoothness etc...M y knowledge of the table as a physical 
object, on the contrary, is not direct knowledge. (Russell,
1912, pp. 25-26)
Russell’s claim that we are acquainted with particular sense-data 
seems relatively straightforward, but the claim that we are acquainted with 
properties and relations of sense-data might mean that either, (i) the 
properties and relations with which we are acquainted are only properties 
and relations of sense-data, or that, (ii) the properties and relations with 
which we are acquainted are at least properties and relations of sense-data 
but might also be properties and relations of external objects. Russell’s view 
(at least, prior to Newman’s objection: see chapter 4) is that there are no 
“cross category” properties or relations (or at least we have no reason to 
think that there are any) so the universals with which we are acquainted do 
not pertain to external objects but are solely properties and relations of 
sense-data. Russell puts this view forward in a letter to A.J. Ayer (and 
elsewhere):
You say that from the fact that the perceived qualities of 
physical objects are causally dependent upon the state of 
the percipient, it does not follow that the object does not 
really have them. This, o f course, is true. What does follow 
is that there is no reason to suppose that it has them. From
introspection” (Russell, 1912, p. 26, original emphasis), which gives us awareness o f our 
own awareness (acquaintance with our being acquainted) and that we are probably 
acquainted with ourselves (Russell, 1912, pp. 27-28). However, these exceptions are not 
important for present purposes.
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the fact that when I wear blue spectacles, things look blue, 
it does not follow that they are not blue, but it does follow 
that I have no reason to suppose they are blue. (Russell,
1969, p. 179)
Russell’s point is that even if one was, in fact, acquainted with some 
property o f (or relation between) external objects one would not know this 
to be the case, because one would not be acquainted with it as a property o f 
(or relation between) external objects, but only as a property o f (or relation 
between) sense-data. Given this, the working assumption should be that one 
is not acquainted with properties of (or relations between) external objects.3 
In fact, it seems to be a category mistake even to say that an external 
property or relation could be like a sense-datum property or relation. The 
two are so radically different that the comparison seems to make no more 
sense than the claim that the number eight is like a spray of salt water on the 
sea front.
1.3. Russell’s Argument for his Structuralist Thesis
Given this background, we can now consider Russell’s argument for his 
structuralist thesis. Consider any statement that we know to be 
(approximately) true. Presumably, such a statement must be meaningful to
3 This seems to be Russell’s view, most o f the time prior to Newman’s objection, but he 
does at one point back away from it to a degree, arguing that although we do not know that 
the properties and relations in the two realms are similar there could be grounds to suppose 
that they are: “we know nothing o f the intrinsic quality o f the physical world, and therefore 
do not know whether it is, or is not, very different from that o f percepts...If there is any 
intellectual difficulty in supposing that the physical world is intrinsically quite unlike that 
o f percepts, that is a reason for supposing that there is not this complete unlikeness” 
(Russell, 1927, p. 264). An intellectual difficulty (of the sort intended) in supposing that 
something is true may provide some reason for supposing it is not, but not necessarily a 
very compelling reason. Most people find that there is intellectual difficulty in supposing 
that there are more than three spatial dimensions, or that there are the same number o f even 
numbers as natural numbers, but that should not stop us believing these things.
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us. So, by the principle of acquaintance, all the non-logical terms in the 
statement are meaningful to us. There are only two types of non-logical 
term: primitive terms and non-primitive terms. By the principle of 
acquaintance, a primitive term is meaningful only if  it refers to an item of 
acquaintance. Consequently, given Russell’s indirect realism, a primitive 
name must name an internal object. Moreover, at least some of the objects 
(pairs, triple, etc.) to which primitive predicates apply must be internal. But 
then (given that Russell thinks that there are no cross-category predicates) 
these predicates must apply only to internal objects (pairs, triples, etc.). 
Hence they must be internal predicates. Hence, the primitive terms are all 
internal terms. But a non-primitive term is meaningful only if it is an 
abbreviation o f a description formed using ultimately only primitive terms. 
Hence, in its unabbreviated form, the statement contains only primitive 
terms. Hence, in its unabbreviated form, the statement contains only logical 
and internal terms. Hence any statement we know to be (approximately) true 
is constructed using only logical and internal terms. This implies that:
The knowledge provided to us by our mature scientific theories consists (in 
its ultimate form) of statements constructed using only logical and internal 
terms.
This was referred to as a corollary of the SESRist’s structuralist thesis in the 
introduction to this thesis. But, as noted there, Russell was writing before 
the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR was developed, so we may take it 
that, for Russell at least, this “corollary” is the structuralist thesis.
Note that, even if this argument works, it does not establish SESR, 
because it does nothing to support the structural realist’s realist claim: it 
does not follow from the alleged fact that if  we have knowledge of the 
external world then it consists of claims constructed using only logical and 
internal terms that we actually do have such knowledge. What the argument 
does suggest (if it is sound) is that something like SESR is probably the 
strongest form of realism that could reasonably be upheld.
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The principle of acquaintance is clearly a crucial part of Russell’s 
argument (the other crucial part being his indirect realism). In subsections 
1.4 and 1.5 objections to the principle o f acquaintance are put forward.
1.4. Kripkean Objections to the Principle of Acquaintance
As noted, Russell’s principle of acquaintance (i.e. his [partial] theory of 
meaning) is intimately connected to his (partial) theory of reference. Kripke 
(1981, especially pp. 80-91) has put forward a number of objections to this 
“description theory of reference”. It may be thought that even if  these 
undermined Russell’s theory of reference that would not undermine the 
principle of acquaintance, because although Russell thought that meaning 
and reference were intimately connected, there is no reason why one could 
not combine the partial theory of meaning embodied in the principle of 
acquaintance with a non-Russellian theory of reference, e.g. the causal 
theory. However, because Russell’s theories of reference and meaning are 
so intimately connected some of Kripke’s arguments against the description 
theory of reference can easily be turned into arguments against the principle 
of acquaintance.
The principle of acquaintance implies that if  we understand the 
(apparent) name “Julius Caesar” then we must be taking it as an 
abbreviation for a definite description. One possible objection is that the 
apparent name is meaningful to many people (children, for example) who 
know no more about Julius Caesar than that he was a Roman emperor, or 
some equally mdefinite description, and -  to forestall a possible attempted 
counter -  it is quite possible that some of them have forgotten how they 
came by the name. This objection, however, is not very compelling, because 
it does seem fairly plausible to say that in such cases people who use the 
term only partially understand what it means.
A second possible objection is that the principle of acquaintance 
seems to imply that a number o f statements that appear to be synthetic are 
actually analytic. For example, if the definite description associated with
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“Julius Caesar” is “the Roman Emperor from 49 B.C. to 44 B.C.” then it is 
analytically true that Julius Caesar was the Roman Emperor in 49 B.C.4 
This, however, appears to be a synthetic truth. However, the proponent of 
the principle o f acquaintance can perhaps bite the bullet here and argue that 
more statements are analytic than we normally think because many analytic 
truths (like many mathematical truths) are (although a priori true) not 
obviously true.
A third possible objection in this vein is based on the observation 
that, even in cases where we think that we can substitute a name for a 
definite description, we may, in fact, be wrong. For example, we might think 
that the name “Godel” can be substituted by the definite description “the 
man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic”5. Although this 
appears to be a definite description it might not be: perhaps the 
incompleteness of arithmetic was in fact discovered by a number of people 
simultaneously but for some reason Godel ended up with all the credit. Or 
perhaps, as Kripke suggests, “the proof simply materialised by a random 
scattering of atoms on a piece of paper -  the man Godel being lucky enough 
to have been present when this improbable event occurred” (Kripke, 1981, 
p. 86). Then, after all, “the man who discovered the incompleteness of 
arithmetic” is not a definite description, so the principle of acquaintance 
implies that the name “Godel” is not meaningful to us, even though we think 
we can give a definite description as substitute for it. The problem is that the 
principle of acquaintance implies that the name “Godel” is meaningful to us, 
if, in fact, “the man who discovered the incompleteness o f arithmetic” is a 
definite description (and we believe this to be the case) but not meaningful 
to us if, in fact, it is not. Yet whether or not the name is meaningful to us 
does not seem to depend on this sort of contingency (although whether or 
not the name refers might do). In fact, if  it did depend on this sort of
4 This description itself uses predicates with which we are not acquainted. Consequently, 
before it could qualify as a legitimate Russellian description these predicates would 
themselves need replacing.
5 See footnote 4.
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contingency then it is doubtful that we would ever know that any non- 
logical term was meaningful, a deeply counter-intuitive result.6
Although the third o f these objections has some force, none of 
them is wholly compelling, because they all rest on our intuitions about 
meaningfulness, and intuitions on this matter are easily deformed by a pet 
theory. An objection that does not have this defect is put forward in the next 
subsection.
1.5. A Formal Objection to the Principle of Acquaintance
As noted, according to Russell, we lack acquaintance not only with long 
dead Roman emperors, but with all external objects, properties and relations. 
As most everyday terms, such as “table” and “red” refer to external objects, 
properties and relations and we obviously understand these terms Russell 
must treat them as abbreviations for definite descriptions. Russell explicitly 
commits himself to this view with regard to “table”, but he is less clear that 
this approach should be adopted for colour words, which he sometimes 
seems to treat as referring to properties of sense-data. However, if  one held 
that “table” was an abbreviation for a definite description referring to an 
external object but that “red” referred to a property of sense-data then the
6 It has been suggested to me that this problem can be evaded if we take the appropriate 
description to be “the man who is most widely believed to have discovered the 
incompleteness o f arithmetic”. But this evasion probably does not work. Suppose we carry 
out a survey asking everyone which man they think discovered the incompleteness of  
arithmetic, in order to determine the reference o f the expression “the man who is most 
widely believed to have discovered the incompleteness o f arithmetic”. Most people who 
had an opinion would probably say “Godel”. This wouldn’t help us pin down the reference 
of the expression, since the reference of “GOdel” is supposed to be determined by the 
reference of the expression. Unless most people who have an opinion have an independent 
means of picking out the man they believe to have discovered the incompleteness of  
arithmetic (e.g. by pointing to him) then it seems that, on this account, the referent of the 
expression “the man who is most widely believed to have discovered the incompleteness of  
arithmetic” will never be fixed, and will thus not be an appropriate definite description to 
associate with “GOdel”. The problem is that it seems unlikely that most people who have an 
opinion do have an independent means o f picking out this man (cf. Kripke, 1981, p. 89).
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statement, “the table is red” would always be false (or at least we would 
never have any reason to think that it was true) as it would attribute a sense- 
data property to an external object. This seems implausible.
It is, therefore, hard to see how appropriate definite descriptions 
referring to external objects could be constructed: the only non-logical terms 
that can be used in the description are those that refer to objects, properties 
and relations with which we are acquainted, but if  we are not acquainted 
with the referents o f “table” and “red”, with which words’ referents are we 
acquainted? Actually, there’s an easy way out o f this problem, by taking 
(practically all) terms to be ambiguous. “Red” for example, would have two 
meanings and would ideally be replaced with two words. “Internal red” 
would refer to a property o f sense-data, with which we are acquainted, 
whereas “external red” would refer to a property of external objects, with 
which we are not acquainted. In its latter sense it would need to be replaced 
with a definite description. Similarly for “table”.
However, it is still not clear that it is possible to produce an 
appropriate definite description with which to replace even the simplest term 
that refers to an external object. Take “(external) table” for example. Russell 
suggests the appropriate definite description is, “the physical object which 
causes such-and-such sense-data” (Russell, 1912, p. 26), which is, formally, 
ix(Px & Cxa), where “Px” means x is physical, “Cxy” means “x causes y” 
and “a” names the sense-datum in question (presumably a sense-data table). 
This will obviously not do: it seems that neither “physical” nor “cause” 
should be meaningful according to the principle of acquaintance (unless 
they are themselves to be taken as abbreviations for appropriate definite 
descriptions: this approach will be discussed shortly). The word physical 
could be omitted from the above altogether (leaving us with the definite 
description “the object that causes such-and-such sense-data”, i.e. ix[Cxa]) 
but the word “cause” seems indispensable. In this case “cause” is taken to be 
a relation between an external object on the one hand and a sense-datum on 
the other. Presumably we cannot be acquainted with this causal relation 
when we are only ever acquainted with one o f its two terms anymore than 
we could grasp the “bigger than” relation by being told (truly) of a variety of 
objects that, “this is bigger than something”.
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If we are not acquainted with the “cause” relation then the definite 
description of a table as “the object that causes such-and-such sense-data”, 
i.e. ix(Cxa), is at best a half-way house, but it might still be legitimate if 
“cause” could be replaced by an appropriate definite description.7 One 
possible attempt would be to define cause as, “the relation holding between 
two objects such that the first is not a sense-datum and the second is”, i.e. 
iX(VxVy[Xxy —» (^Sx & Sy)]) where “Sx” means “x is a sense datum” (it 
seems plausible to suppose that we might be acquainted with such a 
property) but this would not do, because it is not a definite description o f 
“cause” (assuming that there is not exactly one sense-datum and exactly one 
object that is not a sense-datum): if we have n non-sense-data objects and m 
sense-data objects then there are n.m pairs of the form <non-sense-data 
object, sense datum> and so 2n m subsets of the set of these pairs and so 2nm 
-  1 relations between non-sense-data objects and sense-data objects (the “- 
1” here is because one of the subsets is the empty set, which is not a relation 
between non-sense-data objects and sense-data objects).
Perhaps it might be argued that “cause” refers to an unusual 
relation, one that sometimes holds between two sense-data and sometimes 
between an external object and a sense-datum. We could then be acquainted 
with the relation because it does sometimes hold between two sense-data 
(and being acquainted with a relation does not involve being acquainted 
with all its instances). We would then have no difficulty in understanding 
the term “cause” even when the particular instance o f the relation we are 
talking about involves an external object and a sense-datum (rather as the 
conventional scientific realist might claim that having grasped the relation
7 It has been suggested to me that there is a third option: Russell could argue that the term 
“cause” is meaningful, not because “cause” is an abbreviation for an appropriate definite 
description, nor because we are acquainted with causes, but because we are acquainted with 
our belief that “A causes B”. However, I don’t think this works. I don’t think we can really 
believe that “A causes B” unless we know what the word cause means: it would be like 
believing that “A flubbles B”. And, according to the principle o f acquaintance, we can’t 
know what “cause” means, unless we are acquainted with causes, or “cause” is an 
abbreviation for an appropriate definite description.
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“bigger than” there is then no difficulty in understanding how it can hold 
between two objects that are both too small to be observed).
However, this seems a rather dubious approach: sense-data and 
external objects are supposedly radically different things (in a way that 
observable and unobservable objects are not, according to the conventional 
scientific realist). It therefore seems to be something like a category mistake 
to suppose that the very same relation could be instantiated either by two 
sense-data or by one external object and one sense-datum. It is hard to 
believe that a sense-data flame stands in the same causal relation to a 
external flame as it stands in to a sense-data striking o f a match. Even if  this 
was possible, it is doubtful that we could ever have reason to suppose that it 
was true, any more than we could have reason to suppose that external red
Q
was like sense-data red.
In fact, assuming the Russellian does not adopt this dubious 
approach, then it can be formally proved that it is in general impossible for 
him to create a definite description of an external object. It can be shown 
that:
It is impossible to create a definite description of an external object using a 
language of second-order logic whose non-logical terms refer exclusively to 
internal objects (or properties exclusively thereof or relations exclusively 
amongst internal objects), if there is more than one external object.
This is a straightforward corollary of the following theorem:
Given a domain with two classes o f objects, A and B, and a language of 
second-order logic whose non-logical terms refer exclusively to objects in 
class A (or sets o f objects in class A, or sets o f tuples o f objects in class A), 
it is impossible to create a definite description of an object in class B, if B 
contains more than one object.
8 However, Russell does adopt this line in response to Newman’s objection: he claims that 
there is at least one predicate (“co-punctuality”) that can apply to both internal and external 
objects. The difficulties with this proposal will be further elaborated in chapter 4.
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which is proved in appendix 2. This result commits an advocate o f the 
principle of acquaintance to the view that it is impossible to refer to a unique 
external object (as he is already committed to the view that we cannot 
directly refer to external objects). This appears to be a reductio of the 
principle, because phrases like “the nearest supernova” do appear to refer to 
unique external objects (at least potentially). As Russell’s semantic 
argument for the SESRist’s structuralist claim crucially depends on the 
principle o f acquaintance, this result also undermines this argument. In 
section 2 we will turn to consider Russell’s argument for the SESRist’s 
realist claim.
2. Russell’s Epistemic Argument for SESR
It has been argued that Russell’s semantic argument for SESR is far from 
compelling, because it is based on the principle of acquaintance, a principle 
that seems to have absurd consequences. Votsis (2004, 2005) identifies two 
further principles that Russell deploys to further argue for SESR, principles 
that Votsis calls the “Helmholtz-Weyl principle” (following Psillos, 2001a) 
and the “mirroring relations principle”. These principles form the basis of 
Russell’s epistemic argument for SESR. While Russell’s semantic argument 
is for his structuralist thesis (the thesis that our knowledge of the external 
world consists o f claims constructed using only logical and internal terms) 
his epistemic argument is for structural realist’s realist thesis (the claim that 
mature scientific theories provide us with substantial knowledge of the 
external world). (Cf. The way Worrall uses the pessimistic induction to 
argue for the WESRist’s structuralist thesis and the no miracles argument to 
argue for the structural realist’s realist thesis: see chapter 1.) There are two 
questions to ask about each of these principles: (i) Is it plausible? (ii) If it 
were true, would it secure substantial (conjectural) knowledge about the 
external world o f the sort that, according to the SESRist, science provides?
2.1. The Helmholtz-Weyl Principle
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Russell states (what has since been called) the Helmholtz-Weyl principle as 
follows: “differing percepts have differing stimuli” (Russell, 1927, p. 255).9 
The term stimuli might refer to a number of things. For example, the 
stimulus that causes a (visual) sense-data table might be taken to be an 
external table, a collection of photons, a brain state, or some combination of 
these. Russell uses the word “stimuli” to refer to, “events just outside the 
sense-organ” (Russell, 1927, p. 227). The term “differing” also might mean 
two separate things: do two objects differ simply by being two and not one, 
or is it also required that they are qualitatively different (i.e. have different 
properties)? The most coherent reading of Russell suggests that he intended 
differing in the latter sense. The Helmholtz-Weyl principle thus amounts to 
the following:
Qualitatively different percepts are caused by qualitatively different events 
just outside the sense-organ.
However, as stated, the principle is false. It is certainly possible that 
someone might be exposed to exactly similar events just outside the sense 
organ on two occasions but have completely different percepts on the two 
occasions -  if, for example, he was blinded in between the two occasions. 
This suggests that the principle is false because of Russell’s intended 
meaning of “stimuli” and that it might be true if we took the stimuli to be 
the total external state of affairs (including the state of the sense organs 
involved). This would yield the following modified form of the Helmholtz- 
Weyl principle:
Qualitatively different percepts are caused by qualitatively different external 
states.
9 Cf. Votsis’ statement of the principle: “Different effects (i.e. percepts) imply different 
causes (i.e. stimuli/physical objects [footnote omitted])” (Votsis, 2005, p. 1362).
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Although not incontrovertible, this has at least some plausibility (except, 
perhaps, for the mention of “causation” it sounds like the familiar claim that 
the mental supervenes on the physical).
Does this modified form of the Helmholtz-Weyl principle enable 
one to infer substantial knowledge about the external world? The answer is 
no. Suppose one has two differing percepts, one o f a sense-data-blue sense- 
data-table and one of a sense-data-red sense-data-table. The modified form 
of the Helmholtz-Weyl principle allows one to infer that they are caused by 
different external states. But it does not licence the inference to anything 
about these states, except that they are different. For all it says the first 
might be caused by a single external object having a single monadic 
property, whereas the second might be caused by an uncountably infinite 
collection of external objects standing in a complex web of relations. The 
modified form of the Helmholtz-Weyl principle maybe plausible, but it is 
nowhere near strong enough to give Russell what he wants. It does give us 
some knowledge of the external world -  that there is at least one distinct 
external state of affairs for each distinct percept -  but no indication of how 
(or if) these states of affairs are related, which is far less knowledge than the 
structural realist claims that we have.
2.2. The Mirroring Relations Principle
Russell states (what has since been called) the mirroring relations principle 
(MR) as follows: “the objective counterparts [of phenomena]...form a world 
having the same structure as the phenomenal world” (Russell, 1919, p. 
6 1).10,11 For present purposes the following formulation of MR will be used:
10 Cf. Votsis’ statement o f the principle: “Relations between percepts mirror (i.e. have the 
same logico-mathematical properties as) relations between their non-perceptual causes” 
(Votsis, 2005, p. 1362).
11 This principle is substantially stronger than the Helmholtz-Weyl principle. Indeed, as we 
shall see, it makes the Helmholtz-Weyl principle altogether redundant, which makes one
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The structure exemplified by the external world is isomorphic to the 
structure exemplified by the internal world.
Is MR plausible? Russell says little in its favour. Votsis claims that, “it is 
hard to imagine how we can have knowledge of the external world without 
accepting something like MR” (Votsis, 2005, p. 1366). If the only argument 
for MR is that it must be accepted if one is to have knowledge of the 
external world, then, if MR is used to support the claim that we do have 
substantial knowledge of the sort the structural realist claims that we have, 
then the argument, although not quite circular, is certainly elliptical enough
19not to convince the antirealist. However, it is easy to see that even if MR 
were plausible it would not justify the claim that we do have substantial 
knowledge of the sort the structural realist claims.
What the Russellian ESRist would like to show using MR is that 
something like the following version of the structural realist’s realist thesis 
is true:
The structure that our mature scientific theories ascribe to the external world 
is isomorphic to the structure of the external world.
Let’s call this R. An initial worry with R is that it just doesn’t make sense to 
talk about the structure that our mature scientific theories ascribe to the 
external world: different theories describe the same system in different 
ways. For example, a hydrogen molecule may be treated as a single object (a 
molecule) by one theory, as a pair of objects (two hydrogen atoms) by 
another, as a collection of four objects (two protons and two electrons) by a
wonder why, given that Russell held MR, he bothered to formulate the Helmholtz-Weyl 
principle.
12 Perhaps though, converting the antirealist is not really Russell’s intention. Perhaps he is 
just trying to be explicit about the principles he believes that we (in our commonsensical 
realist outlooks) actually do presuppose and trying to demonstrate how (if true) they would 
justify SESR.
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third, as a collection of eight objects (six quarks and two electrons) by a 
fourth... These theories will be satisfied by different structures. So what is 
the structure that our mature scientific theories ascribe to the hydrogen 
molecule? Moreover, even the description provided by a single theory might 
be satisfied by more than one (non-isomorphic) structure. There is nothing 
profound about this. It’s just the case that a set o f sentences can (in general) 
be satisfied by more than one structure. Indeed, by the Lowenheim-Skolem 
theorems, if a set of first-order sentences has one infinite model (i.e. a model 
with an infinite domain) then it has models of every infinite cardinality. That 
is profound, but not so relevant. However, let’s assume for the sake of 
argument (since there is worse to come) that these difficulties can be 
resolved: perhaps the structure that our mature scientific theories ascribe to 
the external world is the simplest structure (a tricky notion) that satisfies our 
most fundamental theory or the simplest structure that satisfies all our 
theories (in the unlikely event that there is one).
MR would justify R if and only if  we make the following 
assumption (let’s call it A):
The structure that our mature scientific theories ascribe to the external world 
is isomorphic to the structure of the internal world.
in the sense that:
(MR & A) -> R and (MR & -A ) -> -R
but (even though it is not really clear what the structure that our mature 
scientific theories ascribe to the external world is supposed to be) A is 
blatantly false: our theories describe the world to consist not only o f tables 
and other macroscopic objects that have a counterpart in the internal world 
but also of many other objects (our own brains, photons, molecules, 
atom s...) that do not have internal counterparts. The point is that the 
structure that we (as adults in a scientifically sophisticated society) actually 
infer that the external world exemplifies is generally much more complex
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than the structure that the internal world exemplifies. For example, faced 
with a sense-data human one can infer that there is not just one external 
object (corresponding to the single sense-data human) but many: numerous 
external cells, an even greater number of molecules.... Given that (MR & 
“'A) —> and A is false then:
MR -»  - ’R
so MR, far from justifying R, in fact implies that it is false. This is because it
• 1 ^implies that that the most naive common-sense view possible is right.
What this problem seems to suggest is that there is no simple 
mapping linking the structures exemplified by the internal and external 
worlds, if  our best theories are anything like right. Scientific practice 
presumably does presuppose that there is some relation between the two, but 
not, in general, a simple one, and not one that can be specified in advance to 
cover all occasions. This really should not be surprising: if MR was true 
physics would be a very much easier subject than it in fact is.14
13 Psillos (2001a) also objects to the Russellian contention that the structure o f the internal 
world is isomorphic to the structure o f the external world: “From a realist viewpoint, it 
should at least in principle be possible that the (unobservable) world has “extra structure”, 
i.e., structure not necessarily manifested in the structure o f the phenomena.” (Psillos, 2001a, 
p. S I5). While Psillos claims that the realist requires that this possibility be open what is 
claimed here is something stronger: that the (scientific) realist believes that this possibility 
is in fact realised (since he believes that mature scientific theories are approximately true).
14 It should also be noted that the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR seems to be 
incompatible with MR, because, as Votsis notes, “the Ramsey-sentence o f a theory 
preserves the logical structure o f the whole theory, something directly at odds with 
Russell’s insistence that we infer the structure o f the world from the structure o f our 
perceptions” (Votsis, 2004, pp. 55-56, original emphasis). The two are at odds because the 
structure o f a theory is typically much richer than the structure o f perceptions, so MR could 
not justify (and would in fact undermine) belief in a theory’s Ramsey-sentence. This will 
not worry the advocate o f the Ramsey-sentence approach, because, as noted, there appears 
to be a tension between MR and any form of scientific realism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
most contemporary structural realists are not explicitly committed to MR (Votsis [2003, 
2004, 2005] appears to be the only exception).
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3. Russell’s Semantic Argument Adapted for WESR
In principle, the WESRist could adapt Russell’s semantic argument and use 
it to argue for his own structuralist thesis, i.e. he could argue that the only 
non-logical terms that are directly meaningful are those that refer to 
observables.15 To this end, he would propose a variant of the principle of 
acquaintance, the conjunction of the following claims (henceforth, this will 
be called the principle o f observation):
[1] If x understands a primitive name then x has observed the object to 
which the name refers.
[2] If x understands a primitive predicate then x has observed an instance of 
the property or relation to which it refers.
[3] If x understands a non-primitive term then x understands all the terms 
involved in the underlying definite description.
[4] If x understands a sentence then x understands the non-logical terms in 
the sentence.
The principle of observation is not equivalent to the principle of 
acquaintance as observing an object is not the same as being acquainted 
with it. Recall that observables are (roughly speaking) those external 
objects, properties and relations that have direct counterparts in internal 
experience (e.g. tables and blueness, but not quarks or strangeness). 
Observing such an object, property or relation would not involve being 
acquainted with it in Russell’s sense (which, for the indirect realist, would 
be impossible) but only being acquainted with its internal counterpart.
Consider any statement that we know to be (approximately) true. 
Presumably, such a statement must be meaningful to us. So, by the principle
15 In fact, although WESRists have not explicitly adopted this argument the logical 
positivists did put forward something like this view, without taking it to imply WESR (see, 
for example, Carnap, 1956).
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of observation, all the non-logical terms in the statement are meaningful to 
us. There are only two types of non-logical term: primitive terms and non­
primitive terms. By the principle of observation, a primitive term is 
meaningful only if it refers to an item that has been observed. Consequently 
a primitive term must refer to an observable object, property or relation. 
Hence, the primitive terms are all observational terms. But a non-primitive 
term is meaningful only if it is an abbreviation of a description formed using 
(ultimately) only primitive terms. Hence, in its unabbreviated form, the 
statement contains only primitive terms. Hence, in its unabbreviated form, 
the statement contains only logical and observational terms. Hence any 
statement we know to be (approximately) true is constructed using only 
logical and observational terms. This implies that:
The knowledge provided by our mature scientific theories consists (in its 
ultimate form) of statements constructed using only logical and 
observational terms.
This was referred to as a corollary o f the WESRist’s structuralist thesis in 
the introduction to this thesis, but if the argument established the corollary, 
it would make the thesis highly plausible: it is hard to see how our 
knowledge could go beyond the Ramsey-sentences o f our best theories, if 
our knowledge must consist of claims constructed using only logical and 
observational terms.
Again, however, note that even if this argument works, it does not 
establish WESR, because it does nothing to support the structural realist’s 
realist thesis: it does not follow from the alleged fact that if  we have 
knowledge of the (observable and unobservable) external world then it 
consists o f claims constructed using only logical and observational terms 
that we actually do have such knowledge. What the argument does suggest 
(if it is sound) is that something like WESR is probably the strongest form 
of realism that could reasonably be upheld.
The principle of observation is somewhat more tenable than the 
principle of acquaintance. It is true that the arguments based on intuitions 
about meaningfulness directed against the principle o f acquaintance seem to
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have equal force in the present case (these arguments will not be repeated 
here). However, the final objection to the principle of acquaintance, which 
seemed to be the most powerful, is perhaps not as compelling when applied 
to the principle o f observation. This objection is that it is in general 
impossible to create a definite description referring to an external object 
using only logical terms and non-logical terms that refer to sense-data (or 
properties thereof or relations exclusively amongst sense-data) so the 
principle of acquaintance implies that it is impossible to refer to a unique 
external object. This is a corollary o f the theorem proved in appendix 2. 
Another corollary of this theorem is the following:
It is impossible to create a definite description o f an unobservable object 
using a language of second-order logic whose non-logical terms refer 
exclusively to observable objects (or properties exclusively thereof or 
relations exclusively amongst observable objects), if there is more than one 
unobservable object.
However, the significance of this theorem for the WESRist is debatable. If 
he takes an observational predicate to be one that refers exclusively to sets 
of (tuples of) observable objects then this result will commit the WESRist to 
the view that it is impossible to refer to a unique unobservable object. That 
would appear to be a reductio of WESR, as phrases like, “the nearest black 
hole” do appear to successfully refer to unique unobservable objects (at least 
potentially). However, if the WESRist believes that observational predicates 
can apply to unobservable objects (and this seems intuitively reasonable: it 
does seem that observational predicates such as “larger than” can be used to 
describe a relation between atoms and electrons) then the result is irrelevant, 
because the WESRist does not believe that we have a language whose non- 
logical (observational) terms refer exclusively to observable objects (or
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properties exclusively thereof or relations exclusively amongst observable 
objects).16
This suggests that the semantic argument for ESR, even if not 
entirely unproblematic for the WESRist, works better as an argument for 
WESR than as an argument for SESR. On the other hand, it has already 
been argued (in chapter 2) that drawing the observational term/theoretical 
term distinction in a manner suitable for the WESRist’s purposes is 
problematic.
Contrast this semantic argument for WESR with the historical 
argument (based on the pessimistic induction) discussed in chapter 1: note 
that these two arguments lead one to different opinions with regard to 
theoretical terms (i.e. terms referring to unobservable objects, properties and 
relations) and with respect to the relationship between the sentence, A, that 
expresses the theory and the Ramsey-sentence, A*, obtained from A. If one 
adopts the historical argument for WESR then one can accept that 
theoretical terms have the logical form of names and predicates (i.e. one can 
accept that theoretical terms are primitive terms) and so one can regard A 
and A* as different sentences, where only the latter is known to be true. On 
the other hand, if one adopts the semantic argument for WESR then 
theoretical terms cannot have the logical form of names and predicates and 
A will be regarded as merely an abbreviated way o f writing A* (i.e. a 
theory’s Ramsey-sentence will be regarded as the true logical form of the 
theory).
4. Maxwell’s Scientific Argument for SESR
In a paper presented at a conference in 1965 Maxwell claims that, “the only 
aspects o f the nonmental world of which we can have any knowledge or 
conception are purely structural (or, in other words, purely formal)” 
(Maxwell, 1968, p. 153). A purely formal claim is, presumably, one
16 The SESRist cannot plausibly evade the analogous corollary o f the theorem in analogous 
manner, because the internal and external realms are completely unalike and so it seems
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constructed using only logical terms. Consequently Maxwell’s claim is in 
this respect stronger than the structuralist thesis attributed to SESRists in 
this thesis (as noted, their position implies that our knowledge of the 
external world consists, in its ultimate form, o f statements constructed using 
only logical and internal terms). However, Maxwell concedes (in a footnote 
presumably retrospectively added for the published version, which came out 
in 1968) that, “the account in the present essay is not only incomplete but 
contains a serious error: structure should not be identified with form; rather 
it is form plus causal connections with experience” (Maxwell, 1968, p. 154). 
He elaborates this point in later work, maintaining that our knowledge of 
external objects is at most knowledge of their “structural properties” but 
defining structural properties so that “not all structural properties are also 
purely formal” (Maxwell, 1970a, p. 188) thus allowing that we are not 
limited to purely formal knowledge of external objects.
Maxwell’s proposal is that a “structural” description o f an object, 
property or relation can make use of non-logical terms, as long as these refer 
to items of internal experience. In other words, Maxwell (after 1965) defines 
a “structural” claim to be one constructed using only logical and internal 
terms. This seems to be a confusing choice of terminology, but once we 
understand that this is what Maxwell means by “structural” (after 1965) his 
claim that knowledge of the world is “structural” is (after 1965) in line with 
the structuralist thesis attributed to SESRists here.
1 7Maxwell’s argument for this claim runs as follows:
If our current theories in physics, neurophysiology, and 
psychophysiology are at all close to the truth or even if they 
are at all headed in the right direction, then a complete 
description, including a complete causal account, of 
everything that is involved in perception .except the private 
experience itself would mention only such entities and 
events as submicroscopic particles, electromagnetic quanta,
that there cannot be any predicates that apply to objects in both domains.
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etc., and their relations and interactions with one another 
and with, for example, neural termini in the retina, afferent 
neural impulses, and patterns of neuronal activity in the 
brain. At no point in the entire complete description and 
causal explanation is there any mention of any first order 
property such as colors until we come to the private 
experience that results from the pattern of neuron firings in 
the brain, [footnote omitted] It seems to me that we must 
conclude that colors are exemplified only in our private 
experiences and that there is no reason to believe that they 
are ever properties of the material objects o f the external 
environment. What holds fo r  colors must be true fo r  all o f  
the firs t order properties that we perceive directly. We do 
not know what any of the first order properties o f material 
objects are, although our (Ramseyfied) theories tell us that 
they exist and what some of their (second and higher order) 
properties are. This ends the summary of the scientific 
argument for Russell’s contention that our knowledge of 
the external (or physical, or nonmental) realm is limited to 
its structural aspects. (Maxwell, 1970b, p. 19, original 
emphasis)
Maxwell argues here that a complete description of the physical 
process that terminates in the perception of a colour would not make any 
reference to colours, but only to such entities and events as “submicroscopic 
particles” etc. and that we should infer from this that colours do not exist. 
However, there is something wrong with this reasoning, as is perhaps more 
apparent when we note that it could just as well (or rather badly) be argued 
that a complete description of the physical process that terminates in the 
perception of a cat would not make any reference to cats, but only such 
entities and events as “submicroscopic particles” etc. and that we should
17 Maxwell offers no argument for the structural realist’s realist thesis.
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infer from this that cats do not exist. This is an affront not only to common 
sense (and cats) but also to a number of scientific (biological) theories that 
purport to deal with the behaviour, physiology, etc. o f cats.
This absurdity arises because Maxwell (in effect) assumes that 
there is a single uniquely accurate description of the external world (given 
by our most fundamental theories). It is true that if  we assume a very strong 
reductionist thesis then only the most fundamental theory is needed (in 
-principle) in the sense that it should be able to account for all phenomena 
without recourse to any less fundamental theories. Such a thesis is of course 
not uncontroversial, but even if it is maintained it doesn’t seem to make any 
difference: even if it is possible to account for all phenomena with a theory 
of the world that doesn’t mention cats that surely would not imply that cats 
do not exist in the world, only that they are supervenient on other entities. 
The same applies to Maxwell’s own example o f colours. Colours do not
appear in our most fundamental theories o f the world. It would be fair to
infer from this that objects’ colours supervene on their other properties but it 
would be wrong to infer from this that objects are not coloured. As Quine 
notes in his comment on Maxwell’s paper:
Water remains water gallon by gallon, I say, even though 
its submicroscopic bits are rather oxygen and hydrogen; 
there is no paradox in this, and there is none in saying that a 
table remains smooth and brown, square inch by square 
inch, even though its submicroscopic bits are discrete, 
vibrant, and colorless. The quality of being aqueous, also of 
being smooth and brown, are like swarming, or waging 
war: they are traits only of a congeries. This does not make 
them unreal or subjective. There is no call for a predicate to 
hold o f each part of the things it holds of. Even a predicate 
o f shape, after all, would fail that test. It is a modem 
discovery in particular that aqueousness, smoothness, and 
brownness resemble squareness and swarming on this 
score; but it is not a contradiction. (Quine, 1968, p. 162)
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However, although Maxwell’s argument is flawed, his conclusion, 
that the objects, properties and relations that we perceive are not external 
objects, properties and relations follows immediately from indirect realism. 
For the indirect realist the colours that we experience in percepts are not the 
same as the colours of external objects. More generally, we must distinguish 
between external cats, colours, electric charges, spatial extensions and atoms 
and their internal counterparts (if they have any). According to the indirect 
realist we directly perceive the latter but not the former. Maxwell’s 
argument from science for this conclusion is completely redundant if  one 
accepts indirect realism, and, for the reasons discussed, cuts no ice if  one 
does not. However, whilst (if we are indirect realists) it is reasonable to give 
Maxwell the lemma that we do not directly experience the properties or 
relations of external objects (or the objects themselves), his conclusion, that 
our knowledge of external objects is “structural” (in Maxwell’s sense: i.e. 
consists of claims constructed using logical and internal terms) only follows 
if we further assume something like the principle o f acquaintance: that any 
meaningful primitive non-logical term must refer to something that we 
directly experience. Maxwell does endorse this principle, but it has already 
been argued (in section 1) that it is false.
5. Zahar’s Adverbialist Approach to SESR
5.1. Zahar’s Version of SESR
Zahar (1996, 2001, 2004) advocates a version of SESR based on the 
Ramsey-sentence approach. However, certain comments he makes suggest 
that his view may be substantially different from those of other SESRists, 
such as Russell and Maxwell. The latter make a distinction between internal 
objects, properties and relations that can be referred to directly by primitive 
non-logical terms, and external objects, properties and relations that can 
only be referred to by descriptions (formed using logical and internal terms). 
Zahar, however, sometimes appears to draw a quite different distinction in 
addition to the distinction drawn by Russell and Maxwell, between our
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knowledge of external objects and our knowledge of external relations 
(whether or not he intends this to include monadic relations, i.e. properties, 
is not clear). For example, he claims that, “in a unified and highly confirmed 
theory, the basic relations mirror some objective reality while the relata
1 Rremain inaccessible to human knowledge” (Zahar, 2001, p. 38).
Notice how Zahar here juxtaposes an ontological claim about 
relations (that they mirror some objective reality) with an epistemic claim 
about the relata (that they are inaccessible to human knowledge). If this is 
taken to imply that the relata do not mirror some objective reality (or that we 
cannot know this to be the case) then it is incompatible with the version of 
ESR that has been ascribed to Russell and Maxwell in the previous sections. 
According to Russell and Maxwell, each relatum in the theory mirrors a 
relatum in the external world every bit as much as the relations in the theory 
mirror the relations in the external world: the “mirroring” (in its ideal form, 
which occurs when the theory is exactly true) is a one-one mapping from the 
objects in the domain of the structure o f the theory to the objects in the 
domain of the structure of the world (that preserves the relations), so each 
relatum in the theory has a counterpart in the external world, as well as each 
relation. Of course, according to the indirect realist, we don’t have direct 
access to the external world, so we could never be certain that there was 
such a mapping (i.e. we could never be certain that the theory in question 
was true). Moreover, the structural realist does not maintain that our theories 
are ever exactly true, but only that they are approximately true, so he would 
not claim that the mapping would take exactly this form, only something 
that approached this form. However, neither of these considerations imply 
the sort of difference between relata and relations that Zahar seems to 
suggest.
In fact, it is hard to see in what sense the relations in a theory could 
mirror the external world without the relata doing likewise, because the 
relations just are sets of n-tuples of relata. As Zahar puts it, “classical 
semantics seems unable to interpret relations except through their relata”
18 In actual fact, Zahar puts this forward as Poincare’s view, but it is fairly clear that he
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(Zahar, 2001, p. 38). This leads Zahar to suggest that we need a new 
“structural semantics” to replace the normal semantics of predicate logic. 
However, if Zahar’s position really requires a radical new semantics for 
predicate logic to become viable then, given that he doesn’t even begin to 
suggest what such a new semantics might look like, that is surely so much 
the worse for his position. With regard to the second part of the above 
quotation it is true, according to Russell and Maxwell, that external objects 
remain, “inaccessible to human knowledge” in so far as we are not 
acquainted with them, but the same also holds for external relations (and 
neither is completely inaccessible: we have knowledge by description -  
knowledge consisting of claims formed using logical and internal terms -  of 
both).
In attempting to further elucidate why it is that SESR implies 
relations are more important than relata Zahar makes the similar claim that a 
relation in a theory may reflect, “a real connection between elements about 
whose intrinsic nature we know next to nothing” (Zahar, 2001, p. 38). 
Notice how Zahar (again) juxtaposes an ontological claim about relations 
(that they are real) with an epistemic claim about the relata (that we don’t 
know anything about their intrinsic natures). Both may be true, but the 
comparison does not seem to support the claim that the relations are (either 
ontologically or epistemically) more important than the relata. On the one 
hand, if a relation in a theory reflects “a real connection” why don’t the 
relata reflect real objects? On the other hand, if  we know nothing about the 
“intrinsic nature” of objects isn’t the same true of relations? The second case 
is not so trivial: it depends what is meant by the intrinsic nature o f an object. 
Such talk suggests that Zahar is chasing -  or perhaps running away from -  
Lockean substances, but isn’t the nature of an object exhausted by its 
properties and relations? If so then it is true -  according to SESR -  that our 
knowledge of the nature of external objects is limited (to knowledge 
consisting of claims formed using logical and internal terms) but again, the 
same holds with regard to the nature of external properties and relations.
endorses it.
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It is true that, on any approach to SESR, there is a sense in which 
we have less knowledge of external objects than of external relations. 
According to SESR when we consider an external object or external relation 
in itself (i.e. when we ignore how it is related to other objects and relations, 
in particular internal objects and relations) we are restricted to knowledge of 
its formal properties. An object, considered in itself (i.e. ignoring its 
properties and relations) doesn’t have any interesting formal properties, 
whereas a relation, considered in itself, can display a variety of formal 
properties: it may be transitive or symmetric or reflexive or Euclidean etc. 
Properties in this respect are more like objects than relations, there seems to 
be nothing (formal) to say about them, in themselves, except that they 
contain a certain number of elements. However, this can’t be the point that 
Zahar was trying to make, for clearly it does not suggest the need for a new 
semantics for predicate logic. On the contrary, it is completely trivial: there 
is obviously nothing interesting (formal or otherwise) to say about an object, 
i f  we ignore its properties and relations (even if there is something more to 
its “nature”).
5.2. Zahar’s Argument for SESR
Like Worrall, Zahar employs the no miracles argument to argue for the 
structural realist’s realist thesis. One can also reconstruct from his writings 
an argument for the SESRist’s structuralist thesis that is closely linked to 
Russell’s semantic argument, but has an important difference: Zahar rejects 
Russell’s sense-data version of indirect realism in favour of an adverbialist 
indirect realism. Zahar’s reasons for rejecting the former are traditional 
worries about the ontological status of sense-data. Sense-data are certainly 
supposed to have some very unusual properties. Firstly, they have only a 
minimal independence of the individuals that sense them: they presumably 
only exist when they are sensed, but what sort o f object can be destroyed by 
closing one’s eyes or (re?-)created by opening them? For that matter is it the 
same sense-data table with which I am acquainted before and after I blink? 
Furthermore, as Zahar (2001) has noted, sense-data would often be 
incomplete objects:
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A speckled hen is apprehended as having a finite number of 
speckles but neither as having 100 speckles nor as not 
having 100 speckles...the phenomenal hen will have a 
finite number of speckles but it is not the case that this 
number will be either equal to or different from 100.
(Zahar, 2001, p. 28)
Adverbialists, such as Zahar, do not postulate sense-data at all. The 
original motivation for postulating sense-data is that apparently seeing a 
speckled hen (for example) does not (necessarily) involve seeing a speckled 
hen, and this can be explained by supposing that what we (directly) see is 
something else -  a sense-data speckled hen -  that may or may not be caused 
by a real speckled hen. But in fact there is no need to suppose that 
(apparently) seeing a speckled hen (ever) involves seeing a sense-data hen. 
Instead of construing the experience o f apparently seeing a speckled hen as 
involving a two-place relation o f “seeing” in which the viewer stands to 
another object (a sense-data speckled hen) it would be better (in so far as it 
would avoid the need for such troublesome objects as sense-data) to 
construe “apparently seeing a speckled hen” as a one-place relation in which 
the “viewer” alone stands, i.e. as a mode of being that an individual 
undergoes. (Of course, the common-sense view is that it is a two place 
relation in which the viewer stands to a real hen, but this is implausible 
because, as noted, there need be no real hen for the viewer to undergo an 
experience of apparently seeing a speckled hen.)
However, there is still a significant distinction to be drawn 
between sentences that make claims about the external world (such as 
“There is a table in Elie’s room” or “I saw a table in Elie’s room”) and 
sentences that make claims only about one’s own experiences (such as “I 
believe that there is a table in Elie’s room” or “I had an experience like 
seeing a table in Elie’s room”). Zahar (2001) calls the latter 
autopsychological sentences. It seems that making autopsychological claims 
is a relatively safe business: for any non-autopsychological claim, p, that I 
take to be true I am always less likely to be wrong if I assert (the
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autopsychological) “I believe that p” rather than just (the non- 
autopsychological) “p”. Similarly, whenever we have a non- 
autopsychological sentence o f the form “I observed q” the 
autopsychological statement “I had an experience as o f observing q” is less 
likely to be false (in fact in this case -  but not in the earlier case -  it seems 
that the former implies the latter, but not vice-versa).
However, this difference, in itself, does not argue for the SESRist’s 
structuralist thesis, nor even for the corollary of this thesis: the fact that 
claims about the external world are less certain than claims about one’s own 
experiences does not imply that our knowledge of the external world 
consists of claims constructed out of logical and internal terms. To argue for 
the latter Zahar would need, although does not explicitly put forward, 
something like the following variant of the principle of acquaintance:
[1] If x understands a primitive name then it names x himself (the only 
object with which x is acquainted, according to the adverbialist).
[2] If x understands a primitive predicate then it ascribes to its subject a 
psychological state that x has experienced (the only properties with which x 
is acquainted, according to the adverbialist).
[3] If x understands a non-primitive term then x understands all the terms 
involved in the underlying definite description.
[4] If x understands a sentence then x understands the non-logical terms in 
the sentence.
Given this version of the principle of acquaintance Zahar could 
argue for the corollary of the SESRist’s structuralist thesis in essentially the 
same way as Russell but it seems that this version o f the principle of 
acquaintance faces essentially the same problems as the original principle o f 
acquaintance. In particular, the formal objection to Russell’s principle of 
acquaintance is equally compelling when applied to this version of the 
principle of acquaintance. The objection was based on the following 
corollary of the theorem proved in appendix 2:
112
Chapter 3
It is impossible to create a definite description of an external object using a 
language of second-order logic whose non-logical terms refer exclusively to 
internal objects (or properties exclusively thereof or relations exclusively 
amongst internal objects), if there is more than one external object.
This is relevant to the modified version of the principle of acquaintance 
because, according to this principle, we are restricted to a language whose 
non-logical terms refer exclusively to internal objects (or properties 
exclusively thereof or relations exclusively amongst internal objects). In 
fact, we are restricted to a language with only one name (denoting 
ourselves), a number of extensionally identical one-place predicates (the 
extension of each being the set containing ourselves) denoting the various 
psychological states that we have experienced and no other non-logical 
terms (so, in particular, no non-logical predicates denoting relations). So the 
modified version of the principle of acquaintance implies that it is 
impossible to create a definite description of a unique external object. This 
implies that it is impossible to refer to a unique external object (assuming 
that there is not only one external object). This appears to be a reductio of 
Zahar’s approach to SESR, because phrases like “the nearest supernova” do 
appear to successfully refer to unique external objects (at least potentially).
6. Chapter Summary
The main claim of this chapter is that the principle of acquaintance is not 
tenable and that, consequently, the semantic arguments for the SESRisf s 
structuralist thesis have no force. It has also been argued that Maxwell’s 
“scientific” argument for the thesis is unconvinvcing. This does not mean 
that the thesis is not true, but it does mean that we have been given no good 
reason to think that it is true. In the next chapter we will look at Newman’s 
objection, which (it will be argued) shows that both the SESRist’s and the 
WESRist’s structuralist claims are much stronger than they might initially 
appear and that they make SESR and WESR only trivially distinct from 
antirealism.
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Chapter 4
Newman’s Objection
Max Newman put forward his now famous objection to Russell’s ESR in his 
review (Newman, 1928) of The Analysis o f  Matter (Russell, 1927). More 
recently, Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) and Ketland (2004) have put 
forward variants of the objection aimed at the Ramsey-sentence approach to 
ESR. Following the recent revival of interest in ESR numerous authors 
(Cruse, 2005, French and Ladyman, 2003a, Melia and Saatsi, 2006, Psillos, 
1999, Redhead, 2001b, Votsis, 2003, 2004 and Zahar, 2001, 2004) have 
suggested a variety of ways in which one might attempt to evade the 
objection.
This chapter consists of four main sections. In section 1, the 
objection and its recent variants are outlined. In section 2, two responses 
that argue that the objection can be evaded by abandoning the Ramsey- 
sentence approach to ESR are considered. In section 3, three responses that 
have been put forward specifically to rescue the Ramsey-sentence approach 
to ESR from the modem versions of the objection are discussed. Finally, in 
section 4, three responses are considered that are neutral with respect to 
one’s approach to ESR and all argue (in different ways) that the objection 
can be evaded by introducing the notion that some relations/structures are 
privileged over others. It is concluded that none o f these suggestions is an 
adequate response to Newman’s objection.
1. The Objection
1.1. Newman’s Version
Newman (1928) takes Russell’s ESR to imply that the most that we can 
know about the external world is its structure. He ascribes this view to 
Russell on the basis of passages like the following (which Newman quotes
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[Newman, 1928, p. 144]): “Thus it would seem that wherever we infer from 
perceptions it is only structure that we can validly infer; and structure is 
what can be expressed by mathematical logic” (Russell, 1927, p. 254), “The 
only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be one of 
complete agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical properties” 
(Russell, 1927, p. 270). Newman then launches the following objection to 
this view:
Any collection of things can be organised so as to have the 
structure W [where W is an arbitrary structure], provided 
there are the right number o f them. Hence the doctrine that 
only structure is known involves the doctrine that nothing 
can be known that is not logically deducible from the mere 
fact o f existence, except (“theoretically”) the number of 
constituting objects. (Newman, 1928, p. 144, original 
emphasis)
For example, being told that a system has domain D = {a, b, c} (where a, b 
and c are arbitrary names for three distinct but unspecified objects) and 
instantiates a relation R= {<a, b>, <a, c>, <b, c>} tells us no more than that 
the system consists of three objects, because some elementary set-theory 
reveals that any three objects instantiate seven non-empty one-place 
relations, 511 non-empty two-place relations (of which R is one) and 
134,217,727 non-empty three-place relations.1 Being told that they 
instantiate R is both trivial (in so far as it follows from some elementary set- 
theory) and perversely specific (in so far as R is just one o f the 134,218,245 
non-empty relations they instantiate). Thus being told that the system has 
structure <D, R> is being told no more than that it contains three objects, 
because any system containing three objects can be taken to have this 
structure, along with a vast number of other structures (any tuple whose first
1 A set o f n objects has 2n-  1 non-empty subsets, n objects can be arranged into a set o f n.n 
distinct pairs, which has 2n n -  1 non-empty subsets, n objects can be arranged into a set o f  
n.n.n triples, which has 2n n n -  1 non-empty subsets.
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member is D and whose other members are amongst the 134,218,245 
relations instantiated by the members of D is a structure that can be taken to 
be possessed by any system containing three objects).
The objection arises because our purely structural knowledge gives 
us only extensional information about the structure of the system: if  we had 
an intensional interpretation of R, we would not have this problem. For 
instance, if we knew that R was the “heavier than” relation (restricted to the 
system) then we would have some more useful information: we would know 
that the three objects in the system were of unequal weights. However, the 
claim that we have any such intensional information about the external 
world is exactly what Newman thinks that Russell denies.
Newman considers two possible responses to this objection. The 
first is to distinguish “real” relations from “fictional” relations and assume 
that when the Russellian tells us what relations hold in a system he is talking 
only about real relations. A fictional relation is defined as “one whose only 
property is that it holds between the objects that it does hold between” 
(Newman, 1927, p. 145). By this Newman does not mean to call real only 
those relations that have interesting formal properties (like reflexivity, 
transitivity etc.) because the Russellian would presumably not wish to 
ignore all relations that lack interesting formal properties (for example, all 
one-place relations lack interesting formal properties, but the Russellian 
would presumably not wish to ignore all one-place relations). Rather he 
means that real relations are those that are the extensions o f intensionally 
interpreted predicates. At first it seems that the problem here is that all 
relations are fictional for Russell, because, according to Newman, he denies 
that our knowledge claims about the external world involve any 
intensionally interpreted predicates (except perhaps equality). However, 
Newman claims that the problem is just the opposite, i.e. that all relations 
are real, because, having named the objects in the domain, each relation will 
be the extension of some intensionally interpreted predicate. In the above 
case, for example, R is the extension of the relation that holds between x and 
y just in case (x = a and y = b) or (x = a and y = c) or (x = b and y = c).
This leads Newman to consider a second possible response, which 
is to distinguish between “important” and “trivial” relations and assume that
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when the Russellian tells us what relations hold in a system he is talking 
only about important relations. Newman dismisses this response as follows:
we should have to compare the importance of relations of 
which nothing is known save their incidence (the same for 
all of them) in a certain aggregate. For this comparison 
there is no possible criterion, so that “importance” would 
have to be reckoned among the prime unanalysable 
qualities of the constituents of the world, which is, I think, 
absurd. (Newman, 1928, p. 147)
Although Newman thought that this response was absurd, a number of 
philosophers have put forward variants of it. These will be discussed in 
section 4.
However, isn’t there a much more obvious response to Newman: 
hasn’t he misunderstood the position he attacks? Newman imputes to 
Russell something like the following claim:
Our knowledge of the world is purely structural (i.e. it consists of claims 
constructed using only logical terms).
However it has been suggested (in chapter 3) that Russell actually held the 
following (weaker) view:
Our knowledge of the world consists of claims constructed using only 
logical and internal terms.
It is true that the passages of Russell that Newman quotes seem to 
suggest he would go along with the former (stronger) of these claims, but 
elsewhere Russell is quite explicitly committed to the view that we know 
how external objects are connected to internal experience, which he allows 
we can legitimately describe with non-logical terms. For example, Russell 
says that, “My knowledge of the table is of the kind which we shall call 
‘knowledge by description’. The table is ‘the physical object which causes
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such-and-such sense-data.’ (Russell, 1912, p. 26). This seems to imply that 
he held only the latter (weaker) claim. If we understand Russell this way 
then it seems that Newman has misunderstood his position.
However, Russell did not respond to Newman this way (Russell’s 
response is discussed in passing in subsection 3.2, as it relates to Cruse’s 
[2005] response). It is difficult to believe that Russell just missed such an 
obvious rejoinder. Perhaps the reason he did not offer it is that he could see 
that although Newman’s objection, as Newman states it, is not strictly 
speaking to the point, nonetheless Newman’s line o f thinking does lead one 
to the conclusion that ESR is not significantly distinct from standard 
antirealism. This point has been made by Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) 
and Ketland (2004) with respect to the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR 
and is discussed in the next subsection.
1.2. Demopoulos and Friedman’s and Ketland’s Versions
Demopoulos and Friedman (quite anachronistically) impute to Russell a 
form of the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR (Demopoulos and Friedman, 
1985, p. 622) whereby the knowledge a scientific theory provides is 
expressed by the Ramsey-sentence of that theory, which will contain non- 
logical terms that refer to either internal objects, properties and relations (for 
the SESRist) or observable objects, properties and relations (for the 
WESRist) but will in either case not be purely structural. They claim 
(although without substantial argument) that if “our theory is consistent, and 
if all its purely observational consequences are true, then the truth o f the 
Ramsey-sentence follows as a theorem of set theory or second-order logic, 
provided our initial domain has the right cardinality” (Demopoulos and 
Friedman, 1985, p. 635, original emphasis). Although Demopoulos and 
Friedman do not really back up this claim, Ketland (2004) does provide a 
strong argument for (a slight variant of) the claim.
To understand Ketland’s argument we must distinguish between 
intended and arbitrary interpretations of a language. An intended 
interpretation is a function from the non-logical terms of the language to the 
objects, properties and relations in a structure that respects the intended
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meanings of the non-logical terms. For example, under its intended 
interpretation, the name “Julius Caesar” is assigned the person Julius 
Caesar. Similarly, under its intended interpretation, the predicate “larger 
than” is assigned the set of pairs <x, y> such that x is larger than y. An 
arbitrary interpretation does not respect intended meanings in this way. In an 
arbitrary interpretation the name “Julius Caesar” might be assigned any 
arbitrary object and the predicate “larger than” might be assigned any 
arbitrary set of pairs.
Ketland assumes that we have a two-sorted second-order language. 
A two-sorted language (see, for example, Enderton, 2001, pp. 295-296) has 
two types of individual variables that range over two different domains. 
Many-sorted languages are harmless in the sense that they can be reduced to 
standard one-sorted languages without loss (except of convenience) (see 
Enderton, 2001, pp. 296-299). In this case the two domains (in the intended 
interpretation o f the language) are observable objects and unobservable 
objects.
The language is also assumed to have three types of predicates: 
observational predicates, which (in the intended interpretation of the 
language) refer to observable properties and relations (which Ketland takes 
to be sets [of tuples] of observable objects), theoretical predicates, which (in 
the intended interpretation o f the language) refer to unobservable properties 
and relations (which Ketland takes to be sets [of tuples] of unobservable 
objects) and mixed predicates, which (in the intended interpretation of the 
language) refer to mixed relations (which Ketland defines as sets o f tuples 
such that each tuple contains at least one observable object and at least one 
unobservable object).
2 Ketland himself notes that the characterisation o f observable (etc.) properties and relations 
as sets (of tuples) o f observable (etc.) objects has some counterintuitive consequences. In 
particular he notes that, “many scientifically significant relations and quantities (e.g., 
various space-time relations and quantities, various scientific quantities such as mass, 
length, duration, location, etc.) will ‘decompose’ into three strangely distinct relations, 
depending upon the observational status of their relata” (Ketland, 2004, p. 289, footnote 5). 
Cruse (2005) argues that the ESRist (or at least the WESRist) can respond to Ketland’s 
version of Newman’s objection by denying that this is an accurate characterisation of the
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Let <Do, Oi, 02...> be the structure associated with the intended 
interpretation o f the observational part of the language, i.e. let Do be the set 
of observable objects in the world and let Oi, O2 etc. be (the sets 
corresponding to) the observable properties and relations referred to by the 
observational predicates of the language.
We can now define what it means for an arbitrary structure for the 
language, « D i ,  D2>, R 1.1, R 1.2 - ,  R2 .1, R2 .2 - ,  R3 .1, R3.2 -.>  to be empirically 
correct (<Di, D2> is an arbitrary two-sorted domain, each Ri.j is an arbitrary 
interpretation o f an observational predicate over Di [i.e. a subset o f Dj or a 
subset of DixDi etc.], each R3 .j is an arbitrary interpretation a theoretical 
predicate over D2 [i.e. a subset of D2 or a subset of D2xD2 etc.] and each R2.j 
is an arbitrary interpretation of a mixed predicate over D ju D 2 [i.e. a subset 
of D]xD2or a subset of D 2xDj etc.]). We do this as follows:
Definition 1: « D j ,  D2>, R 1.1, Ri,2..., R2.i, R2.2 •••, R3 .i, R3.2 is empirically 
correct if and only if its reduct <Di, R 1.1, Ri,2...> is isomorphic to <Do, Oi,
0 2...>. (cf. Ketland’s “Definition E” [2004, p. 296])
In other words, a structure is empirically correct if  the appropriate reduct of 
the structure is isomorphic to the structure of the observable world (relative 
to some choice of predicates). This definition of empirical correctness is in 
line with van Fraassen’s (1980) notion of empirical adequacy: van Fraassen 
says that, “a theory is empirically adequate exactly if...[it] has at least one 
model that all the phenomena fit inside” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 12). We 
will return to the issue of how this definition of empirical correctness 
compares with other notions o f empirical correctness (or adequacy) later. 
Let’s assume that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory in this language is 
obtained by Ramseyfying away the mixed and theoretical predicates that 
appear in the theory (cf. Ketland, 2004, p. 292). It follows that:
observable/unobservable distinction that he wishes to draw. This response is discussed in 
subsection 3.2.
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Theorem 1: The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if  and only if  there is 
some sequence o f relations R2.1, R22.., R3.1, R-3.2--- such that «  D o, D t > , 
Oi, O2..., R2.1, R2.2—, R3.1, R3.2—> h A (cf. Ketland’s “Theorem 4” [2004, p. 
293])
where Dt is the set of unobservable objects in the world. (Ketland gives a 
proof of this result, this has been omitted, as the result itself seems 
intuitively obvious.) We need one more definition:
Definition 2: « D i ,  D2>, R1.1, R1.2-, R2.1, R2.2.R3.1,  R3.2.-> is T- 
cardinality correct if  and only if ID2I = |Dt|. (cf. Ketland’s “Definition G” 
[2004, p. 298])
and we can then prove:
Theorem 2: The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if and only if A has a 
model that is empirically correct and T-cardinality correct, (cf. Ketland’s 
“Theorem 6” [2004, p. 298])
The proof is in two steps:
[1] Left-to-right: Suppose the Ramsey-sentence o f A is true. Then, by 
Theorem 1, there is some sequence of relations R2.1, R2.2—> R3.1, R3.2— such 
that «  Do, D t >, Oi, O2..., R2.1, R2.2---, R3.b R3.2—>  f= A, i.e. «  Do, D t >, 
Oj, 02..., R2.1, R 2 .2 -, R3.1, R3.2...> is a model of A. Clearly, <D0, Oi, 02...>  
is isomorphic to <D0, Oj, 02...> , so «  D0, DT >, Oi, 02..., R2.1, R 2 .2 -, R3.h 
R3.2..> is empirically correct (by definition 1). Equally clearly, |D t| = |D t|, 
so «  Do, D t > , Oi, O2..., R2.1, R2.2—, R3.1, R3.2—> is T-cardinality correct 
(by definition 2).
[2] Right-to-left: Suppose A has a model, « D i ,  D2>, R1.1, Ri.2---, R2.1, 
R2.2-•, R3.1, R3 2...>, that is empirically correct and T-cardinality correct. As 
« D ] ,  D2>, Rj.i, Ri.2 -, R2.1, R22. ., R3.1, R3.2-> is empirically correct, <Dj, 
R1.1, R i . 2 - i s  isomorphic to <Do, Oj, 02...>, i.e. there is a bijection, f  (Di
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-> Do), such that, for every Ri.j and every n-tuple, <xi, X2 , . . .xn>, of elements 
ofD i:
< x i ,  x 2,.. .X n >  e  Ri.i i f  a n d  o n ly  i f  < f ( x i ) ,  f ( x 2) , . . . f ( x n) >  e  Oi
As « D i ,  D2>, R i . i , R i . 2 - R2.1, R2 .2 —, R3 .1, R3.2 •> is T-cardinality correct, 
|D2| = |D t|, i.e. there is a bijection, g (D2 —> D t). We can use f  and g to 
define a new function, f 'g  (<Di, D2> —» <Do, D t> ) such that f*g(x) = f(x) if 
x € Di and f'g (x ) = g(x) if x e D2 and we can use f*g to define new 
relations such that, for every R2 j and every R3j:
(i) R2T =df {<f*g(xi), f*g(x2),... f*g(xn)> : <xh x2,... xn> g R2i}
(ii) R3.i’ =df {<f|cg(xi), f*g(x2) ,... f*g(xn)> : <xi, x2,... xn> e R3.j}
By the construction of the R2.j’s and R3.i’s, f 'g  is an isomorphism between 
<<Di, D2>, R i . i ,  R 1 . 2  - ,  R 2 . 1 ,  R 2 . 2 — » R 3 . 1 ,  R 3 . 2 — > and « D o ,  D t> , O i, 0 2..., 
R 2 . i ’ , R2 2 , ...5 R 3 . 1 ’ , Rs^’..^ . We know that « D ] ,  D2>, Ri.i, R i . 2 - . - ,  R 2 . 1 ,  
R 2 . 2 . . . ,  R 3 . I ,  R 3 2 . . . >  |= A, SO « D o ,  D t> , O i ,  0 2 . . . ,  R 2 . i ’ ,  R 2 .2 ’ . . ,  R 3 . i ’ , 
R3 .2 *—> (= A. So by theorem 1, the Ramsey-sentence of A is true.
QED.
How does Ketland’s result compare to Demopoulos and 
Friedman’s claim that if “our theory is consistent, and if  all its purely 
observational consequences are true, then the truth of the Ramsey-sentence 
follows as a theorem of set theory or second-order logic, provided our initial 
domain has the right cardinality” (Demopoulos and Friedman, 1985, p. 635, 
original emphasis)? Ketland notes that his result is, strictly speaking, 
weaker, because it is in principle possible that all a theory’s purely 
observational consequences could be true whilst it might not have an 
empirically correct model but not vice-versa. (An observational 
consequence here is assumed to be any statement formed using only 
observational predicates and logical terms, excluding predicate variables.
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Observational consequences in this sense are thus assumed to include 
empirical generalisations. Zahar’s reply to the modem version of the 
objection is based on the claim that this is inappropriate; this is discussed in 
subsection 3.1.)
It is not easy to give an example that demonstrates how all a 
theory’s purely observational consequences could be true whilst it might not 
have an empirically correct model, but Ketland gives an example that 
demonstrates how something analogous can occur in number theory. Say 
that a model is “arithmetically correct” if  and only if it has a reduct 
isomorphic to the standard natural number structure. Say that a theory has 
true “arithmetical consequences” if and only if all the consequences of the 
theory that are stated in the language of arithmetic are satisfied in the 
standard natural number structure. Let L be the language o f arithmetic, and 
let Lt be the language of arithmetic extended by a monadic predicate 
symbol, T (which is intended to behave like a truth predicate). Now consider 
the theory FS*: this contains the axioms o f Peano arithmetic and certain 
axioms concerning the predicate T (these are axioms that, intuitively 
speaking, a truth predicate should satisfy) (see Halbach, 1999, pp. 368-369). 
It can be shown that, (i) if M is a model of FS* then M does not have a 
reduct isomorphic to the standard natural number structure, so FS* does not 
have a model that is arithmetically correct, but nonetheless, (ii) every 
consequence o f FS* that does not involve T is true in the standard natural 
number structure, so FS* has only true arithmetical consequences. For more 
on this see Ketland (2004, pp. 295-298).
However, despite the fact that Ketland’s result is strictly speaking 
weaker than the one Demopoulos and Friedman claim, the difference 
appears to be immaterial: Ketland’s result still suggests that ESR is not 
significantly distinct from antirealism. As noted, Ketland’s notion of 
empirical correctness formalises van Fraassen’s notion of empirical 
adequacy. Since van Fraassen argues that it is rational to believe that our 
mature theories are empirically adequate (but not necessarily true) Ketland’s 
result shows that what the knowledge that a theory’s Ramsey-sentence is 
(approximately) true would amount to, beyond what van Fraassen’s 
antirealism allows, would be (at most) only knowledge of the cardinality of
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the unobservable world. Thus ESR (in its Ramsey-sentence form) is just van 
Fraassen’s antirealism, augmented by the peculiar claim that we can 
(perhaps) know the cardinality of the unobservable world.
2. Replies that Abandon the Ramsey-Sentence Approach to 
ESR
In this section two arguments that claim that Newman’s objection can be 
evaded if one abandons the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR are 
discussed. On the face of it, this appears to be a strange line to take, because 
although Demopoulos and Friedman’s and Ketland’s versions of the 
objection are directed at the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR Newman’s 
original version o f the objection is not. This first impression remains on 
closer inspection of these arguments.
2.1. Redhead’s Reply
Redhead (2001b) argues that the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR is 
indeed undermined by Newman’s objection, commenting that, “the Ramsey 
sentence 3R(S[R]), asserting the existence of a relation R which has 
structure S, is in fact a logical truth, modulo the specification of the 
cardinality of the domain over which the relation is defined” (Redhead, 
2001b, pp. 345-346). This is false: the Ramsey-sentence o f a theory is not 
satisfied by every model of the right cardinality, so the Ramsey-sentence is 
not “a logical truth, modulo the specification of the cardinality o f the 
domain” (on the most obvious reading of this expression). For example 
consider the “theory” expressed by the sentence 3w3x ([w ^  x] & Vy [(y = 
w) v (y = x)]) & Vz(Pz) (which says that there are two things, and that
3 The qualifications “at most” and “perhaps” appear here because knowing that a theory’s 
Ramsey-sentence is true doesn’t guarantee that we know the cardinality o f the unobservable 
world, it only guarantees that we know that the theory has some model with the right 
cardinality (and the theory might have models of different cardinalities).
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everything is P). It’s Ramsey-sentence is E3X[3w3x ([w * x] & Vy [(y = w) 
v (y = x)]) & Vz(Xz)] (assuming P needs to be Ramseyfied). This is 
satisfied by the structure <{1,2}; {1,2}> but not by every structure with two 
elements in its domain. For example, it is not satisfied by the structure 
<{1.2}; {!}>• Hence it is not “a logical truth, modulo the specification of 
the cardinality of the domain”. What (Ketland’s version of) Newman’s 
objection actually shows is that i f  the theory has an empirically correct 
model then the theory’s Ramsey-sentence is bound to be satisfied by some 
structure (instantiated by the world) as long as the world contains an 
appropriate number of (unobservable) things.
Redhead puts forward an alternative approach to ESR, which, he 
claims, avoids Newman’s objection. He describes this alternative approach 
as follows:
We need not deny that there are real physical relations 
posited by physical theories...Thus S(R), where R refers to 
a specific relation having the structure S, is of course 
logically stronger than the Ramsey sentence, and is by no 
means a logical truth. But this means.. .that the reference o f 
R must be picked out in non-structural terms. But this is not 
denied in the above account. Our claim is merely that R is 
hypothesised in some explanatory theoretical context so it 
exists as an ontological posit, but all that we have epistemic 
warrant for is the second-order structure S. (Redhead,
2001b, p. 346).
Redhead appears to suggest that the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR 
denies that there are real physical relations posited by physical theories. This 
is also false. The Ramsey-sentence approach does claim (roughly speaking) 
that all we know about (some of) these relations is structural, and this is 
(roughly speaking) why Newman’s objection operates against it. But this is 
a claim that Redhead apparently endorses. The point o f Newman’s objection 
is (roughly speaking) that if  all we know is that there is some (real) relation
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R (of which we have only structural knowledge) then we know nothing 
more than a cardinality constraint on the domain over which the relation is 
defined.
On the other hand, in parts o f the above quote Redhead seems to 
suggest that we can specify the relation R intensionally. If he does think this 
then he appears to have abandoned ESR, and it is hard to see how he can 
maintain the claim that we have only structural knowledge o f R.
Perhaps the most charitable reading of Redhead’s position would 
be to substitute the word “important” or “natural” for the words “real” and 
“specific” in the above quote. This would lead us back to Newman’s own 
“absurd” response to his objection (variants of which are discussed in 
section 4). However, it is doubtful that this is really what Redhead intended. 
Neither “natural” nor “important” means the same as “real”, much less is 
either synonymous with “specific”. Moreover, there seems to be no reason 
why taking this line forces one to abandon the Ramsey-sentence approach 
(as will be seen when this approach is discussed in section 4).
2.2. French and Ladyman’s Reply
French and Ladyman (2003a) appear to suggest that Newman’s objection 
does not arise if one adopts the semantic view of theories (whereby a theory 
is taken to be a collection of structures) as opposed to the syntactic view 
(whereby a theory is taken to be a collection of sentences):
Worrall’s approach is thoroughly embedded in the so- 
called syntactic view of theories that adopts first-order 
quantificational logic as the appropriate form for the 
representation of physical theories. [Footnote omitted] We 
will not rehearse our reasons here, but we consider this 
approach to be deeply flawed, not only because of its 
inadequacy in reflecting scientific practice, but also 
because o f the pseudo-problems that arise once one has 
adopted it. So for example, the Newman problem is
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obviated if one does not think of structures and relations in 
first-order extensional terms. One of us (Ladyman 1998) 
has suggested an alternative descriptive framework for SR 
[structural realism], namely the “semantic” or model 
theoretic approach to theories. (French and Ladyman,
2003a, p. 33)
On the face of it, it seems highly unlikely that moving to the semantic view 
would really allow the ESRist to evade Newman’s objection. In fact, 
Newman’s original version of the objection is posed against the view that 
scientific theories directly specify a structure that represents the world. It is 
true that Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) and Ketland (2004) aim their 
objections at the Ramsey-sentence approach, which does assume that 
science presents us with a linguistic representation of the world. However, it 
is easy to show that an analogue of their objections applies to a version of 
ESR framed using the semantic view.
Framed in terms of the semantic view, ESR would imply 
something like the following limitation on our knowledge:
The most that we can know about the world is that some structure (provided 
by our scientific theories) is empirically correct and isomorphic to a 
structure instantiated by the world.
Let <D o, Oi, O2.. .> be the structure instantiated by the observable 
world (relative to some chosen observational predicates): i.e. let Do be the 
set of observable objects in the world and let Oi, O2 etc. be the intended 
extensions of observational predicates. Let a theory present us with a 
structure, « D i ,  D2>, R1.1, Ri.2-.., R2.1, R2.2—, R3.1, R 3 . 2 w h e r e  Di is a 
domain that is to represent the set of observable objects, D2 is a domain that 
is to represent the set of unobservable objects, each Ri.j is to represent an 
observable relation (where an observable relation is taken to be a set of 
[tuples of] observable objects), each R2.j is to represent a mixed relation 
(where a mixed relation is taken to be a set o f tuples that each contain at 
least one observable object and at least one unobservable object) and each
127
Chapter 4
R.3 .i is to represent an unobservable relation (where an unobservable relation 
is taken to be a set of [tuples of] unobservable objects). Define such a 
structure to be empirically correct as before:
Definition 1: « D i ,  D2>, Ri.i, R 1.2-.-5 R215 R2 .2 — 5 R3 .I5 R3.2 —> is empirically 
correct if  and only if  its reduct <Di, Rj.i, Ri.2 -.-> is isomorphic to <Do, O i,
0 2...>. (cf. Ketland’s “Definition E” [2004, p. 296])
Let D j be the set of unobservable objects in the world. Define 
« D i ,  D2>, Ri.i, R 1.2-.-5 R2 .1, R2 .2-.-5 R3.I5 R3 .2 .-.> to be T-cardinality correct 
as before:
Definition 2: « D i ,  D2>, R 1.1, R 1.2 - ,  R2 .1, R2 .2 R3 .1, R3 2 -> is T- 
cardinality correct if  and only if ID2 I = |D t|. (cf. Ketland’s “Definition G” 
[2004, p. 298])
We can now prove that:
Theorem 3: « D i ,  D2>, Ri.i, Ri.2 -.-, R2 .1, R2 .2 ---, R3 .I5 R3 .2 —> is empirically 
correct and isomorphic to a structure instantiated by the world if and only if 
it is empirically correct and T-cardinality correct.
The proof comes in two stages:
[1] Left to right: Suppose « D i ,  D2>, R 1.1, R 1.2 - ,  R2 .1, R2.2 --., R3 .1, R3.2 .-> is 
empirically correct and isomorphic to a structure instantiated by the world. 
I.e. « D j ,  D2>, Ri.i, R 1.2 - ,  R2 .1, R2.2 -, R3.1, R3 .2 - >  is isomorphic to a 
structure of the form, « D o ,  D t> , Oi, O2 ..., R2 .1’, R2 .2 ’ ..-5 R3 . i \  R3 2 , . . -> 5 
where O], O2 etc. are the intended extensions of observational predicates. 
By stipulation it is empirically correct. And clearly, P 2 I = |D t|, i.e. « D i ,  
D2>, Rj.i, R 1.2 - . 5  R2 .1, R2 .2 - ,  R3 .I5 R3.2 - > is T-cardinality correct.
[2] Right to left: Suppose « D i ,  D2>, R 1.1, R 1.2 -., R2 .1, R2 .2 -., R3 .1, R3.2 - > is
empirically correct and T-cardinality correct. By stipulation it is empirically
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correct. As « D j ,  D2>, Ri.i, R1.2—» R2.1, R2.2—, R3.1, R3.2—> is empirically 
correct there is some isomorphism between <Di, Ri.i, R i.2...> and <Do, Oi,
02 .. .>. I.e. there is a bijection f  (Di —> Do), such that, for every Ri j and 
every n-tuple, <xi;x2..., xn>, of elements of D i:
<xj, x2 ,...xn> e Ri.i if  and only if <f(xi), f(x2),...f(xn)> e O j
As « D i ,  D 2>, Ri.i, Ri.2—» R2.i, R22..., R3.], R3.2-.> is T-cardinality correct 
there is some bijection, g (D 2 -»  D j). We can use these functions to define a 
new function, f 'g  (<D i, D 2> —> <Do, D t>) such that f*g(x) = f(x) if  x e Di 
and f*g(x) = g(x) if  x e D 2 and we can use f 'g  to define new relations such 
that, for every R 2 .j and every R3.j:
(i) R 2 .i’ = d f  {<f|,g(xi), P g(x2),... f*g(x„)> : <xb x2,... xn> e R 2 i }
(ii) R 3 .i’ =df (< f |eg(xi), f*g(x2),... f*g(xn)> : <xi, x2,... xn> e R 3 . i }
By the construction of the R2 .j’s and R3.j’s, f 'g  is an isomorphism between 
« D j ,  D 2>, Ri.i, Ri.2..., R2.i, R2.2 R3.1, R3.2.•>  and « D o ,  D j> , Oi, 02...,
R2.1 ’, R2.2’ R3.1’, R3.2, - > - <<;D o, D t> , Oi, 02..., R2.i \  R2.2’- -, R3.l’,
R3,2’...> is a structure instantiated by the world: we know that Oi, 0 2 etc. are 
the intended extensions of observational predicates and each R2 .j’ is an 
arbitrary mixed relation that is obviously instantiated by the world (all its 
tuples are built from objects in the set D cM D t, i.e. the set o f objects in the 
world) and similarly, each R 3 . j ’ is an arbitrary unobservable relation that is 
obviously instantiated by the world (all its tuples are built from objects in 
the set D t, i.e. the set of unobservable objects in the world) . 4
QED.
4 It may be objected that the R.2.i’s  and the R^fs, presumably unlike the O jS, may not 
correspond to any natural relations; this again leads to essentially Newman’s own “absurd” 
response to his objection (variants o f which are discussed in section 4).
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Theorem 3  states that the semantic view formulation of ESR (i.e. 
the claim that the most that we can know about the world is that some 
structure -  provided by our scientific theories -  is empirically adequate and 
isomorphic to a structure instantiated by the world) is equivalent to the 
claim that the most that we can know about the world is that some structure 
(provided by our scientific theories), « D j ,  D2>, Ri.i, R1.2..., R2.i, R2.2—, 
R3.1, R3.2...>, is empirically correct and T-cardinality correct, so Theorem 3  
provides a Newman-esque reductio of the semantic view formulation of 
ESR. It is true that there is a slight difference between the ESRist who 
works with the semantic view and the ESRist who works with the syntactic 
view/Ramsey-sentence approach (because the latter’s claim is equivalent to 
the even less optimistic view that the most we can know about the world is 
that one o f the -  possibly many -  structures that satisfy a given theory is 
empirically correct and T-cardinality correct) but this difference does not 
appear to be very significant. (The difference arises because the proponent 
of the semantic view -  at least as he has been characterised here -  thinks 
that the theory specifies a unique structure, whereas the proponent of the 
syntactic view thinks that a theory is a sentence that picks out only a family 
of structures, all o f which satisfy the sentence.)
3. Replies Designed to Rescue the Ramsey-Sentence 
Approach
In this section three replies that are designed to save the Ramsey-sentence 
approach to ESR from the modem versions o f Newman’s objection are 
considered.
3.1. Z ah ar’s Reply
Zahar ( 2 0 0 1  [in appendix 4 , co-written with John Worrall], 2 0 0 4 ) takes 
issue with Demopoulos and Friedman’s version o f Newman’s objection, 
which he characterises as the claim that it is “only what the Ramsey- 
sentence asserts over and above its observational content [that] is reducible
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to ...a  cardinality constraint” (Zahar, 2004, p. 10, original emphasis). Zahar 
goes on to say that:
This “over and above” however proves to be essentially 
indefinable; for on the one hand, the Ramsey-sentence does 
not normally follow from its empirical basis, i.e. from the 
set o f true and empirically decidable, hence singular 
sentences. If, on the other hand, all the -  generally 
undecidable -  “empirical generalisations” were included in 
the observational content of a theory, then the Ramsey- 
sentence might well turn out to be one of them; in which 
case Demopoulos’s and Friedman’s thesis collapses into 
the trivial claim that the Ramsey-sentence follows from 
itself (Zahar, 2004, p. 10, original emphasis).
Zahar’s first “hand” holds the proposition that only singular 
sentences form the observational content of a theory. He then demonstrates 
that Ramsey-sentences can go beyond such observational content. He asks 
us (Zahar, 2004, p. 11) to consider a theory expressed by the sentence:
A: Vx(Fx —» Tx) & Vy(Ty -> Ky)
where F and K are observational predicates and T is a theoretical predicate. 
The Ramsey-sentence of this theory is:
A*: 3X(Vx[Fx -> Xx] & Vy[Xy -»  Ky])
which is equivalent to:
Vx(Fx -» Kx)
and this last sentence (and hence the equivalent A*) goes beyond any 
number of singular statements of the form:
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F a j  — >  K a j
in the sense that no matter how many statements o f this form we have there 
is always a model in which they are all true but in which the generalisation 
Vx(Fx -> Kx) (and hence the equivalent A*) is false. So there is a clear 
sense in which the Ramsey-sentence of the theory goes beyond (Zahar’s 
understanding of) the observational content of the theory.
However, given Zahar’s understanding of the observational content 
o f a theory as consisting of the singular sentences (containing only 
observational terms) entailed by the theory then not only do Ramsey- 
sentences typically go beyond observational content but, as Zahar’s example 
clearly illustrates, universal generalisations that involve only observational 
predicates (i.e. “empirical generalisations”) also go beyond observational 
content. Even the antirealist would typically agree that we can know such 
generalisations to be true, so even the antirealist would agree that we can 
know more than the observational content o f a theory, in Zahar’s sense of 
observational content.5 Unless the ESRist can demonstrate that Ramsey- 
sentences also go beyond empirical generalisations he has failed to 
distinguish his position from antirealism. In fact, Zahar clearly states (in the 
above quote) that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory might often be 
(equivalent to) an empirical generalisation. At this point he seems to 
concede to Demopoulos and Friedman even more than they ask for: they 
claim that ESR is antirealism plus a cardinality constraint, while Zahar 
seems to concede that ESR is (often) plain antirealism (because he claims
5 Typically, the antirealist would say that we can have knowledge o f singular empirical 
statements and empirical generalisations (i.e. generalisations that do not involve theoretical 
terms or second-order variables) but would deny that we generally have knowledge o f a 
theory’s Ramsey-sentence (since, notwithstanding Zahar’s example, a theory’s Ramsey- 
sentence is not typically equivalent to an empirical generalisation). (Although what 
Newman’s objection shows is -  roughly speaking -  that knowing a theory’s Ramsey- 
sentence to be true is knowing very little beyond knowing that the singular empirical 
statements and empirical generalisations that follow from the theory are true, so ESR 
collapses into a position not significantly distinct from antirealism.)
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that Ramsey-sentences are [often] equivalent to empirical generalisations, so 
the ESRists’ claim that we can have knowledge o f at most Ramsey- 
sentences is [often] equivalent to the antirealists claim that we can have 
knowledge of at most empirical generalisations).
Nonetheless, Zahar denies that ESR is just antirealism. This denial 
seems to rest on an equivocation over the meaning of “observational 
content”. On the one hand he suggests that the difference between realists 
and antirealists is that the latter deny that we can have knowledge that goes 
beyond the observational content of a theory, which is true, but only if the 
observational content o f a theory is taken to include empirical 
generalisations. He then demonstrates that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory 
goes beyond the observational content of a theory, where this is now taken 
to exclude empirical generalisations. Thus his conclusion that knowing the 
Ramsey-sentence of a theory is knowing more than the antirealist would 
allow does not follow.
3.2. Cruse’s Reply
Cruse’s (2005) reply is directed at Ketland’s version of the objection. In 
particular, Cruse objects that not all ESRists need draw the observational 
term/theoretical term distinction in the way that Ketland suggests (and given 
a suitably different construal of the distinction, Ketland’s proof of theorem 2 
would not go through). Recall that Ketland takes observational predicates to 
refer exclusively to sets of (tuples of) observable objects, theoretical 
predicates to refer exclusively to sets of (tuples of) unobservables objects 
and mixed predicates to refer to sets o f tuples that each contain at least one 
observable and one unobservable object. As noted, Ketland acknowledges 
that this has some rather counter-intuitive consequences. Cruse emphasises 
this point:
consider the relation denoted by the predicate “larger than”.
On Ketland’s taxonomy, there is no such single relation; 
there are three. First, there is the relation we might call 
observably larger than, which ranges entirely over
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observable objects. Second[,] there is the relation we might 
call unobservably larger than, which ranges entirely over 
unobservable objects. Third, there is the relation we might 
call miscellaneously larger than, which applies to all and 
only pairs of objects such that the first is observable, the 
second unobservable, and the first larger than the second.6 
On Ketland’s terminology, only the first class o f relations -  
those which range entirely over observable objects -  count 
as observable...I will call this the strong version of the 
observational-theoretical (O/T) distinction. (Cruse, 2005, p.
561, original emphasis, footnote added)
Cruse’s reply is based on rejecting the strong observational term/theoretical 
term distinction.
Cruse notes that some ESRists do appear to be committed to this 
form of the observational term/theoretical term distinction or rather (as he 
puts it) “something isomorphic to it” (Cruse, 2005, p. 563). Translated into 
the terminology of this thesis, he suggests that the internal term/external 
term distinction employed by SESRists (such as Russell) must take this form 
because, “the mental and physical domains are entirely disjoint, so no (non- 
mathematical) property which applies to a mental event applies to a physical 
event or vice versa. Similarly, no (non-mathematical) predicate which 
applies to a mental event will apply to a physical event” (Cruse, 2005, p. 
563).
In fact, in the face o f Newman’s objection, Russell decided that he 
was not committed to this form of the distinction. In a letter to Newman 
(reprinted in his autobiography [1968] and by Demopoulos and Friedman 
[1985]) he wrote:
6 This is splitting hairs, but it seems that we could also have an unobservable object that 
was larger than an observable object if, for example, “the universe” or “the nearest black 
hole” qualify as unobservable objects.
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It was quite clear to me, as I read your article, that I had not 
really intended to say what in fact I did say, that nothing is 
known about the physical world except its structure. I had 
always assumed spacio-temporal continuity with the world 
o f percepts, that is to say, I had assumed that there might be 
co-punctuality between percepts and non-percepts...And 
co-punctuality I regarded as a relation which might exist 
among percepts and is itself perceptible. (Russell, 1968, p.
176)
Russell is here putting forward the view that there is at least one non-logical 
predicate (“co-punctuality”) that refers to a relation that can hold between (i) 
pairs of external objects, (ii) pairs consisting o f one external object and one 
internal object (in either order) and (iii) pairs o f internal objects. Russell’s 
own reply to Newman is actually essentially the same as Cruse’s reply to 
Ketland, which is perhaps surprising, as Cruse cites Russell as the sort of 
ESRist for whom this reply is not available.
There are good reasons to think that this sort of reply isn’t 
available to Russell. As Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) point out, 
Russell’s move is completely ad hoc:
in the earlier theory [i.e. Russell’s (1927) theory] we could 
not assume acquaintance with a cross category notion such 
as spacio-temporal contiguity or causality; but in the light 
o f the difficulties o f that theory we now find that we can 
assume this! [footnote omitted] We are not saying that one 
cannot resolve the issue in this way. But it seems quite 
clear that without a considerable advance in the theoretical 
articulation of this rather elusive Russellian concept [i.e. 
acquaintance], no such resolution of the difficulty can be 
very compelling. (Demopoulos and Friedman, 1985, p. 632, 
original emphasis)
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I would go further: it seems that, given the supposedly radical difference 
between external and internal objects, it is very unlikely that the issue could 
be satisfactorily resolved this way. Moreover, if Russell makes this 
concession then he seems to be left at the top of a slippery slope: if we can 
assume that external objects can be “co-punctual” with one another in the 
same way that internal objects sometimes are why can’t we assume that they 
can be “bigger than” one another in the same way? It thus does seem (as 
Cruse suggests) that SESRists (such as Russell) are committed to a internal 
term/external term distinction of the form Ketland suggests (so they cannot 
evade the Newman/Ketland objection this way).
However, Cruse’s main point (translated into the current idiom) is 
that the WESRist is not committed to anything like Ketland’s form of the 
observational term/theoretical term distinction. He proposes an alternative 
form of the distinction according to which:
observational predicates refer to, broadly speaking, 
perceptible, or observable properties such as redness or 
squareness. A natural understanding of this would be that 
these observable properties are unproblematic not because 
they are always observable, but simply because we can in 
at least some cases observe them (Cruse, 2005, p. 565, 
original emphasis)
This is supposed to capture the intuition that, “we can meaningfully (and for 
a realist, truly) assert the existence of red blood cells, or microscopic square 
grids, for example” (Cruse, 2005, p. 564) i.e. that observational predicates 
can be applied to unobservable objects. A natural interpretation of this 
suggestion (natural in the light of the foregoing discussion, at any rate) is 
that rather than taking an observational predicate to be one whose intended 
extension is a set consisting only of (tuples of) observable objects (as 
Ketland suggests) we are to take an observational predicate to be one whose 
intended extension is a set consisting of at least some (tuples of) observable 
objects. Theoretical predicates would then be those whose intended 
extension is a set consisting entirely of (tuples of) unobservable objects.
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However, interpreted this way, Cruse’s suggestion is also deeply counter­
intuitive, because it classes as observational a number of predicates that are, 
intuitively speaking, theoretical. It is true that “being a superstring” is on 
this account a theoretical predicate, because no superstring is observable, 
but “being a collection of superstrings” is observational, because it applies 
to some (in fact, if the theory is correct, all) observable objects. And it is (to 
say the least) counter-intuitive to classify “being a collection of 
superstrings” as observational.
However, this is not the only possible interpretation o f Cruse’s 
suggestion. In fact, this interpretation assumes that observability of 
properties and relations must be defined in terms of observability of objects. 
But it has already been noted (in chapter 2) that there is no compelling 
reason to assume this. It is quite conceivable that the extensions of 
observational predicates can contain both observable and unobservable 
objects, and that the extensions of theoretical predicates can contain both 
observable and unobservable objects, depending on what the criteria of
• • 7observability are.
If the WESRist adopts an observational term/theoretical term 
distinction along these lines then it is true that Ketland’s proof o f theorem 2 
does not go through (Ketland’s proof crucially assumes that observational 
predicates apply only to sets of [tuples of] observables, which is not the case 
with this characterisation of the observational term/theoretical term 
distinction). The WESRist can thereby evade the conclusion that:
Theorem 2: The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if and only if  A has a 
model which is empirically correct and T-cardinality correct, (cf. Ketland’s 
“Theorem 6” [2004, p. 298])
7 It has been argued that there are problems with any attempt to draw the 
observable/unobservable distinction in a way that is suitable for the WESRists purposes. 
The point here is that there is no need to assume that, if the observable/unobservable 
distinction can be suitably drawn, it must be such that the observability o f properties and 
relations is defined in terms of the observability of objects.
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However, the WESRist would be well advised to leave the champagne on 
ice, if  not in the cellar. Even using this more liberal characterisation of the 
observational term/theoretical term distinction we can still prove a theorem 
that casts doubt on the view that knowledge of a theory’s Ramsey-sentence 
is the sort of knowledge that the WESRist wants to claim that we have.
We assume that we have a language containing a number of 
observational predicates (construed as above, so that they may apply to 
observable and unobservable objects) and a number of theoretical predicates 
(construed as above, so that they too may apply to observable and 
unobservable objects). The structure associated with the intended 
interpretation of the observational predicates is:
<Da, Oi, O2.. .>
where Da is the domain of (observable and unobservable) objects in the 
world that instantiate some observable property or relation that is referred to 
by one of the observational predicates of the language and each Oj is the 
intended extension of an observational predicate o f the language. Now, 
given a theory, A, the Ramsey-sentence o f A is obtained by Ramseyfying 
away the theoretical predicates. As before, it is obvious that:
Theorem 4 : The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if  and only if  there is 
some sequence of relations, R2.1, R2.2." such that « D a ,  Db>, Oi, O2..., R2.1, 
^ 2.2 - ^
where Db is the domain of objects in the world that do not instantiate any 
observable property or relation that is referred to by one of the observational 
predicates of the language (depending on the choice of these predicates, Db 
may well be the empty set, e.g. if one of the observational predicates is 
“larger than” Db will presumably be empty as every object is surely on at 
least one side of this relation to at least one other object). We will say of an 
arbitrary structure for the language, « D i ,  D2>, R 1.1, R 1.2 ...R 2 .1, R2 .2- ^ ,  
(where <Dj, D2> is an arbitrary two-sorted domain, each Ri.i is an arbitrary
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interpretation of an observational predicate over Di, and each R2.1 is an 
arbitrary interpretation of a theoretical predicate over D1UD2) that:
Definition 3 : « D i ,  D2>, R1.1, R12...R21, R2.2-.> gets the extensions o f  the 
observational predicates right if  and only if its reduct <Di, R u , Ri.2...> is 
isomorphic to <D a, Oi, 0 2 ...>
We will also say that:
Definition 4 : « D i ,  D2>, R1.1, R1.2-. R21, R2.2-..> is B-cardinality correct if  
and only if  ID2I = |Db|.
It is easy to prove:
Theorem 5 : The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if and only if A has a 
model which gets the extensions of the observational predicates right and 
which is B-cardinality correct.
The proof is in two steps:
[1 ] Left-to-right: Suppose the Ramsey-sentence of A is true. Then, by 
Theorem 3 , there is some sequence of relations R2.1, R2.2--- such that « D a ,  
Db>, Oi, O2..., R2.1, R2.2- - • >  ^A, i.e. « D a ,  D b>, Oi, O2..., R2.1, R2.2- --> is a 
model of A. Clearly, <D a, Oi, 0 2 ...>  is isomorphic to < D a, Oi, 0 2 --> , so  
« D a ,  Db>, Oi, O2..., R2.1, R2.2- • •> gets the extensions o f the observational 
predicates right (by definition 3 ). Equally clearly, |Db| = |Db|, i.e. « D a ,  
Db>, Oi, O2..., R2.1, R2.2. > •> is B-cardinality correct (by definition 4 ).
[2 ] Right-to-left: Suppose A has a model, « D i ,  D2>, R1.1, R12...R21, 
R22-..>, which gets the extensions of the observational predicates right and 
which is B-cardinality correct. As « D j ,  D2>, R1.1, R12. .R21, R2 .2 - - •> gets 
the extensions o f the observational predicates right, <Di, R11, Ri^..^ is
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isomorphic to <DA, Oi, 02...>, i.e there is a bijection f  (Di -> DA), such that, 
for every Ri.i and every n-tuple, < x i fX2...xn> ,  of elements o f D i:
<xj, x2,...xn> e Ri.i if  and only if  <f(xj), f(x2),...f(xn)> e Oj
As « D i ,  D2>, Ri.i, R 1 2 ...R 2 1 , R2.2 ---> is B-cardinality correct, there is a 
bijection g (D2 -»  D b ). We can use f  and g to define a new function, f*g 
(<Di, D2> -> <Da , Db>) such that f 'g (x ) = f(x) if  x e Di and f'g (x ) = g(x) 
if  x g D2 and we can use f 'g  to define new relations such that, for every R2 .j:
R2.i’ =df {<f*g(xi), f ‘g(x2),... f*g(xn)> : <xi, x2>... xn> € R2.i}
By the construction o f the R2 .i’s, f 'g  is an isomorphism between « D j ,  D2>, 
R 1.1, R 1.2 ...R 2 .1, R2 .2 . • •> and « D A, DB>, Oi, 0 2..., R2 . i \  R22 ’ •>. We know 
that « D i ,  D2>, Ri.i, R 1.2—, R2.1, R2.2 ---> b s0 <<:^ a , Db>, Oi, O2 ..., R2 . i \  
R2 2 f= A. So by theorem 3, the Ramsey-sentence o f A is true.
QED.
Theorem 5 implies that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory can tell us 
something substantial about the world, beyond what the antirealist typically 
allows: it tells us about the “observable” properties and relations of the 
unobservable world. So ESR, construed on these lines, does represent a 
halfway house between realism and antirealism. However, it doesn’t look 
like the house the ESRist claims to inhabit: the position implies that we have 
no non-trivial knowledge of unobservable properties and relations (and, in 
particular, no interesting structural knowledge of such properties and 
relations). This implies that predicates likes “strangeness” or “being a 
collection of superstrings” serve only an instrumentalist function in our 
theories, which seems to be at odds with the traditional ESRist’s claims.
8 Discussing whether or not this position was actually plausible in any detail would be 
tangential to the aims of this thesis. It would also be a highly scholastic exercise, because it 
is not a position that anyone holds. However, there is one very obvious objection to this
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3.3. Melia and Saatsi’s Reply
Melia and Saatsi’s (2006) response to Newman’s objection is based on the 
observation that:
The properties postulated in scientific theories are typically 
taken to stand in certain intensional relations to various 
other properties. Some properties counter/actually depend 
on others, some are correlated in a law-like manner with 
others, some are independent o f others, and some are 
explanatory o f others. (Melia and Saatsi, 2006, pp. 579- 
580, original emphasis)
Melia and Saatsi point out that such relations between properties (i.e. 
second-order relations) cannot be expressed in standard second-order logic.9 
Moreover, they claim that if we formulate scientific theories and their 
Ramsey-sentences in a language that is capable of expressing such relations 
then Newman’s objection will be blocked.
As Melia and Saatsi note (2006, p. 580) the obvious way to 
formulate such relations would be to introduce higher order predicates into 
one’s language. This is not the approach they ultimately favour, but let’s 
consider this approach first. Consider a “theory” which states that there is a 
click on a Geiger counter if and only if there is an atom in the vicinity of the 
Geiger counter that radioactively decays. We might attempt to formalise this 
theory as follows:
position, which is that it relies on a sharp distinction between the observable and 
unobservable and, as argued in chapter 2, drawing such a distinction in a principled way is 
highly problematic.
9 The terminology could become confusing here. I call properties and relations o f  properties 
and relations second-order properties and relations. It is important to note that second-order 
logic is so-called because it allows for quantification over sets o f (tuples of) objects as well 
as objects and not because it accommodates second-order properties and relations in this 
sense.
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3xCx <-» 3y(Ay & Dy)
where “A” and “D” are “theoretical” predicates such that “Ax” means “x is 
an atom in the vicinity of a Geiger counter” and “Dx” means “x 
radioactively decays” and “C” is an “observational” predicate such that 
“Cx” means “x is a click in a Geiger counter”. Melia and Saatsi would say 
that implicit in the theory is the claim that the correlation between Geiger 
counter clicks and radioactive decay is a lawful (as opposed to accidental) 
correlation. Consequently, they would argue that a more faithful 
formalisation o f the theory would be as follows:
(3xCx <-> 3y[Ay & Dy]) & LDC
where L is a second-order predicate such that LXY means “X is lawfully 
correlated with Y”. Consequently the Ramsey-sentence of the theory is not
3X3Y(3xCx 3y[Xy & Yy])
which would be contentless10 but is rather:
3X3Y[(3xCx <-> 3y[Xy & Yy]) & LXC]
which is not so trivial: it states that some property has a lawful correlation 
with clicks on Geiger counters.
However, this assumes that the second-order predicate L does not 
need to be “Ramseyfied”. If it does then we would obtain the following 
“Ramsey-sentence”:
10 The Ramsey-sentence of this “theory” (formalised this way) is completely contentless: it 
states that there is a click on a Geiger counter if and only if there is something that has two 
(not necessarily distinct) properties. This is utterly trivial since a click on a Geiger counter 
is something that has at least one and hence two (not necessarily distinct) properties.
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3X3X3Y[(3xCx <-> 3y[Xy & Yy]) & XXC]
which is, again, effectively contentless: it states that there is a click on a 
Geiger counter if and only if there is something that has two (not necessarily 
distinct) properties and that there is some (second-order) relation between 
one of these properties and clicks on Geiger counters. This is contentless 
because there is always some second order relation between any two 
properties: given any two properties P and Q we can construct the second- 
order relation {<P, Q>} between them.
So this response is only viable if  it is reasonable to suppose that 
second-order relations between properties like “is lawfully correlated with” 
do not themselves need to be Ramseyfied. But this is surely not something 
the ESRist could consistently accept: “lawful correlations” and their ilk are 
surely not observable, much less internal, relations.
As noted, Melia and Saatsi do not advocate the use of higher order 
predicates to formalise the relations between properties. They suggest that 
we should instead augment the language with a number of modal operators 
that express the pertinent relations: “So, for instance, let Lp express ‘it is 
physically necessary th a t...’. Then 3XLpVx(Xx <-> Gx) says that there is a 
property which is lawfully coextensive with G.” (Melia and Saatsi, 2006, p. 
581). The claim is that scientific theories, and their Ramsey-sentences, 
would typically (perhaps invariably) include such modal operators. This 
sidesteps the problem that undermines the previous approach, because there 
can be no question o f “Ramseyfying” modal operators. This approach is, 
however, open to the objection that it requires us to take these modal 
operators as logical primitives and we surely cannot accept that modal 
operators expressing things like “it is physically necessary that...” can be 
taken as logical primitives, since whether or not something happens as a 
matter of physical necessity is an issue that must be decided empirically, not 
as a matter of logic.
4. Replies that Argue that Some Structures/Relations are 
Privileged
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In this section three variants of Newman’s own “absurd” response to his 
objection are considered. This response is founded on the claim that some 
relations are more important than others. Newman took this response to be 
absurd because, as the ESRist believes we have only structural knowledge 
of the relations in question, he lacks a criterion to distinguish the important 
relations from the unimportant relations, so “importance” must be left as an 
unanalysed primitive, a mysterious quality that attaches to some relations 
but not others. However, the idea of a primitive important/unimportant 
distinction (or something similar) has not appeared absurd to everyone. The 
proposal most similar to Newman’s own was put forward by Carnap (1967) 
to resolve an analogue of Newman’s problem that faces the theory he puts 
forward in the Aufbau. The adaptation o f this proposal to resolve Newman’s 
objection to ESR is discussed in subsection 4.1. The other two variants of 
this approach discussed here both in some sense deny that “importance” 
needs to be taken as primitive. Votsis’ (2003, 2004, chapter 4) proposal 
(discussed in subsection 4.2) grounds the importance of a relation on the 
means by which it is discovered. Psillos’ (1999, chapter 3) proposal 
(discussed in subsection 4.3) takes the importance of a relation to be a 
contingent physical property o f the relation. Psillos himself argues that 
taking the approach ultimately amounts to abandoning ESR. (Both Merrill 
[1980] and Lewis [1983] make suggestions similar to Psillos’ in response to 
Putnam’s [1977] “model-theoretic” argument against realism -  an argument 
that is very closely related to Newman’s objection to ESR.)
4.1. A Carnapian Reply
This reply has some similarities to Melia and Saatsi’s (2006) reply 
(discussed in subsection 3.3). The essence o f the proposal is the suggestion 
that we should take importance (or as Carnap [1967] calls it, “foundedness”) 
as a primitive (second-order) logical property that attaches to some relations 
(in the way that identity is sometimes taken as a primitive logical relation 
that holds between some pairs). With a little adaptation o f the Ramsey-
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sentence approach, this enables the proponent o f ESR to evade Ketland’s 
variant of the Newman objection. Let the symbol for the foundedness 
property be “Found”. Instead of advocating belief in a theory’s Ramsey- 
sentence, the ESRist who takes this approach should advocate belief in the 
theory’s Ramsey-sentence*, where the latter is just like a normal Ramsey 
sentence, except that, for each predicate variable, X, we add (in the scope of 
the quantifier 3X) the phrase, “& Found(X)”. For example, consider the toy 
theory:
Vx(Oix -» Tjx) & Vy(T2y -»  0 2y)
where Oi and 0 2 are observational predicates and Tj and T2 are theoretical 
predicates. This theory yields the Ramsey-sentence:
3X3Y(Vx[Oix -> Xx] & Vy[Yy -> 0 2y])
and the Ramsey-sentence*:
3X3Y(Vx[Oix -> Xx] & Vy[Yy -> 0 2y] & Found[X] & Found[Y])
As “Found” is taken as a logical primitive the Ramsey-sentence* contains 
only logical and observational terms. It is thus hygienic, by the WESRists 
standards (in that the WESRist’s claim does not imply that it is impossible 
to know the Ramsey-sentence*). However, if  Ramsey-sentences are 
swapped for Ramsey-sentence*s then Ketland’s argument no longer goes 
through. In particular, the relevant analogue of:
Theorem 1: The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if  and only if  there is 
some sequence of relations, R2,i, R2 .2 ”*, R3 .1, R3.2 **,* such that «  Do, D t >, 
Oj, 0 2 ..., R2.l, R2 .2 R3 .I, R3.2--> b A
is:
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Theorem 1’: The Ramsey-sentence* of a theory A is true if  and only if there 
is some sequence o f relations, R2 .1, R2 .2 --, R3 .1, R3.2 --,- such that «  Do, D t 
>, Oi, O2 ..., R2 .1, R2 .2 --J R3 .1, R3.2 - •> |= A and such that each member o f  the 
sequence is a founded relation.
This blocks Ketland’s proof of theorem 2 at the last step: although given that 
a theory has some model, «  Di, D2 >, R 1.1, R 1.2 - ,  R2 .1, R2 2 ..., R3.1, R3 2 ..> , 
that is empirically correct and T-cardinality correct we can construct a 
model of the theory of the form «  Do, D j >, Oi, O2 ..., R2 . i \  R2 .2 ’.--, R3 . i \  
R3 2 ’...> this does not guarantee that the theory’s Ramsey-sentence* is true, 
as there is no guarantee that the relations R2 .1’, R2.2 ’ -- we have constructed 
will be founded.
However, even Carnap does not have licence to invent logical 
predicates at whim; if  we are to accept “Found” as a new logical term we 
surely must be given reason to do so. Here is what Carnap says:
[Found] does not belong to any definite extralogical 
domain, as all other nonlogical objects do. Our 
considerations concerning the characterisation of the basic 
relations o f a constructional system as founded relation 
extensions of a certain kind hold for every constructional 
system of any domain whatever. It is perhaps permissible, 
because o f this generality, to envisage the concept of 
foundedness as a concept of logic and to introduce it, since 
it is undefinable, as a basic concept o f  logic. (Carnap, 1967, 
p. 237, original emphasis)
We might, just possibly, think that the following was plausible:
If a property or relation is instantiated in every possible system then it is a 
logical property or relation.
However, if I understand him correctly, Carnap seems to assume something 
like the following:
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If a property or relation is instantiated in every possible constructional 
system then it is a logical property or relation.
The notion of a constructional system is central to Carnap’s theory in the 
Aufbau, but it is not the case that every possible system is a possible 
constructional system, so it is hard to see why we should accept this 
assumption. Compare Carnap’s assumption with the following assumption:
If a property or relation is instantiated in every possible system whose 
domain contains human beings then it is a logical property or relation.
No one would accept this: it would lead to the conclusion that properties like 
“being a human being” and “being a mammal” are logical properties. So it 
seems we at least need an argument that shows that constructional systems 
are more important (founded, as it were) than systems whose domain 
contains human beings.
It is instructive to contrast foundedness with identity, a relation we 
might sensibly take to be logical. In the first place we can see that the 
identity relation will be instantiated by some pairs o f objects from any 
possible non-empty domain; by contrast the foundedness property need not 
be instantiated by any relations from a given set of relations. In the second 
place, given a domain we can determine the extension of the identity 
relation over that domain a priori; by contrast we cannot determine the 
extension of the foundedness relation over a set o f (extensionally specified) 
relations a priori.
It seems that it is fair to say that taking the notion of the 
importance o f a relation as a primitive logical notion is absurd and cannot 
form the basis of a reasonable response to Newman’s objection.
4.2. Votsis’ Reply
Votsis claims that Newman’s objection purports to show that “the 
knowledge claims of SR [structural realism] [are] o f little worth or
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importance” (Votsis, 2003, p. 886) by showing that “the information they 
offer can also be derived a priori from set theory modulo a cardinality 
constraint, hence the only important information contained in the structural 
realist claims concerns the cardinality of the domain” (Votsis, 2003, p. 
886).11 He also claims that the inference from the latter to the former rests 
on the assumption that, “any information contained in a statement that is 
also derivable a priori lacks importance” (Votsis, 2003, p. 886). Votsis takes 
issue with this assumption. There is a sense in which everyone will surely 
agree that this assumption is false. The statement that there is no largest 
prime is surely o f some importance, at least in some contexts, but the claim 
is derivable a priori.
However, Votsis does not dispute the assumption that “any 
information contained in a statement that is also derivable a priori lacks 
importance” (Votsis, 2003, p. 886) by pointing out that there is a sense in 
which some results that are obtained a priori are important. Rather, he seems 
to make the extraordinary suggestion that how a claim is arrived at affects its 
importance. In particular, he seems to suggest that a claim is more important 
if  it is arrived at empirically than if it is arrived at a priori. He claims that, 
“The method of arriving at the abstract structures is at least partly 
empirical...The fact that set theory also allows me to derive the same 
structure a priori does not mean that the information I have reached is 
devoid of importance” (Votsis, 2003, p. 887, original emphasis). But surely 
this is wrong: if the information is of no importance if it is arrived at by set 
theory it is surely still o f no importance if it is arrived at empirically. A fact 
that is unimportant, in so far as it can be easily discovered, does not become
11 This isn’t strictly true, at least if we take the modem version o f Newman’s objection that 
is directed at the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR. In this form, what Newman’s 
objection shows is that knowing that a theory’s Ramsey-sentence is true is only knowing 
that the theory has a model that is T-cardinality correct and empirically correct. Moreover, 
it seems that the essence o f Newman’s objection is not so much that ESR implies that 
scientific theories are of little worth but rather that it implies that all they tell us about the 
unobservable world is its cardinality, so ESR is not significantly distinct from antirealism. 
So it seems that Votsis fails to address the right issue in his reply to Newman’s objection. 
However, this is not too important: it will be argued that he does not satisfactorily address 
the wrong issue.
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more important because it can also be discovered by an unnecessarily 
difficult route. For example, suppose someone claims to have made the 
important discovery that “eggs is eggs”. We might well reply that their 
discovery is not in fact important, in so far as it is easy to show (a priori) 
that “eggs is eggs”: the claim follows directly from the a priori principle that 
everything is self-identical. It would be ridiculous if  they were to reply that 
the discovery was important because they arrived at it by an empirical study 
of eggs. Indeed, it seems that Votsis’ contention comes down to the claim 
that “two” results can be the same but o f different importance, a claim that 
violates the law of the indiscemibility o f identicals.
Votsis attempts to support his contention with a thought 
experiment:
Take the numbers 133 and 123. I can, restricting myself 
solely to arithmetic, perform various operations on these 
numbers. One such operation is addition. Similarly, if I had 
two collections of 133 and 123 physical objects 
respectively, I could count them one by one, and would 
reach the same result. Despite the similarities, there is an 
important difference between the two cases. The latter case 
is one in which the result is a property that is then ascribed 
to the physical world, in particular to the physical objects 
under consideration, and not merely an exercise of 
arithmetic. This claim is warranted by the employment of 
an empirical method to arrive at the given number. The 
main point is quite simple: The fact that arithmetic allows 
me to do this a priori does not mean that the information I 
have reached counting objects is o f little or no importance.
One need only consider the consequences if  I had made an 
error in counting. (Votsis, 2003, p. 886, original emphasis)
This case does not at all support Votsis’ contention. In this case the two 
procedures, the a priori arithmetical procedure o f adding 133 and 123 and 
the empirical procedure of counting the objects in two collections, do not
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achieve the same results. The former enables us to determine that 133 + 123 
= 256, whereas, as Votsis notes, the latter enables us to determine that there 
are 256 objects in a particular collection. These results may well be of 
different importance but we cannot infer from this, as Votsis does, that two 
procedures yielding the same result can yield results of different importance, 
as the results in this case are not the same: the former is a theorem of 
arithmetic, the latter is a contingent fact about the world.
Votsis goes on to note that, “Using the...a  priori method, set 
theory allows us to set up any structure we like...No structure is privileged 
in this sense. The structural realist’s a posteriori method guarantees that 
some structures are privileged over others.” (Votsis, 2003, p. 887, original 
emphasis). There is a trivial sense in which the structures that have been 
arrived at a posteriori are privileged compared with those that have not been 
arrived at a posteriori, but it is not clear that there is an important sense: it is 
not obvious why the fact that some structures have been arrived at a 
posteriori guarantees that these structures are more important than those 
structures that have been arrived at “merely” a priori. Simply being arrived 
at via an a posteriori method does not seem to be sufficient to make a result 
important, especially if that result could have been arrived at a priori. After 
all, if the claim, “eggs is eggs” had been discovered to be true a posteriori it 
would not thereby be more important than those identity claims that had 
been that had been arrived at “merely” a priori.
Newman argued (in effect) that the ESRist (unlike the 
conventional realist) does not have the resources to distinguish the important 
structures instantiated by a system from the unimportant structures, or even 
to say in what sense one structure could be more important than another. 
Votsis seems to be suggesting that the ESRist can make the distinction, 
because a structure is made important simply in virtue of the fact that it has 
been arrived at via an a posteriori method. This is surely untenable.
4.3. The Merrill/Lewis/Psillos Reply
This proposal was first suggested as a possible response to Putnam’s model 
theoretic argument against realism by Merrill (1980). It was adopted by
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Lewis (1983) and has been discussed in connection with Newman’s 
objection by Psillos (1999). The key to the proposal is the suggestion that it 
is a contingent fact that some relations instantiated by the world are more 
important than others. The importance, or as proponents of this approach 
usually put it, “naturalness”, of a relation is not a logical property of the 
relation, nor a property the relation somehow acquires via the method by 
which it is discovered, but a physical property. Proponents of this view 
would not, presumably, deny that there is a perfectly good sense in which 
objects in the domain of the world, Dw, instantiate every relation compatible 
with the cardinality of Dw- However, they would add that only some of 
these relations are natural relations. The idea is that the world isn’t ju st a 
collection of objects that can be grouped howsoever we please, rather it is a 
collection of objects that also have preferred natural groupings. The world 
itself determines that some relations are more important than others and in 
this way comes pre-structured.
This is just the “natural kinds” doctrine (or something very like it)
and so this response is only open to those ESRists who are prepared to buy
10into this doctrine (or something very like it). However, if  one does accept 
it then Newman’s objection misses the point. Let’s call a structure a 
structure of the world if its domain is Dw (the set of objects in the world). 
Let’s call a structure a natural structure of the world if in addition the 
relations in it are (the sets corresponding to) natural relations. It is true that 
any structure whose domain has the same cardinality as Dw is isomorphic to 
some structure o f the world, but it is certainly not true that any such 
structure is isomorphic to some natural structure of the world (and 
presumably science aims to discover not just any old structures of the world 
but only the natural structures).
12 Worrall (personal communication) says that he takes natural kinds to be, by definition, 
the properties and relations that we refer to with the predicates o f our best theories. This 
response to Newman’s objection is also not open to the ESRist who accepts only this form 
of the natural kinds doctrine: saying that the predicates o f our best theories refer to natural 
kinds does not limit the properties and relations to which these predicates can refer if any 
property or relation that is referred to by these predicates is, by definition, a natural kind.
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In terms of the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR the claim 
would be that the relations over which the quantifiers in the Ramsey- 
sentence range are restricted to the natural relations. It follows that theorem 
1:
Theorem 1: The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if and only if there is 
some sequence of relations, R2 .1, R2 .2 -*, R3 .1, R3 .2 -V such that «  Do, D t >, 
Oi, O2 ..., R2 .1, R2 .2 - -, R3 .1, R3.2—> ^ A
must be replaced by:
Theorem 1” : The Ramsey-sentence of a theory A is true if  and only if there 
is some sequence of natural relations, R2.1, R2 .2 .-, R3 .1, R3.2 -, such that «  
Do, D j >, Oi, O2 ..., R2.1, R2.2 --, R3 .1, R3.2 - > |= A
because the relations R2.1, R2 .2 -., R3.1, R3 .2 .. are now only in the scope of the 
existential quantifiers if  they are natural. This blocks Ketland’s proof of 
theorem 2 at the last step: although given a theory has some model, «  Dj, 
D2 >, R 1.1, R 1.2 ..., R2 .1, R2 2 -.-, R3.1, R3.2 —>, that is empirically correct and T- 
cardinality correct we can construct a model o f the theory of the form «  
Do, D t >, Oi, O2 ..., R2 T ,  R2 .2 ’-••, R3 .i’» R3 2 this does not guarantee that 
the theory’s Ramsey-sentence is true, as there is no guarantee that the 
relations R2.T, R2 .2 ’--  we have constructed are natural. As Merrill puts it:
So long as we ignore any intrinsic structuring of the world, 
there is nothing to forbid us imposing a structure along any 
lines we chose. But if, as the realist surely must hold, the 
real world is a structured domain, then we are not free to 
ignore its intrinsic structuring in playing our model- 
theoretic tricks. (Merrill, 1980, p. 74, original emphasis)
Melia and Saatsi (2006) have objected to this response to 
Newman’s objection as follows:
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the structural realist shouldn’t take the second order 
quantifiers to be [sic] the natural properties if he wants his 
Ramseyfied theories to avoid the pessimistic meta­
induction. One way in which new theories can overthrow 
old theories is by showing that properties that were once 
thought to be absolutely fundamental are in fact not. Being 
green, being hot, being hydrogen have all turned out to be 
disjunctive properties. Future developments in physics may 
show that having a mass is a disjunctive property. But the 
structural realist wants his Ramsey sentences to be 
preserved  across theory change -  they are supposed to 
capture something that is constant between theories, else 
the structural realist does little better than the full blown 
realist in dealing with the pessimistic meta-induction. If the 
intended domain of the second order quantifier is the set o f 
natural properties, then the discovery that the properties 
postulated by the previous generation of theories are not 
natural will refute the structural realist’s Ramsey sentence 
as much as it refutes the old realist theory. (Melia and 
Saatsi, 2006, p. 576, original emphasis)
However, it has been argued (in chapter 1) that the WESRist’s response to 
the pessimistic induction is in any case unconvincing, so it seems that the 
structural realist should not be too worried if he is forced to abandon this 
response.
It might also be objected that the structural realist could have no 
warrant for the claim that the second-order variables in the Ramsey-sentence 
range over only natural properties and relations, because we can have no 
idea what the natural kinds are independently o f our theories. However, the 
structural realist needn’t claim that we do know what natural kinds are 
independently o f our theories. He will claim that whatever reason we have to 
believe that our theories are true is also a good reason to think that the terms
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in our theories refer to natural kinds and that the second-order variables in
• 13the Ramsey-sentence range over only natural properties and relations.
As noted, Psillos (1999) considers this response to Newman’s 
objection but argues that it is not available to the ESRist:
in order for them [i.e. ESRists] to distinguish between 
natural and non-natural classes they have to admit that 
some non-structural knowledge is possible, viz. that some 
classes are natural, while others are not. (Psillos, 1999, p.
66)
As long as we do not go down Carnap’s route and take naturalness to be a 
logical property of properties and relations then it is true that the knowledge 
that some property or relation is natural is not purely structural. However, 
neither the WESRist nor the SESRist claims that we have only purely 
structural knowledge (WESRists claim that our knowledge is restricted to 
claims constructed using logical and observational terms, SESRists claim 
that our knowledge is restricted to claims constructed using logical and
13 He might also suggest, as Lewis does, that:
It takes two to make a reference, and we will not find the constraint [on 
what properties and relations we refer to] if we look for it always on the 
wrong side of the relationship. Reference consists in part o f what we do 
in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in 
eligibility of the referent. (Lewis, 1983, p. 371)
Lewis’ suggestion is that there is some feature o f the world  that restricts the range o f our 
variables for us. So it doesn’t matter whether we know that our terms refer to natural kinds 
or not. It is just a fact that only certain properties and relations are eligible referents of 
terms, so, like it or not, our (second-order) variables can only range over certain properties 
and relations. However, this response is incoherent. It amounts to the claim that “there are 
some properties and relations (the unnatural ones) that lie outside the scope o f our 
quantifiers” and this claim is obviously self-defeating. Suppose (for reductio) that it is true. 
Then there is something in the scope o f the “some properties and relations” that lies outside 
the scope of the “some properties and relations”. So the claim is false. Or, to put it another 
way, we clearly can refer to unnatural relations, even if  we don’t typically do so.
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internal terms). However, Psillos’ point is essentially unaffected by this 
consideration, because the “naturalness” of a property or relation is surely 
not an observable (or internal) property, so neither the WESRist nor the 
SESRist can consistently treat “naturalness” as a primitive second-order 
non-logical predicate, and if  the predicate “naturalness” must itself be 
“Ramseyfied” this response will not work: cf. subsection 3.3.
5. Chapter Summary
It has been argued that none of the attempts that have been made to evade 
Newman’s objection are successful. Consequently, Newman’s objection 
remains a very serious problem for the ESRist. O f course, one cannot rule 
out the possibility that ESRist may in the future come up with a satisfactory 
reply, but in the absence of such a reply it seems that the sensible attitude 
toward his position is one of considerable scepticism.
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Chapter 5
Ontic Structural Realism
The main proponents of OSR are French and Ladyman (see French, 1998, 
1999, French and Ladyman, 2003a, 2003b and Ladyman, 1998, 2001). 
Related views have been suggested by Dipert (1997), Esfeld (2004) and 
Esfeld and Lam (forthcoming).1 Ladyman (1998) puts forward OSR as an 
alternative to ESR. He characterises the latter as the view that “the objective 
world is composed of unobservable objects between which certain 
properties and relations obtain; but we can only know the properties and 
relations of these properties and relations, that is the structure o f the 
objective world.” (Ladyman, 1998, p. 412, original emphasis). Roughly 
characterised, OSR is the view that the reason that we can only know the 
structure of the objective world is because there is nothing else to know; the 
world just is a structure.
OSR appears to be strictly stronger than ESR (it appears that it is 
just ESR with the additional claim that “the world is a structure”) so it 
seems that it must inherit all the problems of ESR. However, this is not so. 
The OSRist does not simply take ESR wholesale and strengthen it: he (more 
or less explicitly) denies a (widely held) metaphysical presupposition that 
the ESRist (implicitly) accepts, i.e. that objects are ontologically basic and 
that in so far as structures exist at all their existence is dependent on the 
existence of the objects that constitute them. The OSRist reverses the order 
of ontological priority, arguing that “structure is ontologically basic”
1 In fact, as will be seen in section 3.5, an effectively OSRist approach to the interpretation 
of space-time theories was proposed by Earman in 1989 (although he considers the 
approach only to reject it).
2 This characterisation o f ESR may give the impression that the ESRist holds that all 
knowledge o f the world is purely structural, which is not the case. The WESRist maintains 
that our knowledge o f the world consists o f claims constructed using logical and 
observational terms while the SESRist claims maintains that our knowledge o f the world 
consists o f claims constructed using logical and internal terms.
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(French and Ladyman, 2003a, p. 46) and that in so far as objects exist at all 
their existence is dependent on the existence of structures. This allows him 
to evade the most famous objection to ESR, i.e. Newman’s objection. If we 
think that the world is at bottom a collection of objects (as does the ESRist) 
then it is trivial that these objects instantiate any given structure (consistent 
with their cardinality) so knowing that the world instantiates some given 
structure is knowing nothing more than the cardinality o f the world. 
However, if we think that the world is at bottom a structure (as does the 
OSRist) then it is by no means trivial that the world instantiates (or rather, is 
isomorphic to) some given structure.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In section 1, three 
ways in which the claim that the world is a structure might be understood 
are suggested and discussed. In section 2, a potentially fatal objection to 
OSR (in any of its forms) is addressed. Finally, in section 3, the positive 
arguments adduced in favour of OSR are considered. The upshot of the 
discussion is that while (one form of) OSR is tenable, the arguments in 
favour o f the doctrine are inconclusive.
1. Three Types of OSR
1.1. OSR1
As noted (in footnote 2) Ladyman’s characterisation of ESR might suggest 
that it is the view that all we know of the world is its (mathematical) 
structure. The corresponding version of OSR would be that the world just is
3 Worrall (personal communication) claims that a response to Newman’s objection along 
these lines is available to a proponent of his brand o f ESR, because he does not accept that 
objects are ontologically basic, but is agnostic on this issue. However, it is hard to be truly 
agnostic on this issue: standard formal semantics treats objects as ontologically basic, so, by 
accepting standard formal semantics, one is also implicitly accepting this metaphysical 
assumption. Moreover, no ESRist has responded to Newman’s objection by rejecting the 
framework o f standard formal semantics, which it obviously presupposes (at least not in 
print), so it seems reasonable to assume that most ESRists would accept this framework and 
therefore (implicitly) the metaphysical assumptions that objects are ontologically basic.
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(or at least supervenes on) a mathematical structure. At first sight this claim 
seems highly implausible: how could the concrete physical world be (or 
supervene on) an abstract mathematical structure? However, many people 
find the materialist’s claim that mental states supervene on physical states at 
least somewhat plausible, despite the fact that, at first sight, it too seems 
highly implausible. So it would be wrong to dismiss this version o f OSR out 
of hand. Let’s call it OSR1.
Consider the following structure:
<D, P>
where D = {a} and P = {a}. Clearly, no-one would suggest that this was the 
complete structure of the actual world: it is far too simple. However, it is the 
complete structure of a number o f (very simple) possible worlds. For 
example, it is the complete structure of a possible world in which there is 
just one elementary particle, which has the property o f being positively 
charged (and no other properties). It is also the complete structure o f a 
possible world in which there is just one elementary particle, which has the 
property of having spin XA (and no other properties). So a single structure 
can represent a variety of different worlds. So a world cannot be just a 
mathematical structure, as OSR1 claims. Worlds have non-structural 
properties, as is evidenced by the fact that the structurally identical worlds 
described above are different. The difference between the worlds is reflected 
in the fact that the property P represents a different physical property in each 
case.
It has been suggested to me that the OSR list might reply that this 
example begs the question, because his claim is that apparently basic 
physical properties such as “being charged” or “having spin V2” are in fact 
not at all basic, but are, rather, complex structural properties. Hence the 
possible worlds in which there is a single elementary particle with one of 
these properties are structurally far more complex than has been suggested 
here and are, moreover, distinct. However, the OSRist claims to be a 
scientific realist: he believes that our scientific theories reveal the structure 
of the world. But, according to our scientific theories, properties such as
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“being charged” or “having spin V2” are basic (and structurally simple) 
properties. Physics does not suggest that the (apparently) fundamental 
physical properties of (apparently) fundamental particles are (or supervene 
on) a complex structure of more fundamental properties and relations. 
Hence, in so far as the OSRlist wishes to remain a scientific realist, this 
response is not available to him.4
The lesson is that mathematical properties and relations are 
abstract with respect to physical properties and relations, in the sense that 
the same mathematical property or relation can be realised by a number of 
different physical properties or relations. It is precisely because of this 
abstractness that a purely mathematical structure has no physical content. 
This is an obvious but fundamental objection to OSR1. Indeed, it is so 
obvious and so fundamental that it might seem incredible to suppose that 
anyone could seriously have proposed OSR1. In fact, it may be that no-one 
has, but comments such as, “the structural dissolution of physical objects 
leads to a blurring of the line between the mathematical and the physical” 
(French and Ladyman, 2003a, p. 41) have led a number of critics of OSR to 
understand the doctrine this way and put forward this objection. For 
example, Cao objects to OSR on the grounds that, “no mathematical 
structure would have physical meaning without interpretation, which itself 
cannot be structural in nature, but rather, involves qualitative terms” (Cao, 
2003, p. 59). Busch (2003, p. 220), Psillos (2004, p. 8) and Simons (2002, p. 
38) also make (essentially) this point.5
In response to this criticism (as adduced by Cao [2003]) French 
and Ladyman (2003b) deny that they are committed to a form of OSR in
4 In fact, in some Bohmian interpretations of quantum mechanics spin is not regarded as a 
fundamental property (see, Berkovitz, 2000). Clearly, however, a similar argument could be 
run using properties that these interpretations do take to be fundamental.
5 In fact, Busch goes further: he claims that the only acceptable way o f thinking of 
mathematical structures is as in re objects. However, if one adopts the in re approach to 
mathematical structures then one presupposes that physical systems are distinct from, and 
ontologically prior to, mathematical structures. In effect he argues that the OSRlist is 
exactly wrong, in that the mathematical is ultimately reducible to the physical, not vice- 
versa.
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which the structures are purely mathematical. They claim that the structures 
to which they refer are “physical structures” and that these differ from 
mathematical structures in that they “can be related -  via partial 
isomorphisms in our framework -  to the (physical) ‘phenomena’. This is 
how ‘physical content’ enters. Less trivially, the mathematical can be 
distinguished from the physical in that the latter is also causal' ’ (French and 
Ladyman, 2003b, p. 75, original emphasis).
What are we to make of this distinction between physical and 
mathematical structures? It is reminiscent of the distinction that Redhead 
(2001a, p. 74) and Frigg (2003, p. 46) draw between “concrete” (or 
“specific”) and “abstract” (or “unspecific”) structures. Their intention is to 
distinguish between structures in which the domain is a set o f concrete 
physical objects and structures in which the domain is a set o f abstract 
mathematical objects.6 For example the following represents a concrete 
structure:
<{Brutus, Caesar}; {<Brutus, Caesar>}>
The structure whose domain contains the elements referred to by “Brutus” 
and “Caesar” (i.e. Brutus and Caesar) and which has a property consisting of 
a single ordered pair, which contains the elements Brutus and Caesar (in this 
order).
Abstract structures can then be taken as either in re or ante rem 
objects. In the former case an abstract structure will be construed as an 
isomorphism class of concrete structures (i.e. a class whose members are all 
and only those concrete structures that are isomorphic to some particular 
concrete structure, which is itself a member of the class, as, trivially, any 
structure is isomorphic to itself). In the latter case an abstract structure will
6 Actually, this might not be Redhead’s intention. As examples o f concrete structures he 
gives us “a pile of bricks, timbers and slates, which are then ‘fitted together’ to make a 
house, or brush strokes which ‘relate’ to form a picture, or words which string together into 
meaningful sentences.” (Redhead, 2001, p. 74) perhaps suggesting that he takes concrete 
structures to be actual physical systems (rather than sets -  i.e. mathematical objects -  whose 
elements are physical objects).
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be viewed as the neo-Platonic form that all these concrete structures 
instantiate. We can represent an abstract structure (isomorphic to the above 
concrete structure) as follows:
<{a, b}; {<a, b>}>
as long as “a” and “b” are not taken to denote any (particular) physical 
object.
However, the OSRist can’t intend the difference between physical 
and mathematical structures to be quite the same as the difference between 
concrete and abstract structures suggested by Frigg and Redhead or his
n
position would collapse into something like conventional realism. Given 
what has been said about the radical metaphysics implicit in OSR this may 
come as a surprise. How can OSR collapse into conventional realism when 
the OSRist maintains that structures are ontologically prior to objects and 
the conventional realist maintains that objects are ontological prior to 
structures? The reason is that, given this understanding of what a physical 
structure is, it is apparent that we immediately abandon the radical 
metaphysical claim of OSR, because we are back to the idea that structures 
are built from objects, i.e. that objects have ontological priority over 
structures.
To maintain the central claim of OSR, whilst still making a 
distinction between physical and mathematical structures, we need to take a 
physical structure to be one in which the properties and relations are 
physical, while the objects are taken as non-physical. The OSRist will argue 
that independently existing objects out of which these relations are built are 
a convenient fiction: physical “objects” exist only as places in the structure 
o f the world, which is built out of relations. This is the line that French 
seems to be taking when he claims that objects play only “a heuristic role 
allowing for the introduction of the structures which then carry the
7 Although not quite conventional realism: the conventional realist probably wouldn’t want 
to say that the world was a physical structure, but at most that the world displayed a 
physical structure, relative to some choice o f predicates.
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ontological weight” (French, 1999, p. 204). So, rather than taking a physical 
structure to be built out of physical objects, such as Brutus and Caesar, we 
take it to built out o f physical relations, such as “killed”. The difference 
between a physical and mathematical structure is then that in a physical 
structure the properties and relations are physical properties and relations, 
whereas in a mathematical structure they are only abstract properties and 
relations. In general, a representation of a structure, e.g.
<{a, b}; {<a, b>}>
could be a representation of either a physical or a mathematical structure, 
depending on whether “ {<a, b>}” denotes a physical or a mathematical 
relation in the context in which the representation appears.
However, there are still at least two possible readings of what the 
OSRist intends:
OSR2: The world is a structure built out of (physical) relations (but not 
properties).
OSR3: The world is a structure built out of (physical) properties and 
relations.
It might be noted that these conceptions of OSR do not quite do justice to 
the claim that it is structure that is ontologically basic: in these cases it 
seems that it is the properties and/or relations that are ontologically basic. 
However, this seems to be at least in keeping with the spirit, if  not the letter, 
of OSR.
1.2. OSR2 and Metaphysics
In OSR2 the world is taken to be a structure built out of relations, but no 
properties. This approach seems to be implied by Ladyman’s suggestion that 
“we abandon the attempt to interpret physical theory in terms of underlying 
objects and properties of which the world is made” and focus on “structure 
and relations directly” (Ladyman, 2001, p. 73, original emphasis). OSR2
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implies that properties are not physically real. Esfeld (2004) and Esfeld and 
Lam (forthcoming) are explicitly committed to something like this approach 
(i.e. they deny the existence of properties) although they call their position 
“moderate structural realism” (on the grounds that they take objects and 
relations to be on a par, ontologically, rather than arguing that relations are
o
ontologically prior to objects ).
What reason is there supposed to be for making this discrimination 
between properties and relations? Esfeld and Lam (forthcoming) suggest 
that the main reason is provided by a well-known argument, which Jackson 
states as follows:
When physicists tell us about the properties they take to be 
fundamental, they tell us about what these properties do.
This is no accident. We know about what things are like 
essentially through the way they impinge on us and on our 
measuring instruments. (Jackson, 1998, p. 23, original 
emphasis)
This suggests:
the possibility that (i) there are two quite distinct intrinsic 
properties, P and P*, which are exactly alike in the causal 
relations they enter into, (ii) sometimes one is possessed 
and sometimes the other, and (iii) we mistakenly think that 
there is just one property because the difference does not 
make a difference (as the point is put in information 
theory). An obvious extension o f this possibility leads to
8 Their position appears to be almost deliberately circular on this point. They argue that “It 
makes no sense to assign an ontological priority to objects, because instead of having 
fundamental intrinsic properties, there are only the relations in which they stand. In other 
words, an object as such is nothing but that what [sic] bears the relations. As regards the 
relations, it makes no sense to attribute an ontological priority to them, for at least insofar as 
they exist in the physical world, they exist as relations between objects.” (Esfeld and Lam, 
forthcoming, p. 5).
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the uncomfortable idea that we know next to nothing about 
the intrinsic nature o f our world. (Jackson, 1998, pp. 23-24)
In fact there are cases where we know (something like) this has happened. 
For centuries it was thought that samples of jade were all essentially alike. 
However, we now know that there are two essentially different types o f jade 
(there are two quite distinct chemical compounds, both o f which are green, 
hard etc.). Before the discovery o f the difference between these types of jade 
we were in a position somewhat like the one described in the quote above. 
Although the different compounds were never actually exactly alike in the 
causal relations into which they entered, they were alike as far as we could 
tell and so we did mistakenly think that they were essentially the same. 
Similarly, it was initially thought that the atoms of a single chemical 
element must all be alike, but we now know that elements can have different 
isotopes (so, for example, some carbon atoms have atomic mass 12, others 
13 and others 14 etc.).
The argument purports to demonstrate that we know nothing about 
the properties o f physical objects (and given the OSRist’s desire to close the 
gap between epistemology and metaphysics, the denial that properties are 
real then becomes inevitable). However, it shows at best something 
considerably less than this. In effect, the argument rests on the claim that 
any one-place predicate that we deploy might actually refer to a disjunction 
of two or more quite distinct natural properties that are “exactly alike in the 
causal relations they enter into” (Jackson, 1998, p. 23) (rather as “being a 
carbon atom” turned out to be a disjunction of “being a carbon-12 atom”, 
“being a carbon-13 atom”, etc.).9 But it hardly follows from this that we 
know nothing about the properties of objects in the world. True, we can 
never be sure that the predicates we deploy refer to the most fundamental 
natural properties in nature, but (the argument seems to concede) we can 
have a good reason to think that they refer to properties with at least a
9 Clearly, the argument must intend to say that any one-place predicate that we deploy 
might actually refer to a disjunction o f natural properties, because otherwise the claim is 
trivial: any property (with more than one instance) can be taken as a disjunction of 
properties if no restriction is placed on the naturalness o f the latter.
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derivative naturalness (in that they are disjunctions o f the most fundamental 
natural properties); we might not be able to cut the world at all the joints, 
but this argument provides no reason to think that we ever cut at anywhere 
but a joint.
Yet even if it had been demonstrated that the predicates we deploy 
might well refer to properties that are not in any way natural this would still 
only indicate that we know nothing about the natural properties of physical 
objects. That would not preclude the possibility that we have knowledge of 
the unnatural properties (and even these are, after all, properties). For 
example, as long as people generally come (independently) to the same 
conclusion as to whether or not a given object has the property of “being 
jade” then that is surely a good reason to say that they know whether or not 
that object has that property, irrespective of whether or not the property of 
“being jade” has any naturalness at all. Indeed, if  one does not accept the 
existence o f natural kinds then this would be the only sort of knowledge of 
properties that would be possible.
1.3. OSR2 and Physics
Esfeld and Lam (forthcoming) present an argument for the claim that there 
are no properties in nature based on reflections about general relativity. This 
theory, they claim, entails that space-time points have relational but no 
monadic properties. Even if this is true, however, what it seems to support is 
not the claim that all objects lack monadic properties (i.e. the claim that 
there are no monadic properties), but only the weaker claim that some 
objects lack monadic properties.10
Esfeld (2004) also puts forward an argument for the claim that 
there are no properties in nature on the basis of the phenomenon of quantum 
entanglement. A bipartite quantum system is in an entangled state if  and
10 Which is not to say that this weaker claim is o f no interest: it is generally assumed that all 
objects must have at least one monadic property (see, for example, Langton, 1998, p. 22).
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only if it cannot be written as the product of two separate states.11 For 
example, the following bipartite state (in which particle 1 has spin up and 
particle 2 has spin down) is not entangled:
|up>i|down>2
as it is the product of the separate states:
|up>i and |down> 2
The paradigmatic entangled bipartite pure state is the singlet state: 
(l/V2)(|up>i|down>2 - |down>i|up>2)
This represents a superposition o f two states, one in which particle 1 has 
spin up and particle 2 has spin down and one in which particle 1 has spin 
down and particle 2 has spin up. Esfeld (2004) claims that consideration of 
such states supports the claim that there are no properties in nature, because 
entangled quantum particles appear to have relations to other quantum 
particles, but no monadic properties.
There are two problems with this claim. The first is that it is false: 
entangled particles still have state-independent monadic properties. An 
entangled electron, for example, still has mass and charge. Esfeld 
acknowledges this problem, but his response is unconvincing. He says that 
since quantum physics is essentially the theory o f the state-dependent 
properties of objects and since it “is our basic physical theory, it would be 
desirable to derive state-independent properties within the formalism of 
quantum theory. The idea then is to get state-independent properties such as 
charge and mass on the basis of state-dependent properties” (Esfeld, 2004,
11 I will speak indifferently o f states, systems and subsystems being entangled. It is to be 
understood that a system is entangled if and only if  it is in an entangled state and a 
subsystem is entangled if and only if  it is part o f an entangled system. Similarly I will speak 
indifferently o f systems and states being bipartite. It is to be understood that a state is 
bipartite if and only if it is the state o f a bipartite system.
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p. 612). Whether or not this is especially desirable is unclear, but it is clear 
that there is no reason to believe that it can be done. In fact there are good 
reasons to suppose it cannot be done: Hamiltonian operators always depend 
on state-independent monadic properties, so it seems very unlikely that one 
could do quantum mechanics without taking such properties as basic.
The second problem with Esfeld’s claim is that (according to 
quantum physics) quantum particles needn’t always be in entangled states, 
and particles that are not in entangled states have state-dependent monadic 
properties. So the fact that particles can be in entangled states shows at most 
that quantum particles can sometimes lack state-dependent monadic 
properties. Again, Esfeld acknowledges this problem, but again his response 
is unconvincing. He says, “What has to be accounted for in quantum theory 
is not entanglement, but cases o f the absence of entanglement, if  there really 
are such cases (if not, it has to be explained why there appear to be such 
cases)” (Esfeld, 2004, p. 604). This is unconvincing because Esfeld does not 
explain why it is that such cases need to be accounted for, nor does he give 
any reason for supposing that such cases might actually be non-existent.
1.4. OSR2 and Rigid Designators
Another reason for wanting to deny the reality o f properties might be the
fear that permitting properties will allow objects back into our ontology (as
independent existents) and this would undermine the main claim of OSR
(although of course this fear would hardly count as a good reason for
discriminating against properties, unless one was already convinced that the
main claim of OSR is correct). For example, the property “being the Tony
Blair” appears to be a property that necessarily only one particular object
can instantiate: it seems that, in any world in which the property is
1 ^
instantiated, it must be instantiated by the same object. In that case, 
however, that object cannot be ontologically secondary to the structures in 
which it appears (because if it was it would not [necessarily] be the same
12 At least, that’s apparently the way it appears to some people (e.g. Kripke, 1981). 
Personally, I don’t have strong intuitions on this matter.
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object in the different worlds [structures]). However, the OSRist has at least 
two possible responses to this argument that stop short of denying the reality 
of properties altogether.
Firstly, he can argue that apparent properties that seem to 
presuppose the existence of particular individuals (“being the Tony Blair”, 
“being this table” etc.) are not really features of the world. This would not 
commit him to the view that no properties are really features o f the world: 
he could seemingly still allow the reality of properties such as “being red” or 
“being a cat” that clearly do not presuppose the existence of particular 
individuals. However, it is still unclear what reason there could be to deny 
the reality of properties like “being the Tony Blair”, unless one is already 
committed to the main tenet of OSR. After all, there appears to be an 
instance o f the property “being the Tony Blair”, so it is hard to believe that 
no such property exists.
Secondly, the OSRist can argue that although apparent properties 
that seem to presuppose the existence of particular individuals are genuine 
features of the world they do not really presuppose the existence of 
particular individuals. It is true that, in any given world, there can only be 
one instance of “being the Tony Blair” but it does not follow from this alone 
that the object that instantiates this property must be the same in every 
world: in any given world there can only be one instance o f the property 
“being the tallest man in the world”, but it does not follow from this that the 
object that instantiates this property must be the same in every world. 
Admittedly, it might seem strange to say that different objects could have 
the property “being the Tony Blair”. This is because such properties appear 
to be disguised names, and names appear to be rigid designators (that is,
1 Tthey appear always to apply to the same object, even in different worlds). 
OSR would require us to give up the idea that there are any rigid 
designators, because, according to OSR, objects take their identity from the 
structure in which they occur, so we cannot have (literally) the same object 
in two different worlds (structures). It may seem counterintuitive to deny the 
existence of rigid designators but the central tenet o f OSR (that objects are
13 See footnote 12.
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ontologically secondary to properties and relations) is itself deeply 
counterintuitive, so many of its consequences are bound to seem likewise 
and pointing out that the counterintuitive central tenet o f OSR has some 
counterintuitive consequences is unlikely to convince a proponent of OSR 
that he is wrong.
So there seems to be little motivation (even if one already accepts 
the main tenet of OSR) for discriminating between properties and relations 
in the way that OSR2 does. OSR2 is also potentially subject to the 
incoherence objection, which is discussed in section 2.14
1.5. OSR3
According to OSR3 the world is a structure built out of properties and 
relations. This approach is the version of OSR that is the closest to 
conventional scientific realism (or antirealism, if we take the properties and 
relations that constitute the world to be exclusively observable) but it still 
upholds the OSRist doctrine that objects are ontologically dependent on 
structures (or at least properties and relations) and not vice-versa. As such it 
is still potentially subject to the ubiquitous incoherence objection. However, 
there seems to be no other objections to this view that aren’t also objections 
to conventional scientific realism (or antirealism) and this seems to be the 
most plausible form of OSR: unlike OSR1 it does not fall prey to the 
objection that a purely mathematical structure has no physical content and 
unlike OSR2 it does not make the seemingly unmotivated claim that 
properties (but not relations) have no reality.
14 Moreover, whilst it might seem plausible to deny the reality o f unobservable properties 
(such as “having spin 14” or “being an electron”) it seems highly implausible to deny the 
reality o f observable properties (such as “being red” or “being a cat”). This suggests a 
variant o f OSR2, in which the world is taken to be a structure containing (both observable 
and unobservable) relations and some (exclusively observable) properties. However, this 
version o f OSR2 would face most of the difficulties associated with the original version of 
OSR2 as well as the difficulties associated with any position that makes essential use o f a 
sharp observable/unobservable distinction.
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2. The Incoherence Objection
The two most common objections to OSR are that, (i) the world could not 
literally be a mathematical structure, because mathematical structures in 
themselves have no physical content and (ii) it is incoherent to claim that 
structures (or properties/relations) could be ontologically prior to objects 
because objects are conceptually prior to structures (and 
properties/relations). It has already been argued that the first o f these 
objections undermines OSR1, but it clearly does not affect the other 
versions of OSR that are considered above. The second objection, which I 
call the incoherence objection, would apply to all forms of OSR, as it denies 
that the OSRist’s main claim is coherent.
Busch puts forward the incoherence objection as follows, “the very 
idea of structure presupposes some elements that go together to make up 
that structure. A relation might take anything as its relata, but it always takes 
something” (Busch, 2003, p. 213, original emphasis). Busch’s point is that 
nothing (and, in particular, not the world) can be, at bottom, a structure, 
because structures themselves aren’t, at bottom, structures: they’re built out 
o f objects (at least according to the standard conception of them). Similarly, 
properties and relations are sets o f (tuples of) objects (according to the 
standard [formal] conception of them). The objection has also been put 
forward by Psillos (2004, p. 7).
Chakravartty (2003) agrees that this “is a natural first response [to 
OSR]” (Chakravartty, 2003, p. 871) but argues that as, “OSR recommends 
that we revise our concepts in such a way as to view relations as 
ontologically subsistent” then “To argue against OSR on the basis o f a 
violation of conceptual dependence [i.e. on the basis that it violates the 
notion that objects are prior to relations] is thus, it seems, question begging” 
(Chakravartty, 2003, p. 872, original emphasis). The incoherence objection 
undoubtedly is question-begging, but its proponents might argue that the 
question deserves to be begged, on the grounds that the conceptual revision 
that the OSRist demands is impossible to carry out.
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However, as we shall, there is no reason to think that the revision 
is impossible to carry out. Taking a Quinean line one might argue more 
modestly that although the revision is not strictly impossible, it is a revision 
of a belief that is so central to our web of beliefs that one would need to be 
presented with very strong reasons to carry it out (cf. Quine, 1951, pp. 39- 
43); before one tries to replace a plank of Neurath’s ship whilst at sea it is 
better to make sure that it is really rotten, especially if it is well below the 
waterline (cf. Neurath, 1932, p. 201 and Quine, 1960, pp. 3-4). Taking this 
. approach one would then have to look at the OSRist’s positive arguments 
and decide whether or not they provided good enough reasons to motivate 
the radical change they demand. This is, in effect, the approach that 
Chakravartty (2003) takes (he concludes that the OSRist’s reasons are not 
sufficiently compelling to warrant their revolutionary demands).
Whilst this seems to be a sensible approach (it is essentially the 
approach that is adopted in the remainder of this chapter) a caveat is in 
order: OSR clearly requires some revision of our “common-sense” 
metaphysical intuitions (as embodied in standard formal semantics) but the 
revision that (the more plausible forms of) OSR demands is not as radical as 
it first appears. The claim that the existence of (physical) objects depends on 
the existence of structures might be read either as (i) the claim that the 
existence of physical objects depends on the existence of mathematical 
structures or as (ii) the claim that the existence o f physical objects depends 
on the existence of structures built out of physical (properties and) relations. 
The former claim would be associated with OSR1, which, it has been 
argued, is implausible on independent grounds. Only the latter claim (or 
something like it) would be associated with either OSR2 or OSR3. 
However, the latter claim seems to be almost equivalent to the 
philosophically familiar “bundle theory” (which claims that objects are 
bundles o f properties and/or relations) because, as noted, in the sort of 
structures involved in these cases it actually seems to be the properties 
and/or relations (rather than the structures) that are taken to be ontologically
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basic.15 Although in conflict with common-sense metaphysics and the 
standard formal construal of the relationship between objects and 
properties/relations the bundle theory is hardly radically revisionary from a 
philosophical point o f view: it is one of the two main philosophical theories 
of objects available (the main -  and usually favoured -  alternative being the 
“substrata” or “bare particulars” theory, which takes objects to be a 
propertyless substrata in which properties inhere).16 In the light of this 
OSR3 seems to amount to no more than conventional realism combined 
with an explicit commitment to the bundle theory of objects.
The conclusion of this section is that the more plausible forms of 
OSR (OSR2 and OSR3) do not demand such a radical conceptual revision 
as might at first be thought, so the incoherence objection is not as 
devastating as it might at first appear. However, the main claim of OSR 
undoubtedly demands some revision of our common-sense metaphysical 
intuitions (as embodied in formal semantics, which takes objects to be the 
fundamental units out of which properties, relations and structures are built, 
rather than vice-versa) and so far none of the arguments in favour of OSR 
that might motivate us to make such a revision have been discussed. These 
are the subject of the next section.17
15Compare this with French’s (2006) passing observation that, “in the absence of further 
metaphysical explication o f the notion o f structure itself, it is not yet clear whether or not 
such an approach [i.e. OSR] collapses into another form o f the well-known conception of 
objects as bundles o f properties” (French, 2006, pp. 10-11).
16 In fact there are at least two forms of the bundle theory. The first takes properties as 
universals and so takes objects to be bundles o f universals. The second takes properties to 
be collections o f (individual) instances o f properties (tropes) and take objects to be bundles 
of tropes. For present purposes, however, there is no need to distinguish these versions of 
the theory. The point is merely that the OSRist’s claim that objects are ontologically 
secondary to properties/relations is not without precedent.
17 Van Fraassen makes a related, but distinct objection to OSR, which runs as follows: “If 
God had decided not to create anything concrete, then that statement [i.e. the statement ‘X 
is multiply instantiated’, where X is a property] would have been false. Therefore, taking 
the contrapositive, if such a statement is true, then there exist concrete entities, therefore 
entities other than properties and relations” (van Fraassen, 2006, p. 294). This is supposed 
to tell against OSR, since the OSRist would agree that some starements o f the form “X is 
multiply instaniated” are true, but wants to deny the existence o f entities other than
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3. Arguments in Favour of OSR
3.1. The Argument from Coherence/Parsimony
Esfeld and Lam (forthcoming) claim that there are two general philosophical 
arguments in favour of OSR: the argument from coherence and the 
argument from parsimony. The argument from coherence is that 
epistemology should cohere with metaphysics, i.e. that there shouldn’t be a 
gap between epistemology and metaphysics. If this argument is a good one 
it seems to tell against a metaphysics that posits the existence of substrata 
that can only be described as “something, I know not what” (cf. Locke, 
1690, book 2, chapter 23, paragraph 2, pp. 208-209) in which properties are 
supposed to inhere, and thus (indirectly) in favour o f the bundle theory of 
objects (which, it has been claimed, is the essence of the more plausible 
forms of OSR). So far, however, the argument from coherence seems more 
like an assertion that an argument: why shouldn’t there be a gap between 
epistemology and metaphysics? The basis for this claim seems to be the 
argument from parsimony. This is just an application of Occam’s razor, and 
runs as follows. If there is more in our metaphysics than is required for it to 
cohere with our epistemology then we should trim off the excess. In 
particular (provided it coheres with our epistemology) a metaphysics that 
posits only properties and relations is to be preferred to one that posits 
properties, relations and substrata.
This is essentially the traditional central argument for the bundle 
theory of objects. Advocates o f the substrata theory are likely to reply that 
although parsimony is, in general, a virtue, this is taking it too far, because 
we cannot properly make sense of a metaphysics without substrata in which 
properties inhere (or they might say, more modestly, that although such a
properties and relations. However, this seems unconvincing. If by “concrete entities” van 
Fraassen means “ontologically primitive objects” then the OSRist will deny the premise. 
On the other hand, if by “concrete entities” van Fraassen means objects in the sense o f the 
OSRist (i.e. bundles of properties) then it does not follow from the fact that concrete 
entities exist that entities other than properties and relations exist.
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metaphysics makes sense it leaves a worrying explanatory gap, because 
bundle theories don’t explain why it is that properties are bundled together). 
Whether one thinks that substrata are a redundant metaphysical excess or 
that they are necessary to make our metaphysics intelligible (or at least fulfil 
a useful explanatory role) seems to depend on one’s intuitions about what is 
intelligible (or what needs explaining). Consequently, although the 
argument from parsimony does lend some support to OSR, it is far from 
decisive.18
3.2. The Argument from Quantum Physics
In classical statistical mechanics there are four ways we can distribute two 
particles over two states (four possible microstates of the combined system):
[1] Particle 1 in state 1, particle 2 in state 1.
[2] Particle 1 in state 1, particle 2 in state 2.
[3] Particle 1 in state 2, particle 2 in state 1.
[4] Particle 1 in state 2, particle 2 in state 2.
Note that, assuming the particles are alike in all their intrinsic properties, 
states 2 and 3 are indistinguishable. There are thus three possible 
macrostates o f the combined system:
[A] Both particles in state 1.
[B] One particle in state 1 and one particle in state 2.
[C] Both particles in state 2.
18 It should be noted that when Esfeld and Lam put forward this argument they suggest that 
it tells against a metaphysics that posits the existence of monadic properties (not necessarily 
against one that admits substrata) on the grounds that such a metaphysics does not cohere 
with our epistemology in that we (allegedly) do not know the monadic properties o f objects. 
It has already been argued that this discrimination against monadic properties (as opposed 
to relations) is unwarranted.
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In the classical case, these macrostates are given the weighting 1:2:1 
(Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics) as one would expect (assuming that the 
underlying microstates are equally weighted). In the quantum case, the 
weighting o f the macrostates depends on the type of particles involved. If 
the particles are bosons then the macrostates occur in the ratio 1:1:1 (Bose- 
Einstein statistics). If the particles are fermions then states A and C are 
forbidden (by the Pauli exclusion principle) and the macrostates occur in the 
ratio 0:1:0 (Fermi-Dirac statistics).19
At first sight, what this seems to imply is that permuting bosons 
doesn’t make any difference; that microstates 2 and 3 are in fact the very 
same state differently described. Thus labelling the particles, “particle 1” 
and “particle 2” in the first place is misleading. As Weyl put it:
...the possibility that one of the identical twins Mike and 
Ike is in the quantum state Ei and the other in the quantum 
state E2 does not include two differentiable cases which are 
permuted on permuting Mike and Ike; it is impossible for 
either of these individuals to retain his identity so that one 
of them will always be able to say “I’m Mike” and the 
other “I’m Ike”. Even in principle one cannot demand an 
alibi o f an electron! (Weyl, 1931, p. 241)
This view holds that electrons are objects that can be aggregated (so that it 
makes sense to say “there are two of them”) but not counted (if it was 
possible to count the particles then it would be possible to pair them 
off/label them with the natural numbers, so it would make sense to say “this 
is electron 1”). This is undoubtedly counterintuitive. And this 
counterintuitiveness is reflected and reinforced by the fact that methods for
19 Actually, this is somewhat misleading, because it is not really clear that one can say 
(prior to measurement) that quantum systems are ever in these macrostates. In particular, it 
is doubtful that they can be said to be in macrostate B. This point is discussed in more detail 
shortly.
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dealing with such objects in standard set-theory are rather contrived (see 
French and Krause, 2006, chapter 6).20
However, French (2006) and French and Redhead (1988) have 
argued that the conclusion that quantum particles are non-individuals on the 
basis of quantum statistics is too hasty. In the quantum case there are four 
distinct possible quantum states underlying the three macrostates, but they 
are not:
[5] |Si>i|Si>2 (i.e. particle 1 in state 1 and particle 2 in state 1)
[6] |S1>1|S2>2
[7] |S2>i|S1>2
[8] |S2>i|S2>2
as one would expect from analogy with the classical case. Rather they are 
the states:
[9] IS i^ lS ,^
20 However, Krause and French (1995) and French and Krause (2006, chapter 7) (following 
Krause [ 1992]) argue that a form of quasi-set theory provides a suitable formal framework 
for dealing with objects o f this kind, so we should not be too perturbed by them. The 
essence o f quasi-set theory is that, instead o f having just one kind o f atom (urelemente) as 
in standard set theory we have two: m-atoms and M-atoms. M-atoms are like the atoms of  
standard set theory, and are intended to represent individual objects (the sort of objects 
found in the macroscopic and classical realms). By contrast, the concept o f identity does not 
apply to m-atoms, and these are intended to represent non-individual objects (the sort of 
objects found in the microscopic quantum realm). This means that expressions of the form 
“x = y” are not well formed if x and y denote m-atoms. On the other hand, there is an 
“indistinguishability” predicate {=) in quasi-set theory which can apply to pairs o f m-atoms, 
M-atoms and quasi-sets (quasi-sets being entities built out o f m-atoms and M-atoms, much 
as standard sets are built out of the atoms of standard set theory). (Where both apply, the 
indistinguishability predicate coincides with the identity predicate, i.e. if x and y are not m- 
atoms, then x = y if  and only if x = y.) Because m-atoms can be indistinguishable without 
being identical it follows that they cannot be counted (see Krause and French, 1995, p. 
206). Nonetheless, quasi-sets are taken to have quasi-cardinalities; the concept of a quasi­
cardinal is taken as a primitive. This reflects the idea that quantum particles cannot be 
counted, but can form aggregates containing a definite number o f particles.
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[10] (1/V2)(|Si> 1|S2>2 + |S2>i|S ,>2)
[11](1/V2)(|S1> 1|S2> 2 - |S 2 > 1|S1>2)
[12] |S2>i|S2>2
States 9, 10 and 12 are symmetric (meaning that if  the particle labels are 
exchanged throughout the states are unchanged). State 11 is antisymmetric. 
The reason quantum statistics seem unusual is because bosons are restricted 
to symmetric states and fermions are restricted to antisymmetric states.
This might be taken to suggest that quantum particles are 
individuals after all: there are two distinct quantum states that give rise to 
macrostate B, it is just that only one o f them is ever accessible to a given 
quantum system. (However, it is not at all clear that one would describe 
states 10 and 11 as actually giving rise to macrostate B: the implications of 
this point will be considered shortly.) French and Redhead (1988) conclude 
that what this demonstrates is “not that quantum particles must be 
individuals but rather that it is possible for them to be individuals, despite 
the peculiarities of quantum statistics.” (French and Redhead, 1988, pp.237- 
238, original emphasis). Hence two metaphysical pictures are in fact 
available: one in which quantum particles are individuals and one in which 
they are not.
It is from this point that the OSRist launches the argument for his 
doctrine on which he generally lays the most stress. It is claimed that it 
would be “an ersatz form of realism that recommends belief in the existence 
of entities that have such ambiguous metaphysical status” (Ladyman, 1998, 
p. 420). Therefore (so the argument goes) we should not take objects to be 
the fundamental building blocks of reality, but should “shift to a different 
ontological basis altogether” (Ladyman, 1998, p. 420): we should be realists 
about the existence of relations (and properties) but regard objects as having 
-  at most -  a derivative form of existence. The argument can be summarised 
as follows:
Premise: The question of whether quantum objects are individuals or non­
individuals is not resolved by quantum theory.
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Conclusion: We should abandon the underlying metaphysics that takes
objects as ontologically basic and move to the OSRist’s metaphysics in
0 1which objects are not regarded as ontologically basic.
No one would regard this argument as wholly compelling, but perhaps some 
people would regard it as lending some support to OSR. In subsection 3.3 
the premise of this argument will be bought into question. In subsection 3.4 
the legitimacy o f the form of the argument will be questioned.
3.3. Objections to the Premise of the Argument from Quantum Physics
It might be thought that one could resolve this underdetermination (in favour 
of the non-individuals picture) (and thereby undermine the premise of the 
argument) by considering entangled quantum states. As French and Redhead 
show (1988, pp. 240-241), two particles in an entangled state possess all the 
same monadic and relational properties (including space-time position) in 
the sense that, (i) the probability that the measurement of a property, P, on 
particle 1, pi, has outcome x is equal to the probability that the measurement 
of P on particle 2, p2 , has outcome x, i.e.
Prob (P[pi] = x) = Prob (P[p2] = x)
for every property P and every value x, (ii) the probability that a 
measurement of a property P on particle 1 has outcome x, given that a 
measurement of a property Q on particle 2 has outcome y is equal to the
21 The unresolved underdetermination is between two metaphysical pictures that both take 
objects as ontologically basic: one that takes objects to be individuals in which properties 
inhere (these are the traditional bare particulars or substrata, which will be called 
“individual substrata” here) and one that takes objects to be non-individuals in which 
properties inhere (these will be called “non-individual substrata” here). But note that the 
second o f these is already somewhat non-conventional, because traditionally objects are 
regarded as individuals.
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probability that a measurement of a property P on particle 2 has outcome x, 
given that a measurement of a property Q on particle 1 has outcome y, i.e.
Prob (P[pi] = x | Q[p2] = y) = Prob (P[p2] = x | Q[pi] =y)
for every property P, every property Q, every value x and every value y. In 
standard interpretations of quantum mechanics these probabilities tell us all 
there is to know: there are no facts about physical properties that the 
quantum mechanical description o f the system omits (although, as their 
name suggests, this is not the case in hidden variable interpretations). 
Hence, French and Redhead claim, according to standard interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, the particles are indistinguishable.
Saunders (2003, pp. 293-294) argues that there is a legitimate 
sense in which entangled particles are discernible. The claim is that 
entangled particles are “weakly discernible” : although they have exactly the 
same properties and stand in exactly the same relations to other objects and 
to each other, there is some relation, R, which each stands in to the other but 
which neither stands in to itself. Thus the formula Vx(Rpix Rp2x) is false 
(it is falsified when x = pi or x = P2). For example, consider the relation 
which x bears to y if and only if: x and y are parts o f a system in a 
superposed state and in each component of the superposition x is in the 
opposite state to y. For particles in states 10 and 11, each particle bears this 
relation to the other, but not to itself. Hence Saunders would classify such 
particles as weakly discernible.
French (2006, p. 6) argues that the appeal to this type of relation is 
question-begging, because in order to determine that each particle stands in 
this relation to the other, but not to itself, one must presuppose that the 
particles can be individuated (i.e. that labelling the particles 1 and 2 is 
legitimate). But irrespective of the cogency of this reply, Saunders’ 
argument shows at most only that the normal examples o f indistinguishable 
quantum particles are poor ones: Saunders himself notes that although 
fermions will always be at least weakly discernible in his sense, two or more 
bosons may be in exactly the same state without any irreflexive relation of
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the above sort holding between them. Two bosons may therefore be entirely 
indi stingui shable.
The principle of the identity of indiscemibles is essentially the 
claim that if  “two” things are indistinguishable (i.e. if they have all the same
99properties) then they are in fact identical. If we wish to uphold the 
principle and the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics in this case, 
then we will, it seems, conclude from these considerations that quantum 
particles (in entangled states) are not individuals and are thus not subject to 
the principle (it makes no sense to say that they are either identical or not
99identical). If we wish to uphold the principle of the identity of 
indiscemibles and the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, the 
underdetermination is thus resolved (in favour of the non-individuals 
picture). But we can of course retain the view of particles as individuals by 
abandoning the principle (in which case they can be regarded as distinct 
despite the fact they are indistinguishable) or by adopting a hidden variables 
interpretation of quantum mechanics (in which case they will be regarded as 
having different [hidden] properties). So the question of the metaphysical 
nature of the particles (as individuals or non-individuals) remains 
underdetermined by the theory.24
Nonetheless, there are problems with the premise of the argument 
from quantum physics, and we do not have to consider entangled quantum 
systems to reveal them. Although it is true that there are two distinct
22 The principle comes in a variety o f forms. The strongest claims that it is not possible for 
two distinct objects to share all the same monadic properties. An intermediate version 
claims that it is not possible for two distinct objects to share all the same properties and 
relations, excluding space-time location. The weakest version claims that it not possible for 
two distinct objects to share all the same properties and relations. Only the weakest is under 
scrutiny here -  the stronger versions are clearly violated by both quantum and classical 
particles.
23 Obviously we would not conclude this if  “being particle 1 ” and “being particle 2” are 
taken to be properties. Admitting such properties effectively presupposes that the particles 
are distinguishable individuals.
24 However, Morganti (2004) argues that this isn’t a very interesting case of  
underdetermination, because the principle o f the identity o f indiscemibles is highly dubious 
(so the obvious choice is to abandon it and retain the notion that particles are individuals).
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quantum states that give rise to hiacrostate B, this does not appear really to 
reopen the door to the possibility o f viewing quantum particles as 
individuals. This is because, (i) the two states are not the two that one would 
expect if  the particles were individuals (they are states 10 and 11, not states 
6 and 7) and (ii) the argument that quantum particles can be treated as 
individuals seems to rest on the claim that for any given quantum system (of 
the sort being discussed) there are four possible states, but not all o f these 
are accessible. It is not clear that this claim is legitimate: it seems to be a 
thinly-veiled way of making the obviously illegitimate claim that for any 
given quantum system (of the sort being discussed) there are four possible 
states, but not all of these are possible. Surely what we should say here is 
that for a system of bosons there are three possible states, for a system of 
fermions one, and the one possible state for a system of fermions is not the 
same as any of the three possible states for a system of bosons. Thus there 
are four possible states in total, but not four for any given system. What this 
seems to support is the old-fashioned view (as put forward by Weyl) that a 
consideration of quantum statistics does tell strongly in favour of the view 
that quantum objects are non-individuals. If this is so then the premise of the 
OSRist’s argument from quantum physics, i.e. the claim that the question of 
whether quantum objects are individuals or non-individuals is not resolved 
by quantum theory, is undermined.
3.4. Objections to the Form of the Argument from Quantum Physics
However, even supposing that there is an interesting underdetermination 
between a metaphysics that takes quantum particles as individuals and a 
metaphysics that takes quantum particles as non-individuals one may 
wonder how moving to OSR is supposed to remove this underdetermination 
(or, if it is not supposed to remove the underdetermination, what the 
advantage of moving to OSR is supposed to be), because the OSRist does 
not deny that objects exist, he merely denies that they are the most basic 
ontological units (he views objects as bundles o f properties). It thus seems 
that in the OSRist framework one can still ask whether objects are 
individuals or non-individuals. Perhaps the point is that for the OSRist only
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one answer is possible: objects are non-individuals. To see why this might 
be so, consider the structures <D = {a, b}, E = {a, b}, Si = {a}, S2 = {b}> 
and <D = {a, b}, E = {a, b}, Si = {b}, S2 = {a}> where D is the domain, E is 
the property o f being an electron, Si is the property of being in state Si and 
S2 is the property of being in state S2 . Consider first the case where we 
interpret these structures (as is most natural) using a metaphysics in which 
objects are ontologically primitive. There are two sub-possibilities: either 
we can use a metaphysics of individual substrata or we can use a 
metaphysics of non-individual substrata. In the first sub-case the situations 
represented differ because the individual substrata (a and b) take on different 
properties in the two cases. In the second sub-case, the situations do not 
differ because, as non-individual substrata lack individuality, giving them 
different names in the first place is misleading. Now consider what happens 
if we interpret these structures using a metaphysics in which objects are 
taken to be bundles of properties. In that case there is again no difference 
between the “two” systems represented here. The system represented in each 
case is a system consisting of two objects, one that is a bundle o f the 
properties “being an electron” and “being in state Si” and one that is a 
bundle of the properties “being an electron” and “being in state S2”. In this 
case the labels “a” and “b” can only be arbitrary names for these bundles, so 
swapping them around has no significance. It seems that OSR automatically
9 Simplies that objects are non-individuals. OSR thus resolves the 
underdetermination in quantum mechanics by deciding in favour o f the non­
individuals picture.
However, (assuming that the premise of the OSRist’s argument is 
true, i.e. assuming that there is an interesting underdetermination between 
the picture of quantum objects as individuals and non-individuals) there 
would be, in all, three underdetermined options on the table:
25 But note that if  objects are taken to be bundles o f tropes, and tropes are taken to be 
individuals then objects ought to be individuals as well. OSR seems to be more akin to a 
version o f the bundle theory that takes objects to be bundles o f universals (or non­
individual tropes).
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[1] Take indistinguishable objects as individuals with an underlying 
metaphysics in which objects are individual substrata in which properties 
inhere.
[2] Take indistinguishable objects as non-individuals with an underlying 
metaphysics in which objects are non-individual substrata in which 
properties inhere.
[3] Take indistinguishable objects as non-individuals with an underlying 
metaphysics in which objects are bundles of properties (i.e. adopt an OSRist 
metaphysics).
The OSRist’s argument appears to run as follows. Suppose we ask, “Are 
objects substrata in which properties inhere or are they bundles of 
properties?”. If we give the former answer then there is a further 
metaphysical question to answer: “Are objects individuals or non­
individuals?” (because, after answering the first question in this way, there 
are still two underdetermined options on the table: options [1] and [2]). On 
the other hand, if one gives the latter answer then there are no further 
metaphysical questions to answer (because only one option remains on the 
table: option [3]). For those who dislike metaphysics, this may be a good 
enough reason to give the latter answer. As giving the latter answer is 
tantamount to adopting OSR, for those who dislike metaphysics this may be 
a good enough reason to adopt OSR (although, phrased this way, it sounds
9 f \like a purely pragmatic reason).
However, we don’t have to start with the question “Are objects 
substrata in which properties inhere or are they bundles of properties?”. We 
can instead start with the question, “Are objects individuals or non­
individuals?”. Suppose we do start with this question, then we might reason 
as follows. If we give the latter answer then there is a further metaphysical 
question to answer: “Are objects substrata in which properties inhere or are
26 Of course, if one really dislikes metaphysics one might just try to adopt an agnostic 
attitude to all metaphysical issues. The problem with this is that it is hard to avoid 
(implicitly) making metaphysical assumptions. For example, as has already been noted, 
standard formal semantics effectively embodies the substrata view o f objects, so whenever 
we use standard formal semantics we are implicitly assuming this view.
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they bundles of properties?” (because, after answering the first question in 
this way, there are still two underdetermined options on the table: options
[2] and [3]}. On the other hand, if one gives the former answer then there are 
no further metaphysical questions to answer (because only one option 
remains on the table: option [1]). For those who dislike metaphysics, this 
may be a good enough reason to give the former answer. As giving the 
former answer is tantamount to adopting a metaphysics of individual 
substrata, for those who dislike metaphysics this may be a good enough 
reason to adopt a metaphysics of individual substrata. So, by changing the 
order o f the questions, but using reasoning parallel to the OSRist’s, we we 
end up not with OSR but with an underlying metaphysics of individual 
substrata. Thus the OSRist’s own line of reasoning can equally well be used 
to support a position very different from OSR. The OSRist’s reasoning here
97 98is at best inconclusive. ’
27 It has also been claimed that the fundamental metaphysical character o f quantum entities 
is underdetermined in quantum field theory, because the physics is equally compatible with 
“both the view o f fields as substances whose properties are instantiated at space-time points 
(or regions) and the view of fields as nothing but properties o f those space-time points (or 
regions)” (French and Ladyman, 2003a, p. 46). It might be noted that this 
underdetermination is no worse in quantum field theory than it is in any other field theory 
(e.g. classical electromagnetism). Moreover, it does not appear to support OSR: in this case 
choosing OSR appears to be simply choosing one o f the two underdetermined options (the 
view that fields are collections of properties). It might be objected that this is not so, 
because in the second interpretation one still has objects as basic ontological units, because 
fields are taken to be properties of space-time points and space-time points are objects. 
However, whether or not one takes space-time points as objects depends on one’s 
interpretation o f one’s space-time theory. It is true that if one is a thorough OSRist there is 
no underdetermination, because one will give an OSRist interpretation of both quantum 
field theory and one’s space-time theory, but it is equally true that if one is a thorough 
“objectivist” there is no underdetermination, because one will interpret both quantum field 
theory and one’s space-time theory in terms of objects.
28 Note that if, as argued, there is not in fact an interesting underdetermination, because a 
consideration o f quantum physics does strongly suggest that quantum objects are non­
individuals then there are only two underdetermmed metaphysical options on the table: [2] 
and [3]. In this case OSR is just one o f two underdetermined options.
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3.5. The Argument from Space-Time Theories
There are two main metaphysical interpretations of space-time theories: 
substantivalism and relationalism. Broadly speaking, substantivalism holds 
that space-time exists alongside, but independently of, matter, whereas 
relationalism holds that space-time is ontologically secondary to matter, in 
the sense that facts about space-time are reducible to facts about material 
objects.29 In the modem context, the debate is about the interpretation of 
general relativity. The main argument in favour of substantivalism is that 
there is a solution of the field equations of general relativity (the de Sitter 
solution) in which space-time is empty, so general relativity itself suggests 
that space-time can exist without matter. More fundamentally, the very fact 
that models o f the field equations of general relativity are constructed with a 
manifold of space-time points encourages us to regard space-time points as 
real, at least if  we also find appealing Quine’s contention that we should 
regard as real that which we quantify over (in theories that we believe to be 
true) (see Quine, 1939, 1948). Both of these arguments suggest that taking 
general relativity seriously requires us to adopt substantivalism.
However, adopting substantivalism (or at any rate manifold 
substantivalism, i.e. the view that space-time is a manifold of space-time 
points) seems to lead to a problem. Given some model o f the field equations 
of general relativity <M, g, T> (where M is the manifold, g is the metric 
field tensor and T is the stress energy [matter] field tensor) one can generate 
infinitely many different models via the infinitely many possible 
diffeomorphisms of M onto itself (a diffeomorphism o f M onto itself is a 
differentiable bijection whose domain and range are each the set of points in 
M): if <M, g, T> is a model then so is <M, d*g, d*T> for any 
diffeomorphism d (where, for every point p in M, d*g[p] = g[d_1(p)] and 
d*T[p] = T[d_1(p)]). The metric and matter fields in these models are
29 These are the two main positions, but not the only positions. Esfeld and Lam attribute to 
Descartes and Spinoza a view according to which space-time and matter “are ontologically 
identical and form the same substantival entity” (Esfeld and Lam, forthcoming, p. 16). This 
may be a forerunner o f the position that holds that matter can be reduced to space-time, 
which is now known as geometrodynamics.
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essentially unchanged, the models differ only with regard to which 
particular points in M underlie which parts of the fields. This difference is 
entirely indiscernible (as space-time points are intrinsically indiscernible), 
but if we commit ourselves to the existence of space-time points then it does 
nonetheless seem that these mathematically distinct models represent 
physically distinct universes (universes in which the space-time points 
underlying the fields are permuted); we seem to be committed to the view 
that there are infinitely many distinct but indistinguishable possible worlds. 
This seems ontologically profligate.
In fact, Earman and Norton (1987) argue, via the so-called “hole 
argument”, that this ontological profligacy has a still worse consequence. 
They put forward a version of the argument that can be applied to a range of 
space-time theories. Earman summarises the argument in the context of 
general relativity as follows:
Choose any general relativistic model <M, g, T> you like, 
except...suppose that M, g possess a Cauchy surface. This 
supposition implies that there is a global time function t: M 
-» R such that t increases as one moves in the future 
direction along any timelike curve and such that the level 
surfaces of t are all Cauchy surfaces...choose a 
diffeomorphism d such that d = id [i.e. the identity 
function] for all t < 0 and ^  id for t > 0 and such that there 
is a smooth join at t = 0. By general covariance, <M, d*g, 
d*T> is also a model, and M, d*g also possesses a Cauchy 
surface. By construction, this new model is identical to the 
first for all t < 0: g|t < o = d*g|t < o and T|t < o = d*T|t < o- But if 
d is chosen properly, the models will differ for t > 0 
(Earman, 1989, p. 179)
The conclusion is that if (as the substantivalist has it) <M, g, T> and <M, 
d*g, d*T> represent physically distinct possible worlds, then even the 
weakest sort of determinism fails in general relativity, because the worlds
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are exactly alike up to t = 0 but different thereafter (although, as noted, the 
difference is entirely indiscernible). Earman and Norton argue that this is 
unacceptable, since although it may be that the universe is indeterministic it 
should not be possible to decide this on purely metaphysical grounds:
If a metaphysics, which forces all our theories to be 
deterministic, is unacceptable, then equally a metaphysics, 
which automatically decides in favour o f indeterminism, is 
also unacceptable. Determinism may fail, but if  it fails it 
should fail for a reason of physics, not because o f a 
commitment to substantival properties which can be 
eradicated without affecting the empirical consequences of 
the theory.” (Earman and Norton, 1987, p. 524)
There are at least two problems with the hole argument. Firstly, as Earman 
(1989) concedes, the hole argument does not show that substantivalism 
automatically forces all (space-time) theories to be indeterministic, because 
the hole argument only works for space-time theories with particular 
properties (in particular, generally covariant field equations and a 
background space-time that has almost no intrinsic structure, i.e. almost no 
structure that is not imposed by the fields). So substantivalism is only 
unacceptable if  a metaphysics that forces all theories o f  this sort to be 
indeterministic is.
Secondly, it is a very peculiar type of indeterminism that is forced 
on us, even in these cases, and it is arguably a harmless type of 
indeterminism, because it has no empirical consequences. It would certainly 
be problematic if a metaphysical theory stipulated that physical theories had 
to be indeterministic at the empirical level (if, in fact, some successful ones 
were not) but the form of indeterminism forced on us by substantivalism is 
consistent with a physical theory being deterministic at the empirical level. 
It is true that there can be two models of the field equations of general 
relativity, <M, g, T> and <M, d*g, d*T> that are alike up to t = 0 but differ 
for t > 0, and that according to the substantivalist these represent different 
possible worlds that are physically identical up to t = 0 but differ thereafter.
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However, as noted, the supposed physical distinction between the worlds is 
not supposed to be observable, so the indeterminism does not surface at the 
empirical level (cf. Hoefer, 1996, p. 10). Unless one has a metaphysical 
prejudice in favour of determinism this kind of metaphysical indeterminism 
that (according to substantivalism) underlies the empirical determinism of 
general relativity will seem no more objectionable than the kind of 
metaphysical determinism that (according to Bohmian mechanics, or the 
many minds interpretation) underlies the empirical indeterminism of 
quantum mechanics (and this metaphysical determinism is rarely taken to be 
a flaw, much less a fatal flaw, of these approaches).
However, although bringing up the substantivalist’s commitment 
to an innocuous form of indeterminism with respect to a certain class of 
theories seems to be something of a red herring, the substantivalist’s 
ontological profligacy, i.e. his commitment to infinitely many distinct but 
indistinguishable physical possibilities seems troubling enough in itself. The 
claim has been made that OSR offers a third way that has all the advantages 
but none of the disadvantages of substantivalism about space-time (see, for 
example, Ladyman, 2001, p. 69). (Esfeld and Lam [forthcoming] make a 
similar claim on behalf of their moderate structural realism.) An OSRist 
interpretation of general relativity would imply that space-time points exist 
(so we can take general relativity seriously), but that they exist only as 
places in a model o f the field equations of general relativity, not as objects 
traditionally conceived (so there is no difference between diffeomorphic 
models: it makes little sense to say that we can permute space-time points, 
i.e. put one in the place of another in a new model, if  space-time points just 
are places in a structure: the most we could do would be to swap the names 
of the points). OSRists might well claim to be in good company here: 
something like this position seems to be implied by Einstein’s observation 
that “Space-time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a 
structural quality o f the field” (Einstein, 1954, p. 155).30
30 Although Newton is usually regarded as the arch substantivalist there is some evidence 
that he too might also have held something like OSR with regard to space-time: “the parts 
of space derive their character from their positions, so that if any two could change their
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Earman (1989) considers and rejects this approach because a 
problem seems to arise if there is more than one isomorphism between two 
models, W and W ’:
If \|/j: W -»  W ’ and \j/2 : W -> W’ are relevant 
isomorphisms...and if i is an individual of W, it follows that 
i is identical with v|/i(i) and with \|/2(i). And so by 
transitivity o f identity, \j/i(i) = v|/2(i), which gives a 
contradiction if \j/j(i) and i|/2(i) are distinct (Earman, 1989, 
pp. 198-199)
The problem is that, as the isomorphisms are supposed to tell us which 
objects in W are to be identified with which objects in W* (i.e. which places 
in W correspond to which places in W ’) then, as there are two isomorphisms 
between W and W ’ at least some of the objects in W are each to be 
identified with two distinct objects in W ’, which makes a mockery o f the 
supposition that these objects are distinct in W \
However, this does not appear to be fatal to the OSRist approach. 
Note that in the envisaged situation the function \|/i_1\ |/2  (where =
vj/f1[\|/2(x)]) is a (non-trivial) automorphism on W (and H/1H/2"1 is a [non­
trivial] automorphism on W ’). Hence the models W and W* have two or 
more equivalent places (i.e. there are two or more indistinguishable objects 
in each model). For example, consider the structures S = <{a, b}, {a, b}> 
and S’ = <{c, d}, {c, d}>. There are two isomorphisms between these 
structures, f  (where f[a] = c and f[b] = d) and g (where g[a] = d, g[b] = c). 
The functions f !g (where f  !g[a] = b and f  !g[b] = a) and fg '1 (where fg_1[c] 
= d and fg_1[d] = c) are non-trivial automorphisms on S and S’ respectively. 
It seems that what the OSRist should say in this case is that the existence of
positions, they would change their character at the same time and each would be converted 
numerically into the other. The parts of duration and space are only understood to be the 
same as they really are because o f their mutual order and position; nor do they have any 
hint of individuality apart form that order and position which consequently cannot be 
altered.” (Newton, ca 1670, p. 136).
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these automorphisms implies that a and b are just arbitrary names for two 
indistinguishable places in S and c and d are just arbitrary names for two 
indistinguishable places in S’. Hence in this case there is no need to say 
whether a should be identified with c and b with d or vice-versa. That is, the 
OSRist should deny what Earman assumes that he maintains: that it must 
always be possible uniquely to decide which object in a given structure is to 
be identified with which in another (isomorphic) structure.
However, OSR is not the only way in which one can eat one’s 
substantivalist cake without suffering from ontological indigestion. As 
Hoefer points out, the indigestion arises because of the “ascription of 
primitive identity to space-time points” (Hoefer, 1996, p. 11). As we have 
already seen, one can view objects as non-individuals (i.e. avoid ascribing 
them primitive identity) without going so far as to claim that objects must be 
completely reconceptualised as bundles of properties a la OSR. One can also 
take objects as non-individual substrata (in which properties inhere) that can 
be aggregated (so that it makes sense to say “there are two of them”) but not 
counted (so that it makes no sense to say “this is number 1”). Viewing 
space-time points as objects of this sort has all the advantages but none of 
the disadvantages of substantivalism: it implies that space-time points exist 
(so we can take general relativity seriously), but that they are not 
individuals. (Thus, there is no difference between diffeomorphic models: it 
makes little sense to say that we can permute space-time points, i.e. put one 
in the place of another in a new model, if  space-time points cannot be 
individuated one from another, even in principle.)
So, assuming that we are compelled by the arguments both for and 
against substantivalism, we are faced with a choice between (at least) two 
metaphysical approaches that accommodate these arguments. Both 
approaches agree that space-time points are non-individual objects. The 
difference between the approaches is that whereas one regards objects as a 
primitive ontological category, the other (OSR) regards objects as ultimately 
bundles of properties. As in the case of quantum physics, an OSRist 
interpretation is one of the viable metaphysical options, but it is not the only 
one. Thus the argument from space-time theories, like the argument from 
quantum physics, is inconclusive.
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4. Chapter Summary
Three interpretations of OSR have been proposed. It has been argued that 
the first two of these are untenable. With respect to the third interpretation it 
has been argued that (i) it is not, in fact, a genuinely novel position, being 
essentially scientific realism (or antirealism) combined with an explicit 
commitment to the bundle theory of objects and that (ii) while the most 
common criticisms of OSR do not tell (decisively) against it the arguments 
in favour o f it are also inconclusive.
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Conclusion
In this thesis three principal forms of structural realism have been 
distinguished: WESR, SESR and OSR. The main conclusions that have been 
reached with regard to each are summarised below. WESR:
[1] The positive argument in favour of WESR, i.e. the claim that it can 
accommodate the no miracles argument and the pessimistic induction is 
unconvincing, because, (i) the no miracles argument is flawed, so it is no 
particular virtue of WESR that it can accommodate it and, (ii) it is not clear 
that WESR really can accommodate the pessimistic induction (see chapter 
1).
[2] There are unresolved difficulties in drawing the observable/unobservable 
distinction (or an appropriate alternative distinction) in a way that is suitable 
for the WESRist’s purposes (see chapter 2).
[3] The WESRist has not provided a convincing response to Newman’s 
objection (see chapter 4).
SESR:
[1] Russell’s semantic argument for SESR, and its descendents, is 
unconvincing, because it is based on the principle of acquaintance, a 
principle for which no substantial argument has been given and which has 
absurd consequences (see chapter 3 and appendix 2).1
[2] The SESRist has not provided a convincing response to Newman’s 
objection (see chapter 4).
1 As noted (in chapter 3) a variant of the semantic argument, based on a “principle of 
observation” works somewhat better as an argument for WESR than does the original 
argument as an argument for SESR. It works better in so far as the principle o f observation, 
unlike the principle of acquaintance does not have absurd consequences (due to the 
different characteristics of the observational/theoretical and internal/external distinctions). 
However, there is still no particular warrant for the principle o f observation, and the 
difficulties that face the WESRist (outlined above) would remain even if  one gave some 
weight to the semantic argument for WESR.
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OSR:
[1] Depending on how one interprets the doctrine, OSR is either (i) wholly 
untenable or (ii) conventional scientific realism (or antirealism) combined 
with the traditional metaphysical view that objects are bundles of properties. 
In the latter case the doctrine has some plausibility, but the arguments that 
have been adduced in favour of it are inconclusive.
It thus seems that WESR, SESR and OSR (if it is interpreted as a 
substantially novel position in the scientific realism debate) are all 
unattractive.
However, there remain a plethora of other positions in the 
scientific realism debate; which o f these is to be preferred? To have any 
chance of satisfactorily arguing for an answer to this question would require 
several more theses. What I am going to do instead is state my opinion and 
roughly outline why I hold this opinion.
With some reservations, I am a conventional realist. Boyd 
characterises conventional scientific realism as the conjunction o f four 
central claims:
(i) “Theoretical terms” in scientific theories (i.e. 
nonobservational terms) should be thought of as putatively 
referring expressions; scientific theories should be 
interpreted “realistically”.
(ii) Scientific theories, interpreted realistically, are 
confirmable and in fac t often confirmed as approximately 
true by ordinary scientific evidence interpreted in 
accordance with ordinary methodological standards.
(iii) The historical progress of mature sciences is largely a 
matter o f successively more accurate approximations to the 
truth about both observable and unobservable phenomena.
Later theories typically build upon the (observational and 
theoretical) knowledge embodied in previous theories.
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(iv) The reality which scientific theories describe is largely 
independent of our thoughts or theoretical commitments.
(Boyd, 1983, p. 195, original emphasis)
I do not wholeheartedly endorse all o f these, but I do at least partially 
endorse each of them.
Claim (i) is a semantic claim. I would endorse the following 
variant on this claim:
There is no difference in kind between “theoretical” (or external) and 
“observational” (or internal) terms and a theory o f reference should not treat 
them as different in kind. If we think of the latter as referring expressions 
then we should think of the former in the same way.
The reason for the rephrasing is due to the worry that reference might fail 
for both theoretical (or external) and observational (or internal) terms -  i.e. 
the worry that reference might be a completely fictitious notion. In the face 
of the arguments of Quine (1960) and Putnam (1981) there seem to me to be 
two options: (i) abandon the notion o f reference and with it the 
correspondence theory o f truth and (ii) take reference as a primitive notion. 
However, in view of the usefulness of the correspondence theory of truth (in 
formal semantics), if pushed I probably would incline towards the latter 
route (with a slightly guilty conscience), so, if pushed, I probably would 
endorse Boyd’s formulation of the conventional realist’s semantic claim.
Claim (ii) is an epistemic claim. I would endorse the claim, as 
stated above. However, I would not endorse the claim that it is rational to 
believe that every mature (successful) theory is approximately true, a claim 
not put forward by Boyd here, but a claim that realists often do propose. My 
belief is that there is no difference in kind between “scientific” claims and 
“everyday” claims. Consider an everyday theory. Suppose Lara intends to 
catch the 4pm train from Brighton to London Victoria, which arrives in 
Victoria and 5pm. I have arranged to meet Lara at a cafe in the centre of 
town at 5.30pm. At 4.10pm I notice that I have missed a call from Lara on 
my mobile phone. I try to ring her back but can’t get through. I hypothesise
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that she was ringing to tell me that she missed her train (she often does). A 
prediction o f this hypothesis is that she will not be at the cafe at 5.30pm. 
With nothing better to do, I go to meet her anyway. The prediction turns out 
to be correct. But, despite the fact that this hypothesis has scored a novel 
predictive success (it is a “mature” hypothesis) I would still be very wary of 
the claim that the hypothesis is (approximately) true. There could easily be 
another explanation for her ringing and not being at the cafe at 5.30pm 
(perhaps she was on the train and was ringing to tell me she had to go 
elsewhere first and would meet me at 6pm, perhaps she was ringing for a 
completely unrelated reason and would have been at the cafe but the bus 
from the train station to the cafe got stuck in traffic, etc.). Nonetheless, as 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis amasses (e.g. Lara rings me again and 
tells me that she did indeed miss her train ), I become more and more 
confident that it is (approximately) true.
The same attitude is, I think, appropriate towards scientific 
theories: a theory being mature (successful) does not in itself provide 
sufficient warrant for believing that it is approximately true. But it does 
provide some evidence for believing this. And the more evidence that 
amasses in favour of the theory the higher degree of belief it becomes 
reasonable to assign the theory. The realism I advocate is thus attenuated in 
two respects: it is both piecemeal and graduated. It is piecemeal in so far as 
it does not support the view that we should regard all successful (mature) 
scientific theories as approximately true. It is graduated in so far as it takes 
confirmation as a matter of degree. This latter point may seem to be 
uncontroversial. But realists often talk as if  confirmation is an all or nothing 
matter (e.g. suggesting that we have warrant to believe that a theory is 
approximately true if and only it correctly predicts an empirical phenomena 
that it was not constructed to yield).
Claim (iii) is a historical claim (albeit one that is impossible to 
assess). I would endorse the following variant on this claim:
2 Notice that this provides very strong confirmation of the theory despite the fact that it is 
not a prediction (novel or otherwise) o f the theory.
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There is such a thing as scientific progress. Even though we cannot say that 
all successful theories are (probably) approximately true, it is reasonable to 
assume that the proportion of approximately true theories that we hold is 
increasing.
This variant is proposed in light of the response to the pessimistic induction 
outlined in chapter 1 , subsection 2 .6 .
Claim (iv) is an ontological claim, which I endorse.
Given that I reject the no miracles argument, one might ask why I 
am a conventional realist (in so far as I am). One reason is my suspicion that 
there is no way to draw a sharp and principled observable/unobservable 
distinction, which so many forms o f antirealism (and, as we have seen, at 
least one form of non-conventional realism) depend on. Another (not 
entirely distinct) reason is my endorsement of Popper’s claim that “science 
is common sense ‘writ large’” (Popper, 1959, p. 22). This reason has been 
elaborated by Fine:
I certainly trust the evidence of my senses, on the whole, 
with regard to the existence and features of everyday 
objects. And I have similar confidence in the system of 
“check, double-check, triple-check” of scientific 
investigation, as well as the other safeguards built into the 
institutions of science. So, if the scientists tell me that there 
really are molecules, and atoms, and y /J  particles and, who 
knows, maybe even quarks, then so be it. I trust them and, 
thus, must accept that there really are such things, with 
their attendant properties and relations. Moreover, if  the 
instrumentalist (or some other member of the species “non- 
realistica”) comes along to say that these entities, and their 
attendants, are just fictions (or the like), then I see no more 
reason to believe him than to believe that he is a fiction 
made up (somehow) to do a job on me; which I do not 
believe. It seems, then, that I had better be a realist. One
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can summarize this homely and compelling line as follows: 
it is possible to accept the evidence of one’s senses and to 
accept, in the same way, the confirmed results of science 
only for a realist; hence, I should be one (and so should 
you!). (Fine, 1984, pp. 1197-1198, original emphasis)
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Appendix 1 
Chakravartty’s Semirealism
1. Chakravartty on Entity Realism
Chakravartty (1998, 2004) argues that the most reasonable form of entity 
realism and the most reasonable form of ESR are actually the same doctrine, 
which he calls “semirealism”. Entity realism (see, for example, Hacking, 
1982) is realism with respect to the existence of unobservable entities 
postulated by successful scientific theories, such as electrons, but 
agnosticism with regard to the truth of the theories themselves (and even the 
approximate truth of the theories, otherwise the position would collapse into 
conventional realism). The pessimistic induction suggests an objection to 
this view: there are a number of theoretical entities, such as ether and 
phlogiston, which have been postulated by successful scientific theories, but 
since entirely rejected. However, this objection is not considered further 
here. An objection to the view that is considered further is that it appears to 
be nonsense to say that one is a realist about electrons but one doubts that 
our theories about electrons are even approximately true, i.e. that one doubts 
that electrons are anything like our theories tell us: it is absurd to say that 
you believe in electrons but think that our theories about them might be so 
completely wrong that electrons might be dog-like mammals found in 
Australia, for example. 1
On the other hand there must be some room for disagreement over 
what properties electrons have, otherwise all theoretical claims (other than 
existential claims) about electrons become analytically true: if, by definition, 
electrons have all the properties that our theories ascribe to them then by 
definition they have a charge of 1.60217646 x 10' 19 C and the claim that
1 Moreover, as Psillos (1999, pp. 255-258) points out, our belief in theoretical entities is 
(according to many entity realists) supposed to be based on our ability to manipulate them 
but it is clear that a physicist only believes that he is manipulating electrons (for example) 
because he accepts that certain theories about electrons are (at least approximately) true.
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“electrons have a charge of 1.60217646 x 1 0 * 19 C” is as incontestable as the 
claim that, “all bachelors are unmarried”. This seems wrong. Suppose we 
discover that there are no particles exactly like the ones described by our 
theory o f electrons but that there is a species o f particle that is like the one 
described by our theory of electrons except that it has a charge of 
1.60217645 x 10' 19 C. Surely, what we discover is not that there are no 
electrons but that our theory of electrons is (slightly) wrong: that the claim 
that “electrons have a charge o f 1.60217646 x 10’ 19 C” is false. Chakravartty 
(1998, p. 394) makes this point in a rather different way: he points out that it 
is possible to argue with the president of the flat earth society, which implies 
that his hypothesis is not analytically nonsense.
This suggests that objects have some properties essentially 
(“essentially” here is not used in a thick metaphysical sense, but in the sense 
of “by definition”: in the sense in which it is used in the claim that bachelors 
are essentially unmarried) and others accidentally and that whilst it is 
possible that objects do not have the accidental properties that our theories 
ascribe to them it is not possible that they do not have the essential 
properties ascribed to them (although it is possible that the purported 
objects don’t exist): anything lacking the essential properties of an electron 
(for example) just isn’t an electron. If one accepts this, then the entity realist 
cannot be a complete agnostic about scientific theories. He must accept that 
our theories about electrons at least ascribe to electrons the right essential 
properties.
On the face of it, this is not much of a concession: it seems that the 
entity realist is really only agreeing to use words in the way that our theories 
(implicitly) define them (for example, he agrees to refrain from calling an 
object an electron unless it is a negatively charged micro-particle) and that 
he remains sceptical about the substantial claims that our theories make 
about these entities. However, this appearance is deceptive, because
2 Or some variant of this view, perhaps the view that objects must (by definition) have a 
weighted most o f the properties that our theories ascribe to them.
3 Or that whilst it is possible that objects do not have all the properties that our theories 
ascribe to them, it is not possible that they do not have a weighted most o f the properties 
that our theories ascribe to them.
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although the entity realist is sceptical about our theories’ attributions of 
accidental properties to entities he already agrees that our theories are right 
to make the claim that these entities exist. In itself each claim that the entity 
realist concedes to the conventional realist might be taken to be fairly 
vacuous, but taken together they are certainly substantial: the claim that 
electrons exist is nearly vacuous {if one believes that electrons might have or 
lack any property) and the claim that electrons must, by definition, have 
certain properties is completely vacuous {if one is not committed to the 
existence or non-existence of electrons) but the combination o f these claims, 
the claim that electrons exist and (by definition) have certain properties is 
substantial.
This is essentially the brand of realism that Chakravartty calls 
entity realism: realism with regard to the existence of theoretical entities and 
with regard to the truth o f the theories describing these entities, but only in 
so far as they describe their essential properties. However, Chakravartty 
gives the doctrine a twist. Rather than leaving the potentially problematic 
essential/accidental distinction a primitive he defines it as co-extensive with 
(or perhaps replaces it with) a distinction he draws between “detection 
properties” and “auxiliary properties”:
let us thus define detection properties as those upon which 
the causal regularities of our detectors depend, or in virtue 
of which these regularities are manifested. Auxiliary 
properties, then, are those associated with the object under 
consideration, but not essential (in the sense that we do not 
appeal to them) in establishing existence claims. 
Attributions of auxiliary properties function to supplement 
our descriptions, helping to fill out our conceptual pictures 
of objects under investigation. Theories enumerate both 
detection and auxiliary properties o f entities, but only the 
former are tied to perceptual experience. (Chakravartty,
1998, pp. 394-395, original emphasis)
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It will be argued shortly that the distinction between detection and auxiliary 
properties, as drawn here, cannot be made independently of the theories that 
we believe to be true and that this undermines Chakravartty’s project, but 
first Chakravartty’s approach to ESR will be examined.
2. Chakravartty on ESR
One might formulate a version o f ESR in which the Ramsey-sentence is 
formed by Ramseyfying predicates referring to auxiliary properties, but this 
is not Chakravartty’s approach to ESR. He proposes (what he calls) a form 
of ESR that is very different from those discussed in the main body of this 
thesis. He agrees with Worrall that what is preserved through theory change 
(and what we should be realists about) are structures, but he disagrees with 
the ESRist in two important respects: (i) he argues that preserved structures 
are not preserved partially reinterpreted but retain all o f the same (minimal) 
interpretation, (ii) he does not think that the entirety of a theory’s structure is 
typically (even approximately) preserved, but only the parts of a theory’s 
structure involving detection properties.4
We may contrast his position with “normal” ESR as follows: while 
the normal ESRist believes in the Ramseyfied version of the sentence 
expressing the theory, Chakravartty believes in part of the unRamseyfied 
sentence expressing the theory. In particular, he believes in the part that 
deals with detection properties, but he does not believe in (even a 
Ramseyfied form of) the part that deals with auxiliary properties. This is 
very different to conventional ESR. However, given this understanding of
4 Cf. “not all structures have to do with causal relations involving the detection properties 
of entities. Clearly we can imagine different kinds o f structures, such as ones linking 
auxiliary properties. But for the SRist [structural realist], such flights o f fancy are not 
particularly helpful, for not just any structure will do. SR requires stable structures— ones 
which are, in fact, likely to be preserved. Confidence in theoretical structures is achieved by 
means of their success in mirroring the phenomenal world, and structures which map 
phenomenal regularities are those composed of relations between detection properties.” 
(Chakravartty, 1998, p. 400, original emphasis)
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ESR, Chakravartty’s claim that ESR is equivalent to (Chakravartty’s 
understanding of) entity realism becomes plausible: both views advocate 
belief only in what our theories say about the essential (detection) properties 
o f entities. This is the view Chakravartty calls “semirealism”.
However, a caveat is in order. Although Chakravartty would deny 
that there are parts of retained structures that get completely reinterpreted he 
maintains only that each part of a retained structure keeps the same minimal 
interpretation. An example may clarify this matter. Recall the 
Fresnel/Maxwell equation discussed earlier:
R/I = tan(i-r)/tan(i+r)
As noted, Worrall argues that whereas both Fresnel and Maxwell kept the 
interpretation of the observables (i and r) the same (being the angles made 
by the incident and refracted beams with the normal to the boundary 
between the media) they offered completely different interpretations of the 
unobservables (I and R): Fresnel suggesting they represented amplitudes of 
vibration of the ether, Maxwell suggesting they represented amplitudes of 
vibration of a disembodied electromagnetic field. By contrast Chakravartty 
suggests that they offered the same minimal interpretation of all the terms in 
the equation: both minimally interpreted I and R as amplitudes o f vibration. 
In what sense, if  any, this can be regarded as a “minimal interpretation” is 
discussed in the next subsection.
3. An Objection to Semirealism
How can we tell whether a property is a detection property or an auxiliary 
property? According to Chakravartty:
In order to distinguish these properties we must turn to the 
equations with which we attempt to capture phenomenal 
regularities, and ask: what do these mathematical relations 
minimally demand\l] We must consider not what possible
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metaphysical pictures are consistent with these equations, 
but rather what kinds of property attributions are essential 
to their satisfaction -  i.e. consider not what is possible, but 
what is required. For only these properties are tied directly 
to the detections we employ so as to construct mappings of 
natural phenomena in terms of mathematical relations. 
(Chakravartty, 1998, p. 396, original emphasis)
In particular, Fresnel’s equations:
demand some kind of influence, propagated rectilinearly 
and resolvable into two components, oscillating at right 
angles to one another and to the direction o f the 
propagation. The property or properties of light in virtue of 
which such influences are realized are detection properties.
By way of contrast, consider an auxiliary property 
attributed to light by Fresnel’s optics: here we find not 
merely amplitudes, but amplitudinal displacements in an 
elastic solid medium. (Chakravartty, 1998, p. 396)
However it is hard to see in what sense Fresnel’s equations demand this 
interpretation. As pure mathematics they of course demand no 
interpretation. It would be reasonable to think that when Chakravartty asks 
what interpretation an equation demands, he means to ask what it demands 
in order to retain empirical adequacy. But the minimal interpretation 
required for Fresnel’s equations to retain empirically adequacy is far less 
than the one suggested: we need only interpret I and R as the square roots of 
the intensities o f the incident and reflected light beams respectively; 
empirical adequacy does not demand that we interpret I and R as amplitudes 
of vibration. Moreover, if  Chakravartty does mean by “demand”, “demand 
in order to retain empirical adequacy” then his position would collapse into 
instrumentalism (because, unlike the ESRist, he does not think that 
uninterpreted theoretical structure reveals anything about the world).
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Chakravartty must therefore mean something else by “demand”, but it is not 
clear what this might be.
Recall that Chakravartty defines detection properties as properties 
that are causally linked to our detectors (and auxiliary properties as 
properties that are not so linked). It seems that it must be impossible to 
distinguish these properties independently of the theories that we believe to 
be true: suppose Fresnel’s theory was true, and that light is a vibration in an 
all pervading elastic solid medium (the ether), then such vibrations are 
causally linked to our detections of light intensity, as surely as light is 
causally linked to our detections o f light intensity, because they are light! 
But in that case vibrations of the ether would be detection properties, by 
Chakravartty’s criteria.
This points to a serious problem for semirealism: scientists very 
rarely speculate about properties that would be causally redundant, if the 
theory in question was true (an exception may be Newton’s speculation that 
space is the sense organ of God) and so there are very few properties 
attributed to objects in scientific theories that can be deemed auxiliary (in 
Chakravartty’s sense) before we know that the theory in question is false. In 
that case, however, the semirealist’s advice to believe in what theories tell 
us about detection properties seems to come down to the following: believe 
completely in the theories that we believe to be true, and in other theories, in 
so far as they agree with the former.
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Theorem:
Given a domain with two classes of objects, A and B, and a language of 
second-order logic whose non-logical terms refer exclusively to objects in 
class A (or sets of objects in class A, or sets of tuples of objects in class A), 
it is impossible to create a definite description of an object in class B, if B 
contains more than one object.
A definite description of an object, ix(cp), contains a formula, (p, with one 
free variable, x, that is satisfied iff the object is assigned to x.
To prove the theorem it suffices to show that as long as there are at 
least two objects, bi and b2 , in class B then any formula, (p, that has one free 
variable, x, would be satisfied when bi is assigned to x iff it would be 
satisfied when b2 is assigned to x. This is equivalent to the claim that (p is 
satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff cp is satisfied by 
some g’ (such that g’[x] = b2) with some G’, where g and g’ are functions 
assigning individuals to individual variables, and G and G’ are functions 
assigning sets of appropriate tuples to predicate variables.
This claim follows from the claim that cp is satisfied by some g 
(such that g[x] = bj) with some G iff (p is satisfied by g’ with G’, where for 
all y:
[1] If g(y) = bi then g’(y) = b2 (so, in particular, g’(x) = b2)
[2] If g(y) = b2 then g’(y) = bi
[3] Otherwise g’(y) = g(y)
and G’(X) is the set o f tuples obtained from G(X) by replacing each
occurrence of b] in each tuple in G(X) with an occurrence of b2 and
replacing each occurrence of b2 in each tuple in G(X) with an occurrence of 
bj. Note, that (given 1, 2 and 3) this implies that ^ ’(yiX—gXyn^ e G ’(X) 
iff <g(yi),.--g(yn)> e G(X). This claim can be proved by mathematical
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induction (in the proof it is always assumed that g’ and G’ are obtained from 
g and G as indicated).
For the basis case, we need to prove that for any atomic formula, 
vj/, \j/ is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff \|/ is 
satisfied by g’ with G \ There are three cases to consider:
[1] \\f = X yi,.. .yn, where X is an n-place predicate variable:
[1] vj/ is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff
<g(yi).---g(yn)> e G(X).
(ii) This is the case iff ^ ’( y O v g ’fyn^ e G’(X) (by definition of G’).
(iii) This is the case iff vj/ is satisfied by g’ with G \
(iv) So vj/ is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff Vj/ is
satisfied by g’ with G \
[2] vj/ = Pyi,...yn, where g(yi) * bi or b2 for any i and P is an n-place 
predicate:
(i) vj/ is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff 
<g(yi),...g(yn)> e the extension of P.
(ii) This is the case iff ^ ’(y O v g X y n ^  e the extension of P (because g’ is 
such that g’[yi] = g[yi] for every i, as g[yi] *  bi or b2 for any i).
(iii) This is the case iff v|/ is satisfied by g’ with G \
(iv) So ij/ is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff vj/ is 
satisfied by g ’ with G \
[3] \j/ = Pyi,...yn, where g(yj) = bi or b2 for some i and P is an n-place 
predicate:
(i) vj/ is not satisfied by some (any) g (such that g[x] = bi) with some (any) G 
and vj/ is not satisfied by g’ with G ’ (because g and g’ both assign a member 
o f class B to the y\ such that g[yj] = bi or b2 , and by definition of the 
language no such object is in the extension of any predicate).
(ii) So vjj is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff vj/ is 
satisfied by g’ with G’.
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Induction Hypothesis: a  and (3 are formulae such that a  is satisfied by some 
g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff a  is satisfied by g’ with G’ and p is 
satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bj) with some G iff p is satisfied by g’ 
with G \
As is well known, the logical connectives can all be defined using only “- 1” 
and and the quantifiers are interdefmable. So there are four inductive 
cases to consider:
[l](p = - a :
[1] cp is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff a  is not 
satisfied by g with G (by the semantics of “->”).
(ii) This is the case iff a  is not satisfied by g’ with G’ (by the induction 
hypothesis).
(iii) This is the case iff cp is satisfied by g’ with G ’ (by the semantics of ““'”).
(iv) So cp is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff cp is 
satisfied by g’ with some G \
[2 ] cp = a  & P:
(i) cp is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff a  is 
satisfied by g with G and P is satisfied by g with G (by the semantics of 
“& ”).
(ii) This is the case iff a  is satisfied by g’ with G’ and p is satisfied by g’ 
with G’ (by the induction hypothesis).
(iii) This is the case iff cp is satisfied by g’ with G’ (by the semantics of 
“& ”).
(iv) So cp is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff cp is 
satisfied by g’ with G \
[3] cp = 3ya  (y ^  x, as x is free in cp):
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(i) cp is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff a  is 
satisfied by some y variant o f g, gy, with G (by the semantics o f “By”).
(ii) If this is the case then a  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) (i.e. 
gy) with some G (from (i) and the fact that g is a y variant o f itself).
(iii) This is the case iff a  is satisfied by g’ (the g’ formed from gy) with G’ 
(by the induction hypothesis).
(iv) If this is the case then cp is satisfied by g’ with G’ (by the semantics of
“By” and the fact that g’ is a y variant of itself).
(v) So if 9  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G then 9  is
satisfied by g’ with G’ (by (i) to (iv)).
(vi) 9  is satisfied by g’ with G’ (where g’ and G’ are formed from some 
arbitrary g [such that g(x) = bi] and G as indicated) iff a  is satisfied by some 
y variant of g \  g ,y, with G’ (by the semantics o f “By”).
(vii) This is the case iff a  is satisfied by g (where, for all z, if  g,y[z] = bi 
then g[z] = b2 , if g,y[z] = b2 then g[z] = bi and otherwise g[z] = g,y[z]) with 
G (the G from which the G’ in (vi) is formed) (because, the g’ formed from 
this g is the g’y used in (vi) and the G’ formed from this G is the G’ used in
(vi) so it follows from the induction hypothesis that a  is satisfied by this g ,y 
with this G’ iff a  is satisfied by this g with this G).
(viii) If this is the case then a  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bj) 
with some G.
(ix) If this is the case then 9  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bj) with 
some G (by the semantics of “By” and the fact that g is a y variant of itself).
(x) So if 9  is satisfied by g’ with G’ then 9  is satisfied by some g (such that 
g[x] = bi) with some G (by (vi) to (ix)).
(xi) So 9  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff 9  is 
satisfied by g’ with G’ (by (v) and (x)).
[4] 9  = BXoc:
(i) 9  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff a  is 
satisfied by g with some X variant of G, Gx (by the semantics of “3X”).
208
Appendix 2
(ii) If this is the case then a  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with
Y  y
some G (i.e. G ) (from (i) and the fact that G is an X variant o f itself).
(iii) This is the case iff a  is satisfied by g’ with G ’ (the G’ formed from Gx) 
(by the induction hypothesis).
(iv) If this is the case then cp is satisfied by g’ with G ’ (by the semantics of 
“E3X” and the fact that G’ is an X variant of itself).
(v) So if cp is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G then cp is
satisfied by g’ with G’ (by (i) to (iv)).
(vi) cp is satisfied by g’ with G’ (where g’ and G ’ are formed from some 
arbitrary g [such that g(x) = bi] and G as indicated) iff a  is satisfied by g’, 
with some X variant of G \  G,x (by the semantics o f “3X”).
(vii) This is the case iff a  is satisfied by g (the g used to form the g’
mentioned in (vi)) with G (where G is such that G[X] is the set of tuples 
obtained by replacing every occurrence of bi in a tuple in G’ [X] with an 
occurrence of \>2 and every occurrence of b2 in a tuple in G,x[X] with an 
occurrence of bj) (because, the g’ formed from this g is the g’ used in (vi) 
and the G’ formed from this G is the G,x used in (vi) so it follows from the 
induction hypothesis that a  is satisfied by this g’ with this G,x iff a  is 
satisfied by this g with this G).
(viii) If this is the case then a  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) 
with some G.
(ix) If this is the case then cp is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bj) with 
some G (by the semantics of “3X” and the fact that G ’ is an X variant of 
itself).
(x) So if cp is satisfied by g’ with G ’ then cp is satisfied by some g (such that 
g[x] = bj) with some G (by (vi) to (ix)).
(xi) So 9  is satisfied by some g (such that g[x] = bi) with some G iff cp is 
satisfied by g’ with G ’ (by (v) and (x)).
QED.
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